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Introduction
This year’s Historical Perspectives reflects the
varied interests and expertise of the Santa Clara
University History Department and its students.  The
topics chosen, though primarily modern, represent a
wide range of geographic areas and thematic pursuits.
Despite the diversity of topics, each author displays
proficiency in detailed research, critical analysis, and
intellectual excellence.  
This year’s entries highlight the limitations of
perception in accurately portraying history.  The first
four essays focus on cultural and historical icons, and
consider how public perception affected each
individual’s historic image.  By reexamining the lives
of these figures, the authors successfully shed new
light on each individual’s legacy, and provide valuable
contributions to the existing scholarship.  The
remaining four essays examine major historical events,
ranging from the early Crusades to the Rwandan
Genocide of 1994.  Not content to accept prevailing
attitudes, the authors look to reevaluate the relevant
facts and reach new conclusions.  These past events
are given new life and meaning through the fresh
perspective offered by the authors. 
All the Historical Prespective authors have
created pieces that view conventional history with a
critical eye.  In line with Santa Clara’s longstanding
tradition of academic distinction, these essays are
convincing, entertaining and impressive.  Although
many histories do more to muddle the record than
elucidate it, we hope that the readers will appreciate
these works as exemplars of historical precision and
outstanding scholarship.
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Kate Chopin, Unfiltered 1
Kate Chopin, Unfiltered:
Removing the Feminist Lens
Chelsea Zea
“The little glimpse of domestic harmony which
had been offered her, gave her no regret, no
longing. It was not a condition of life which
fitted her, and she could see in it but an appall-
ing and hopeless ennui.”
(The Awakening, Chapter XVIII)
In this brutally straightforward manner, Catherine
O’Flaherty Chopin introduced her middle-class protag-
onist of The Awakening, Edna Pontellier, to her aston-
ished readers in the 1890s.  Several of Chopin’s female
characters wonder if life beyond marriage and children
offers greater satisfactions.  Contemporary readers
naturally wonder how Chopin could have known then
about the social ills commonly recognized today in
troubled families and especially about their emotional
effects on women.  
Many feminist readers and scholars claim Chopin
as an early version of themselves.  This essay will
argue, instead, that Chopin’s outlook had little in
common with feminism as it is understood today.  Not
believing in political, social, and economic equality of
the sexes, none of the issues for which contemporary
feminists fight were of concern to her. Those aspects of
her life used to label her in this way, rather than
feminist in inspiration, are better suited to under-
standing her as a writer. Chopin used writing as both
a liberating and healing experience, a venue for self-
expression and exploration.  The very act of writing
gave her a sense of personal identity. Viewing Chopin
2 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      1Lynda S. Boren and Sara deSaussure Davis, eds., Kate
Chopin Reconsidered: Beyond the Bayous (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1992), 15.
      2 Bonnie Steppenoff, “Freedom and Regret: The Dilemma of
Kate Chopin,” Missouri Historical Review 81 (4 1987): 449.
      3Barbara C. Ewell, Kate Chopin (New York: Ungar Publishing
Group, 1986), 2.
simply as an author puts an entirely new perspective
on her life and reveals a fuller, more authentic
person—one that burst the limits of any label for her
outlook or her work.
Though Chopin died in 1904, it was not until 1932
that Daniel Rankin wrote her first biography. More
than thirty years would pass before the next one, by
Per Seyersted, appeared.1 Both of these biographers
felt that Chopin only had value as a regional author.
Chopin’s first woman biographer saw her differently. In
her 1972 dissertation, Peggy Dechert Skaggs was the
first to interpret The Awakening as “a feminist plea for
sexual freedom.”2 This description helped to revive
interest in Chopin’s work and that same year the novel
was reprinted in its entirety in Redbook magazine.3
But it is not surprising that The Awakening caught
readers’ attention at the time it did. Members of the
budding women’s liberation movement were fascinated
with a woman writing in 1899 who could sound so
current. Interest in Chopin spread through word of
mouth, and in the 1980s and 90s The Awakening was
assigned as required reading in many college and high
school classrooms. Today The Awakening is considered
one of the great American novels, and the interpreta-
tion of Chopin’s life through feminist criticism contin-
ues. The most recent biography, Unveiling Kate Chopin
(1999) by Emily Toth still ponders this seeming anom-
7
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      4Emily Toth, Unveiling Kate Chopin (Jackson, MI: U. Press of
Mississippi, 1999), 8.
      5 Boren and Davis, Kate Chopin Reconsidered, 22.
aly of a woman in terms of the feminist tones of her
writing. This paper differs from these authors because
it takes Chopin out of both the “local colorist” and
“feminist” contexts in which she has been placed and
identifies her in the way she identified herself: as a
writer. Connecting events from Chopin’s entire life to
her writing, as earlier biographers failed to do, and
removing her from a feminist context that Skaggs and
Toth put her in, serves to flesh out a very private
person.
Catherine O’Flaherty was born on 8 February 1850
in St. Louis, Missouri. She spent her very early years
with her family at home, but at the age of five her
parents sent her to board at St. Louis Academy of the
Sacred Heart. It was rare for a wealthy family to send
such young children to a boarding school, and the
reason the O’Flahertys did so is uncertain. Toth
suggests that Chopin’s mother, Eliza Faris O’Flaherty,
suspected her husband, Thomas, of having affairs with
slaves, and did not wish to answer the questions of an
inquisitive and precocious five-year-old.4 
Shortly after Chopin moved to the academy, she
suffered the first great tragedy of her life. As a St.
Louis dignitary, her father was eligible to participate in
the inaugural train ride over the Gasconade Bridge on
1 November 1855. When the bridge collapsed and ten
cars plunged into the ravine, Thomas O’Flaherty was
one of the thirty men killed.5 Because he left no will or
other instructions, Eliza immediately brought Chopin
back home. Eliza realized the increased control over
4 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      6Toth, Unveiling, 9.
      7Steppenoff, “Freedom and Regret,” 451.
      8Toth, Unveiling, 13.
      9Ibid.
her life she would have as a widow. “Widows controlled
their property, as wives did not; widows also had legal
control of their own children, as wives did not.”6
Thomas’ death meant that Chopin would have no
patriarchal influence until she was past adolescence.
Chopin would never witness marital violence or
fighting, money disputes, or any other negative aspects
of marital relations.  Suddenly finding herself a
wealthy woman and in charge of her own and her
family’s affairs, Eliza invited her grandmother, Ma-
dame Victoire Verdon Charleville, to live with the
O’Flaherty family and serve as Chopin’s teacher. 
Chopin’s great-grandmother would prove to be her
earliest source for “spicy” storytelling and French
culture.7 One of the greatest gifts Madame Charleville
passed on to her eager great-granddaughter was a love
for gossip and storytelling, especially about women.
Through her, Chopin discovered “a subject for intense,
lifelong fascination, contemplation and delight: the
lives of women.”8 
Madame Charleville taught Chopin piano, French,
reading, and writing.  These four interests would
remain with Chopin throughout her life and work their
way into her stories.  Chopin loved music and was
known for her ability to play any piece by ear.9 It was
a way to express her emotions, and several of her
characters share this trait—including Edna Pontellier
in The Awakening. Because she was “fervently commit-
9
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      10Emily Toth and Per Seyersted, eds., Kate Chopin’s Private
Papers (Indianapolis: Indiana State University Press, 1998), ix.
      11Toth, Unveiling, 13.
      12Ewell, Chopin, 7.
      13Toth and Seyersted, Private Papers, 2.
      14Emily Toth, ed., A Vocation and a Voice: Stories by Kate
Chopin (New York: Penguin Books, 1991), x.
ted to the life of the mind,”10 Madame Charleville
imbued in her great-granddaughter a love of reading
and writing and the belief that history was the stories
of women “torn between duty and desire,”11 a classic
French literary theme.  This premise permeates much
of Chopin’s writing. She was influenced not only by her
great-grandmother but her mother’s example as
well—Eliza had married her philandering husband out
of necessity, with unfortunate consequences. Other
beliefs Madame Charleville passed on to Chopin
included the idea that marriage was meant to be a
practical arrangement, with romantic love to follow
later; that God alone may judge the actions of others;12
and perhaps most importantly, that life must be faced
“clearly and fearlessly.”13 This last injunction would get
Chopin through the difficult periods of her life, includ-
ing the death of her beloved great-grandmother. 
After Madame Charleville passed away in 1863,
Chopin returned to the Sacred Heart Academy, a
school staffed by French nuns, who espoused teach-
ings similar to those that she had learned from her
great-grandmother. It was there that Chopin first
found encouragement to write for her own pleasure.
She excelled in her studies and was “acclaimed for her
essays and story telling.”14
The school raised well-rounded students “in the
tradition of French intellectual women,” with a curric-
6 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      15Toth, Unveiling, 15, 36.
ulum for the older girls dedicated to creating “intelli-
gent, active, unselfish women, with minds and hands
trained for the sphere in which God has placed them,
whether it be home-life or some wider social field,” as
expressed in the school’s prospectus.15 The last phrase
is extraordinary in that the Sacred Heart nuns gave
their students options beyond matrimony and chil-
dren. 
At Sacred Heart, Chopin met her lifelong friend
Kitty Garesché. Kitty would become a subject for
Chopin’s future writing. The two were best friends and
spent all of their time together, talking, reading, and
climbing trees. They resembled each other in many
ways, including their aristocratic French ancestry.
With her unconventional family life, it is no surprise
that Chopin liked to spend time with the Garesché
family, which followed traditional patriarchal mores.
Kitty’s father ran the household, and in spending time
with them, Chopin discovered the family life of most
American girls her age.  Chopin would use contrasting
versions of the family unit in many of her stories.
Chopin also developed her love of gossip through her
friendship with Kitty.
During her early years at Sacred Heart, Chopin
kept a small autograph book entitled “Leaves of Affec-
tion,” in which her friends copied down favorite poems
and quotes. Most of these had to do with romance.
However, Chopin added at a later date (distinguished
by different types of handwriting) certain phrases that
indicated her growth as both an interpreter of poetry
and as a writer. Next to several of the poems are notes
such as “very pretty but where’s the point?” and
11
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“foolishness.” 16 The important aspect of “Leaves of
Affection” is that it represented Chopin’s first attempts
at self-expression in writing and that it showed how
important she deemed feminine friendship to be. That
she saved this little book of misquoted, “foolish” poetry
for her whole life illustrates its value to her.
At the outbreak of the Civil War, Chopin was
removed from school. As a result of a traumatic
experience with Union soldiers, Chopin experienced
what psychologists now refer to as a “loss of voice,” a
common occurrence among adolescent females. A “loss
of voice” is not only a refusal to talk but also a sign of
trauma that may include depression, insecurity, and
a desire for solitude.  To make matters worse the
Garesché family had left St. Louis because Kitty’s
father refused to take the Union oath of allegiance.
Chopin might never have recovered—certainly not as
quickly—had a teacher at Sacred Heart not intervened.
To encourage her talent in writing, Mother Mary
O’Meara assigned Chopin to keep a “Commonplace
Book,” where Chopin would copy down passages from
books she read or whatever else caught her attention.17
The very first passage in Chopin’s “Commonplace
Book” is an excerpt from Bulwer’s “My Novel.” Chopin
copied the author’s opinions on writing:
When we look back upon human records, how
the eye settles upon Writers as the main land
marks of the past! …And yet, strange to say,
when these authors are living amongst us, they
8 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      18Ibid., 13-4.
      19Ewell, Chopin, 6.
occupy a very small portion of our thoughts….18
Chopin, at the age of seventeen, may already have
been thinking of what it meant to be an author.
Subsequent copied passages include excerpts from
Macaulay, Longfellow, Goethe, Hugo, and various
definitions and paragraphs describing contemporary
world leaders. Each of the authors she so copied was
a romantic, revealing Chopin’s specific interests at the
time. The Commonplace Book also contains her first
recorded original poem, called “The Congé,” which
highlighted her originality and ability for introspection.
Some of the choices Chopin made in her recordings
also reveal an attraction to realism and a disdain for
bombastic writing styles—foreshadowing her later love
of French author Guy de Maupassant.  She also
exhibited her interest in the French language. Several
of the passages she chose to copy were in the original
French. Significantly, there is scarcely anything in the
book that directly correlates to women’s rights. After
her graduation from Sacred Heart, Chopin would use
this book as her diary and travel journal for her
honeymoon. Because Kitty, her personal confidante,
was absent during this time, Chopin filled her Com-
monplace Book with pieces that reflected feelings she
could not otherwise confide.  But it was also during
this time that she began growing closer to her mother.
A descendant of two of St. Louis’ oldest and most
respected Creole families,19 her mother presented a
unique picture of marriage to Chopin. Eliza’s father
had died when she was sixteen, leaving a large family
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in need of support. As she was the oldest and their
mother was ill, it fell to her to find a solution to their
financial straits. The most obvious option was mar-
riage, but she still needed a good match. Thomas
O’Flaherty was more than twice her age and an immi-
grant from County Galway, Ireland, both conditions
that normally would have eliminated him as a suitable
husband—but he had money. O’Flaherty’s first wife
had just died, leaving him with a young son.  Marrying
Eliza would give him prestige in St. Louis unavailable
to him elsewhere, and she would find the support she
needed for her family.  This arrangement showed
Chopin one type of marital calculation. She had a
firsthand view of an unromantic, economic marriage.
It also gave Chopin a subject for her writing. Her
stories show many mother-like figures, all given
positions of importance.  Near the conclusion of The
Awakening, Edna chooses to care for her maternalistic
friend rather than heed the request of her husband to
return home. This may indicate Chopin’s own feelings
about her mother; for like Edna, Chopin would leave
her own husband at home for long periods of time to
tend to her mother in St. Louis. Eliza was to prove the
only constant source of comfort throughout Chopin’s
life. 
Chopin’s relationships with her great-grandmother,
the teachers at Sacred Heart, Kitty Garesché, and her
mother are used by scholars to show her feminist
roots.  Though these relationships were extremely
important to Chopin’s growth as a young woman, to
turn them into the foundation for a purported femi-
nism narrows their signficance for her. These bonds
contributed above all to her development as a writer.
After the Civil War, Eliza moved her family to a new
10 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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house filled with relatives. The move also allowed
Chopin to witness other marriages and families first-
hand. Eliza’s sisters, Amanda McAllister and Zuma
Tatum, lived in the new house with their husbands
and children. Suddenly, Chopin, who had just reached
puberty, no longer resided in “a women’s household.
…Roger McAllister…was the kind of man who came
home at night, and commanded family meals.”20
Chopin examined closely the practical marriage of her
Aunt Amanda and the romantic one of her Aunt Zuma.
She witnessed how an impetuous marriage like the
Tatums’ might start out beautifully but could just as
easily and abruptly end in sadness. The uneventful,
but solid foundations of the McAllister family were also
not lost on Chopin. Both women were in their early
thirties when Chopin first moved into their crowded
home, which is the age she would give to the discon-
tented wives appearing in her fiction.21 Her aunts
represented the two types of wives that Chopin por-
trayed in her writing.
Upon her graduation, Chopin planned to make her
debut into society. But this was not foremost on
Chopin’s mind because even more exciting for her was
the fact that after a five-year absence, Kitty Garesché
and her family had returned to St. Louis. The two had
kept their friendship alive through correspondence and
had planned to make their social debut together. Then
another tragedy struck—this time, it was Kitty’s father
who died.  Instead of celebrating her entrance into
adulthood, Kitty would pass her first year after gradu-
ation in mourning. Chopin would once again be alone.
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But, unlike Kitty’s departure the first time, Chopin was
better equipped to face the world unaccompanied now.
As an intelligent and guileless young woman,
Chopin was “already fast acquiring that knowledge of
human nature which her stories show. …She was a bit
too smart, or too forthright, for high society.”22 Chopin
confided in her Commonplace Book that she detested
all the balls that she had to attend and the artificial
people she met there. She wrote:
there is no escaping—I dance with people I
despise. …I am diametrically opposed to parties
and balls…I had a way in conversation of dis-
c o v e r i n g a  p e rs o n s  c h ar a c t e ri s -
tics—opinions—and private feelings—while they
no more about me at the end than they knew at
the beginning of the conversation.23
This method of entertaining herself during other-
wise tedious events would no doubt serve her later as
a writer. Without even trying, Chopin would become
quite popular because she knew how to talk to people.
She had acquired a reputation for cleverness, which in
that era was not necessarily a compliment. A clever
woman meant one who was neither afraid to speak her
mind, nor afraid show her intelligence.24 Chopin’s
unwillingness to hide the fact that she could think for
herself may have gotten her into trouble.
In 1869 Chopin met and fell in love with her future
husband: Aurelius Roselius Oscar Chopin, a hand-
12 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      25Toth and Seyersted, Private Papers, 99.
      26Toth, Unveiling, 56.
      27Ibid., 63.
      28Daniel Rankin, Kate Chopin and her Creole Stories (1932):
84, quoted in Boren and Davis, Reconsidered, 29.
      29Toth, Unveiling, 63.
      30Ibid., 63-4.
some Frenchman from Louisiana. She never mentions
his name in her diary, but writes that she had found
the “right man”25 for her. In the diary entries very early
in the marriage, she does seem happy, if a bit sub-
dued. Possibly, this was because she realized “she
would now be, forever, defined as a wife, and take her
assigned, and much more narrowly defined, place in a
patriarchal world. She was now, as she wrote, ‘Mrs.
Chopin and not Miss Katy.’”26
Oscar had been born in 1844 to a wealthy, aristo-
cratic French family. His father, Dr. Victor Jean
Baptiste Chopin, was an abusive, “angry, unregenerate
Frenchman who loathed everything ‘American.’”27 The
only thing American of which he expressed approval
was money. “One of his determinations was not to
marry unless he could have a wife of genuine French
lineage,”28 and so he selected Oscar’s mother, Julie
Benoist, a Creole heiress who had had both the
required pedigree as well as a large plot of land.29  As
the master of the plantation, Dr. Chopin soon gained
notoriety for his cruelty to his slaves and to his wife. It
was his opinion, based in the Napoleonic Code of his
homeland, that his wife and slaves were simply crea-
tures he possessed.30 After bearing five children, Julie
finally had had enough, and escaped from her hus-
band for a period of several years—most likely with the
help of Oscar, her eldest son.
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Luckily, Oscar did not inherit any of his father’s
blatantly abusive tendencies, although he may have
been a user of women, having had several affairs while
he was abroad. He had spent the Civil War years in
France, going to school and romancing all types
women. “Oscar claimed to dislike aristocratic women
(‘prudes’) and to prefer ‘working girls’ with their ‘noisy
and natural laughter and their bold looks.’”31 It may
have been that he was too busy chasing women to
study—he failed his baccalauréat exam, which made
him ineligible to graduate. Upon his return to the
United States, Oscar proved to be the perfect match for
Chopin, partly because their similar backgrounds gave
them compatible outlooks on life. “Oscar evidently had
truly French values—for he appreciated not only the
beauty of young women, but also their intellectual
agility.”32 Chopin chose Oscar because he allowed her
to think, unlike the other men who courted her.  He
was not intimidated by the fact that she was clever; in
fact, he appreciated this about her. In this way they
were fairly unconventional, but not surprisingly
perhaps, since they each had had an unusual child-
hood.
Chopin and Oscar were married in June 1870.
Setting off on a three-month honeymoon in Europe,
Chopin took her Commonplace Book with her and
recorded everything that she found interesting. Her
journal entries were like a writer’s exercise—she was
developing a personal style, a voice, and her own
techniques.  Her ability to “draw” people and places
with words remained her greatest strength through the
14 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      33Ibid., 58.
      34Ewell, Chopin, 11.
      35Toth and Seyersted, Private Papers, 114.
following years, a talent that first became evident
during her honeymoon. She also continued to dislike
all that was phony in people: “The new Mrs. Chopin
liked to record colorful events, and especially things
that were pompous, ridiculous, or venal.”33 Her pen-
chant for authentic behavior and real people had
followed her to Europe. One Chopin biographer is
surprised that her honeymoon diary “discloses more
about her itinerary than about herself,”34 but this facet
of her journal is actually very revealing of Chopin’s
character. It was more important for her as a writer to
focus on her surroundings on her honeymoon than on
herself and how she felt.
During her honeymoon, Chopin showed early signs
of her later independence as a married woman. She
did not spend all her time with Oscar; she even went
out alone one day to row a boat, for which she congrat-
ulated herself: “I find myself handling the oars quite
like an expert. Oscar took a nap in the afternoon and
I took a walk alone. How very far I did go.”35 Chopin
also developed a fondness for smoking while in Eu-
rope, a habit that would get her in trouble when she
returned to the United States. From the evidence
presented in her journal, it is not apparent that
Chopin would have the experience to write about
unhappy marriages. But she had had so much experi-
ence within her own family, and now stories about
Oscar’s, that it did not matter that her own marriage
was a happy one. She had a talent for empathizing,
and used this to her advantage when writing. “With
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Oscar, she was learning about the men’s world that
had been mostly invisible while she was growing up,
and that knowledge helped her to develop a certain
empathy with men, and especially with boys.”36 Oscar
was good for her because he taught her that men too
could offer friendship.
Chopin continued to assert her independence when
the couple returned home from Europe. They moved to
New Orleans, where Oscar worked as a cotton mer-
chant. Though she did not feel it immediately, living in
the city gave Chopin her first experience as an out-
sider. Even in Europe, she had felt socially at ease
because she had her husband for company and
because they had met friends, old and new, along the
way.  But “the new Madame Chopin was a thorough
outsider in the eyes of Oscar’s family. …They regarded
her with great suspicion and disapproval.”37 Chopin
did not like most of her husband’s family. She amused
him by mocking and imitating them with great delight,
and Oscar would only laugh—he liked her sense of
humor.38 Because his relatives lived in the country,
Chopin was sheltered from their opinions while in New
Orleans. Oscar also protected his wife. He “was a rare
man who preferred an original woman, one who was
neither quiet nor stay-at-home.”39 So for the time
being, Chopin did not know how odd her habit of
taking long walks seemed to her new relatives. Nor did
she realize how they viewed her un-ladylike smoking.
While in New Orleans, she lived her life the way she
16 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      40Ibid., 70.
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wanted it, which involved frequent trips to visit her
mother in St. Louis. The normal expectation of the era
was that she would remain at home with her husband.
When the delivery date for her first child approached,
her mother, on whom she continued to rely, came to
New Orleans to help. 
When Chopin became a mother herself, she “en-
tered a new phase of her life with joy and doubt and
fear, emotions she describes over and over in her
fiction.”40 She pondered how the presence of a child
cramped a mother’s space and stole her solitude.
Chopin loved privacy. She almost always used the
word “solitude” in a positive context, so her apprecia-
tion of time alone must only have increased as her
family grew. In the fall of 1879, Chopin was expecting
her sixth child and on the cusp of another life altering
change of residence. After several years of poor cotton
harvests, the family could no longer afford to live in
New Orleans, and so retreated to Oscar’s family farm
in the small village of Cloutierville.  Chopin’s adjust-
ment to small-town living would not be easy.
Now Chopin lived among the family members whom
she had loved to ridicule. For the first time in her life,
she had no other women to support her. The only
friend she had in Cloutierville was Oscar, and he was
often away. She was a big-city woman stuck in a small
town, and whatever she did to console herself scandal-
ized the local gossips. Though she had some blood
relations among Cloutierville residents, “anyone not
born and raised in Cloutierville would always be a
foreigner, an…‘étrangère.’”41
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Chopin tried at first to fit in. She and Oscar began
attending church regularly and “did conform to Catho-
lic expectations,”42 even giving her sixth child a saint’s
name. Presenting herself as a good Catholic, and a
French one at that, should have been enough to get
Chopin into the good graces of the people of
Cloutierville. It might have worked had she not in-
sisted on wearing her fashionable city clothes, often a
becoming purple, or taking her long walks, or riding
horses, or smoking Cuban cigarettes. Some scholars
describe Chopin’s eccentric behavior as the result of
her feminist upbringing—she did what she wanted
because she was strong and independent. But this
only partially explains her actions. She did such
seemingly odd things at first because she really did not
know any better. Having spent her entire life in big
cities, she failed to grasp what kind of statement her
clothes and habits made. People of the area
“measure[ed] a woman’s worth by her devotion to
family, her self-abnegation, and her graciousness and
charm in performing her social duties,”43 while Chopin
gauged people’s worth by how genuine she judged
them to be. Though she did care for her family deeply,
Chopin had never believed in self-denial for its own
sake. The only thing she had to amuse herself was her
reading. Among the more challenging authors she read
were Charles Darwin, Thomas Huxley, and Herbert
Spencer, but the only person with whom she could
discuss them was her husband. Reading Darwin was
18 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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a form of intellectual escape—another thing Chopin
did not share with her in-laws.
However difficult her life in Cloutierville, nothing
equaled the tragedy that befell her in 1882. Oscar fell
severely ill with what the doctors called “swamp fever”
and died on December 10—not due to the illness, but
to an overdose of quinine.44 Chopin had to rely on her
mother Eliza’s example after her father’s death. But
the gravity of the situation exceeded what her mother
had to face: not only was she a single mother of six
young children, but Oscar had left huge debts—more
than $12,000. Widows of that era had two options
when dealing with debt: either to remarry and let the
new husband handle the money, or else to ask a male
relative to handle finances for her.  Because she had
been around husbandless women all her life, Chopin
took a different route. She assumed responsibility for
her husband’s finances, and even for managing their
general store in Cloutierville. She sold some land and
called in debts owing to Oscar, thereby making herself
even less popular in the town. 
She did not act entirely alone.  Chopin became
friendly with a man from town by the name of Albert
Sampite.  They had known each other before Oscar’s
death, and after began seeing each other frequently.45
Conducting an affair with someone so soon after her
husband’s death would have scandalous enough, but
to compound problems, Sampite was married. Chopin
later vented her frustration over the affair in her
writing. Both Sampite and his wife, Loca, would
become characters in Chopin’s fiction. Albert turned
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into Alceé, a name Chopin used in several stories. Loca
became Loka, an ugly and unredeeming character. Her
Alceé characters were always the same: handsome,
rugged, and sensual.  Despite some fond memories of
Sampite, she ended up leaving Cloutierville. Respond-
ing to her mother’s pleas to return home to St. Louis
to be with her family, Chopin also knew that St. Louis
had the best public schools in the nation. When
decisions involved her children, their best interests
always guided her. She spent the remainder of her life
with her family and friends in St. Louis; perhaps owing
to her unhappy affair with Sampite, she never remar-
ried.
After paying off Oscar’s debts, Chopin no longer
worried about money. She could live off the revenues
of the land they owned in Louisiana. She spent her
time caring for her mother and her children, until in
1885 her mother died of cancer, leaving her “literally
prostate with grief.”46 She never quite recovered from
the great tragedies of her life, according to her daugh-
ter: “I think the tragic death of her father early in her
life, of her much loved brother, the loss of her young
husband and her mother, left a stamp of sadness on
her which was never lost.”47 She needed some distrac-
tion to see her through her grief, however. Writing, a
passion she had cultivated for years, came to her
rescue. Once back in St. Louis and settled into a
familiar setting, among people who had not witnessed
20 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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her troubles in Cloutierville,48 Chopin began to write.
In January 1889, she published her first literary
work, the poem “If It Might Be,” in America magazine.
In December 1889, nearly a year later, she finally sold
a short story, “Wiser than a God,” to Philadelphia
Musical Journal. She then began behaving like a
professional writer, following a certain routine each
day. She even had her own writing studio. Her per-
sonal journals from this era are account books,
recording each sale she made. Chopin quickly found
that writing was more therapeutic than profitable, and
she worked out many of her past difficulties through
her stories. Her father and husband’s deaths reappear
in “The Story of an Hour” as she pondered what it
meant to be a widow. Still unsure of her own position
no doubt, Chopin wrote about a woman who has a
weak heart and dies from the emotional turmoil
caused by the death of her husband.  Chopin realized
that her freedom came at a price. Writing helped her
overcome its obstacles.
Unfortunately, Chopin soon became disenchanted
with her stories. She wanted something to distinguish
herself from other authors—she did not want to
become the pretentious sort of writer that she so
thoroughly detested. It was then she discovered the
French author Guy de Maupassant and his novels.
Captivated by his style, she admitted to a literary
revelation: “I read his stories and marvelled at them.
Here was life, not fiction; for where were the plots, the
old fashioned mechanism and stage trapping that in a
vague, unthinking way I had fancied were essential to
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the art of story making.”49 Furthermore, Maupassant
wrote about topics that interested her, like insanity,
adultery, and suicide—hardly the sort of subjects
stocked in the local public library. American writers
avoided such topics, but Chopin intended to change
that. What she especially liked in the French author
was his refusal to judge his characters’ morals, telling
“stories the way she wanted to…with a clear-eyed and
unsentimental focus on reality.”50 She learned from
him to use clear prose and telling details. Because of
him, Chopin found she could write about genuine,
authentic people she met in her real life. She even
adapted Maupassant’s signature surprise ending for
her own purposes.51
As Chopin grew more confident in her writing, she
also learned how to market herself. Unable to find a
distributor for her first novel, At Fault, she published
it herself. When a reviewer made a mistake in review-
ing the contents of her novel, she was not above
writing to admonish him. Bayou Folk, a collection of
short stories, appeared in 1894 and received warm
praise. Critics called it “charming,” “fresh,” and
“glowing with intensity.”52 A Night in Acadie, Chopin’s
second collection, appeared in 1897 and received
similar praise—her style is even described as “deli-
cious.”53 Her remarkable usage of the Creole dialect
and the imagery of the foreign bayou landscape earned
22 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      54“Mrs. Kate Chopin, Author of Bayou Folk,” Current
Literature (1888-1912), XVI (Aug. 1894), 106.
      55Emily Toth, “Kate Chopin’s Secret, Slippery Life Story,” The
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      56Springer, Wharton and Chopin, 182-4.
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the most laudatory comments.54 People loved her
stories. They looked into a fairy-tale land and felt they
knew what it was about. So when The Awakening
appeared in 1899, written in the harshly realistic style
of Maupassant, the public was shocked. To her dis-
may, her most ambitious work met more surprise and
disapproval than admiration. 
Critics called The Awakening “gilded dirt.” Though
they still approved of Chopin’s writing techniques, they
no longer cared for her subject matter. She had not
intended to convey anything world-shattering, but
something more subtle:  “a rarely expressed truth that
Kate Chopin knew: that in many women’s lives,
including her own, ambition is a bigger secret, and a
greater spur, than adultery.”55 Critics condemned the
work as “morbid,” a “story not worth telling,” “brilliant
but unwholesome,” and “totally unjustifiable.”56
Though disappointed by the reviews and sales of the
book, Chopin kept writing. Unfortunately, her pub-
lisher canceled her forthcoming book, A Vocation and
a Voice, without explanation. No magazines would
accept her stories for publication. Despite her continu-
ing efforts, the only work she managed to get pub-
lished was very conventional.57
Perhaps what kept her going despite this rejection
was the fact that, even if critics hated her new style,
she had an effect on real women. She received letters
from fans, telling her what a difference she had made
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in their lives.  She was invited to speak at a women’s
club luncheon in St. Louis, where she received con-
gratulations on her work.  Despite this encourage-
ment, her ambition began to decline. She concentrated
on taking care of sick relatives, until she suffered a
cerebral hemorrhage and died in 1904.
However misguided their interpretation of her
motives as a writer, Chopin’s feminist admirers are
owed a debt of gratitude. Without their attraction to
her work, Chopin might have remained undiscovered
by a public not interested in regional authors. But it
does a disservice to the complex and many faceted
forces that shaped this unconventional woman and
author to see her only through the feminist lens of
modern scholars. Chopin exhibited in 1899 what we
would call a feminist consciousness today, not because
of some kind of precognition, but rather owing to her
unique life experiences. Although it was the feminist
label that rescued Chopin from obscurity, that same
label threatens to relegate her to the ghetto of “feminist
authors.”  Chopin took what she saw around her:
powerful women, a rich French heritage, and Catholic
and Creole influences, and transformed all those forces
into stories that remain powerful and timeless.  To
pigeonhole her as “feminist” is to miss the profound
and universal themes of her work, and to diminish the
uniqueness and complexity of her circumstances and
her outlook.
24 Historical Perspectives March 2005
The Many Leni Riefenstahls:
Inventing a Cinematic Legend
Ashley Bunnell Ritchie
Leni Riefenstahl, an aspiring German actress
turned director/producer is best known for her re-
markable skills in directing documentary films for
Adolph Hitler before World War II. After the war, her
success as a director faltered as the public and the
film community shunned her for her involvement
with the Nazi regime. Many of those attending or
watching the 2003 Academy Awards, where
Riefenstahl was honored as one of the greatest film-
makers of her time, failed to understand how the
Academy could honor a woman who had been so
heavily involved with Hitler. The anger some ex-
pressed raises the issue of how people need to re-
member Leni Riefenstahl. There was little doubt
about her genius as a filmmaker, but the contro-
versy focused on whether or not she deserved to be
recognized by the Academy given her notorious past.
Some interpreted her recognition as an insult to
public opinion since, in their view, her artistic de-
mise after World War II was a punishment adminis-
tered by a public outraged at her Nazi sympathy.
Yet, the enigma of her career before and after the
War remains. 
Who was the real Leni Riefenstahl? Was she a
Nazi collaborator or an unassuming victim? Was she
a naive film genius who did not foresee the conse-
quences of her actions or an ambitious woman who
did not mind sweeping her morals under the carpet
for success? Was she really a cinematic genius?
Would she have continued to create masterpieces
29
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 10 2005
Published by Scholar Commons, 2005
Kate Chopin, Unfiltered 23
in their lives.  She was invited to speak at a women’s
club luncheon in St. Louis, where she received con-
gratulations on her work.  Despite this encourage-
ment, her ambition began to decline. She concentrated
on taking care of sick relatives, until she suffered a
cerebral hemorrhage and died in 1904.
However misguided their interpretation of her
motives as a writer, Chopin’s feminist admirers are
owed a debt of gratitude. Without their attraction to
her work, Chopin might have remained undiscovered
by a public not interested in regional authors. But it
does a disservice to the complex and many faceted
forces that shaped this unconventional woman and
author to see her only through the feminist lens of
modern scholars. Chopin exhibited in 1899 what we
would call a feminist consciousness today, not because
of some kind of precognition, but rather owing to her
unique life experiences. Although it was the feminist
label that rescued Chopin from obscurity, that same
label threatens to relegate her to the ghetto of “feminist
authors.”  Chopin took what she saw around her:
powerful women, a rich French heritage, and Catholic
and Creole influences, and transformed all those forces
into stories that remain powerful and timeless.  To
pigeonhole her as “feminist” is to miss the profound
and universal themes of her work, and to diminish the
uniqueness and complexity of her circumstances and
her outlook.
24 Historical Perspectives March 2005
The Many Leni Riefenstahls:
Inventing a Cinematic Legend
Ashley Bunnell Ritchie
Leni Riefenstahl, an aspiring German actress
turned director/producer is best known for her re-
markable skills in directing documentary films for
Adolph Hitler before World War II. After the war, her
success as a director faltered as the public and the
film community shunned her for her involvement
with the Nazi regime. Many of those attending or
watching the 2003 Academy Awards, where
Riefenstahl was honored as one of the greatest film-
makers of her time, failed to understand how the
Academy could honor a woman who had been so
heavily involved with Hitler. The anger some ex-
pressed raises the issue of how people need to re-
member Leni Riefenstahl. There was little doubt
about her genius as a filmmaker, but the contro-
versy focused on whether or not she deserved to be
recognized by the Academy given her notorious past.
Some interpreted her recognition as an insult to
public opinion since, in their view, her artistic de-
mise after World War II was a punishment adminis-
tered by a public outraged at her Nazi sympathy.
Yet, the enigma of her career before and after the
War remains. 
Who was the real Leni Riefenstahl? Was she a
Nazi collaborator or an unassuming victim? Was she
a naive film genius who did not foresee the conse-
quences of her actions or an ambitious woman who
did not mind sweeping her morals under the carpet
for success? Was she really a cinematic genius?
Would she have continued to create masterpieces
30
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 10 [2005], Art. 1
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol10/iss1/1
The Many Leni Riefenstahls 25
      1Rainer Rother, Leni Riefenstahl: The seduction of genius.
(London: Continuum, 2002), 11.
had she not been shunned? 
To arrive at a fair assessment of the woman and
her talents is not easy. In the literature surrounding
this enigmatic presence in film history, several Leni
Riefenstahls appear. To judge from current scholar-
ship about her, it is evident that she meant different
things to different people. However, few question her
ability. Though commentators almost universally
attribute the demise of her artistic career to her
notorious reputation, this may not have been the
case. Perhaps the failures of her post-World War II
films are better explained by her inability to adapt to
the evolving pace of films. Perhaps the “punishment”
that was inflicted on her had no role in the down-
ward spiral of her career. Leni Riefenstahl, “the lim-
ited talent,” is one possible depiction of this contro-
versial woman very few individuals have con-
structed, but it will be a serious consideration in the
latter part of this paper. 
How Riefenstahl came to be known as a ‘cine-
matic genius’
In order to better understand the public’s percep-
tion of Riefenstahl, it is crucial to examine how she
earned her reputation as a cinematic genius.
Riefenstahl was fascinated with the entertainment
industry at an early age. Relentless in her pursuit of
getting what she wanted, Riefenstahl was convinced
she could do anything and everything.1 Thus, she
pursued dancing as a child, even when though it
horrified her father. When she suffered a knee in-
26 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      2Ibid., 22. 
jury, Riefenstahl made the decision to transition into
acting, a dream she would carry for the rest of her
life. She often described her move into cinema as “a
classical moment of revelation,”2 and after gaining
notoriety for her work in smaller budget films, she
got the chance to work for a director whom she had
long admired: Arnold Fanck. She used her time with
Fanck to familiarize herself with every aspect of film
production and then made the decision to move
behind the camera to explore directing. 
When Riefenstahl became a self-proclaimed direc-
tor, she quickly established herself as a household
name. Her two documentaries, “Triumph of the Will”
and “Olympia,” brought the standards of documen-
tary films to a level never seen before and surpassed
any of the artistic works she had created or ever
would create in the future. “Triumph of the Will,”
Riefenstahl’s best known film, gained its reputation
for its original and brilliant techniques. However,
today it is judged for its effectiveness in promoting
the Nazi regime. 
Riefenstahl got her chance to direct “Triumph of
the Will” after Hitler saw her film, “The Blue Light,”
and was impressed with her original style. He asked
her first to film a small Nazi party meeting. The re-
sults, “Sieg des Glaubens,” pleased Hitler. Thus,
when the Nuremberg rally was in the works, Hitler
knew just whom to call on. Although she lacked
experience with documentary films, Leni Riefenstahl
displayed artistic techniques Hitler had not seen in
other directors. As with everything he did, Hitler was
unremitting in his pursuit of her as a director. In
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jury, Riefenstahl made the decision to transition into
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sults, “Sieg des Glaubens,” pleased Hitler. Thus,
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fact, when initially petitioned to direct the movie,
Riefenstahl refused and referred the Chancellor to
someone she thought could do a better job. This was
unacceptable to Hitler. Eventually, through power of
persuasion and might, Riefenstahl hesitantly ac-
cepted the daunting task.3 Despite her initial reluc-
tance to work with Hitler on the film, Riefenstahl
knew that she would open up doors she never
thought possible by working in such close proximity
to the Third Reich. Directing the film gave
Riefenstahl her first opportunity to direct as if she
were making a “big studio production.”4
The brilliance of Riefenstahl’s film of the
Nuremberg rally liess in the authenticity of her cine-
matic techniques and their tremendous effect upon
the audience. According to author Rainer Rother,
Riefenstahl’s “stylistic ideal” was remarkable in two
ways. “On the one hand, she employed cuts modeled
on narrative films in an attempt to place the audi-
ence in the position of the ‘ideal spectator’.” On the
other hand, Riefenstahl made certain to “heroize” the
main subject of her film. In “Triumph of the Will,”
this “subject” was none other than Adolph Hitler.
Riefenstahl perfected the idea of placing the viewer
in the location of an “ideal spectator” at the begin-
ning of the rally.  She positioned the camera in such
a way that it appeared to be inside Hitler’s head as if
he descended from the clouds onto the Nuremberg
rally. The audience saw through Hitler’s eyes as he
descended closer to the people and witnessed “the
28 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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sheer subjugation of will as untold thousands
relinquish[ed] minds and individuality to a single,
mesmerizing fanatic.”5 This technique became
known as seeing through the “eye of the Fuhrer: the
same buildings, the same misty atmosphere of a new
dawn.”6 Seeing the rally through the eyes of their
hero allowed the audience to feel a closer connection
and more intimate relationship with Hitler.
The film’s journey from the airport to the hotel
also includes “genuine narrative forms” in which
Riefenstahl displayed truly remarkable originality.
This specific sequence “ends with an emphatic fade,
and includes approximately ninety shots within
about five minutes.”7 Thus, the shots are only about
three seconds each. Riefenstahl also used a variety
of camera angles when shooting the eye contact
between Hitler and members of the cheering crowd
to construct the idea of their bonding. However, “the
hierarchy of the eye contact” remained uniform
throughout the film. “The ‘people’ are always shown
in high-angle shots; Hitler from a low or eye-level
angle…Their function is one of orientation, clarifying
the distance already covered.”8 
Riefenstahl wanted to portray Hitler as the savior
of the people and did so by constructing the framing
of her shots carefully and closely considering who
was in them. One example of this placement is seen
in the abundance of women and children in “Tri-
umph of the Will.” Rother notes the prevalence of
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women and children cheering in the crowd. Only
occasionally did the film show any other kind of
onlooker. Such emphatic moments in the film would
help promote its object “as the champion of women
and children,” an untapped resource for many politi-
cians.9 Noteworthy also is the fact that the film never
showed Hitler’s reaction to the loyalty of his follow-
ers; instead it “reflects the devotion evident in the
reactions of other onlookers.”10
The political repercussions from “Triumph of
Will” were profound. To put it concisely, “Triumph of
the Will” was an “effective way of sponsoring enthu-
siasm for military service.”11 The documentary, more
often called a Nazi propaganda film, had a tremen-
dous impact on the German people. Through the
film, many came to see Hitler as their God, their
savior. Debate over whether or not Riefenstahl in-
tended to create such a powerful piece of propa-
ganda loomed over the filmmaker until her death.
Audrey Salkeld found it hard to believe that
Riefenstahl did not see the ramifications of her
highly successful film. In her portrait of the filmmak-
er, she wrote that Riefenstahl’s initial intention may
not have been to glorify Hitler, but her feelings for
him at the time were so full of adoration that she
could portray him in no other light. “For Riefenstahl,
in 1934, as for millions of her countrymen and
women, the Fuhrer represented the savior who
would restore Germany to some (imagined) former
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glory. This is what she filmed.”12
Riefenstahl got another chance to flex her docu-
mentary muscles when the Olympics came to Berlin
in 1936. Because of the incredible success of “Tri-
umph of the Will,” Hitler called on Riefenstahl once
again to profile the athletes throughout the competi-
tion. From the beginning, she designated certain
events for special treatment. In “Olympia,” she chose
the marathon and the decathalon for their epic qual-
ities and the men’s high diving competition for its
visual potential. But more importantly, she looked
for individual human effort. “Physical strain depicted
through pulsing temples, bow-tight muscles” became
a favorite visual theme for Riefenstahl.13 Her focus
was more on people performing greatly, rather than
how great their performances may have been. Hence,
she produced a film appreciated by fans of sports
and cinema enthusiasts alike. 
Although “Olympia” had obvious artistic quali-
ties, its intrinsic political influence for the Third
Reich was perhaps the film’s strongest accomplish-
ment. Masked behind the glistening bodies of Olym-
pic athletes was a recipe for German nationalism.
“Olympia” celebrated a community spirit in which no
subordination seemed apparent, the spirit of happy
harmony which the German people might perceive
between itself and the Fuhrer.14 Where “Triumph of
the Will” emphasized the necessity of creating a new
Germany, “Olympia” presented Hitler, the party, and
the people in a way that celebrated the ‘new Ger-
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many’ that had been created. 
Because of her highly successful documentaries,
Riefenstahl was known as a pioneer in her field. No
longer did men dominate the making of documentary
films. If film professionals wanted to seek guidance
on how to create a profoundly moving documentary
film, they consulted the works of Leni Riefenstahl.
What set her apart from other filmmakers were her
unique style and her techniques. She approached
the camera in ways no one else had, and she knew
how to manipulate it in order to create whatever
feeling she wanted on the screen. Riefenstahl also
had an eye for images. She knew how to pick and
choose useful shots for her work. Many of the shots
in her films resemble photographs. In the long run,
this filming style would work against her. But, for
the time being, it made her a cinematic genius. 
The manifestation of a self-proclaimed genius
The image of Leni Riefenstahl as a genius was not
one that she refuted. On the contrary, Riefenstahl
embraced the idea quite whole-heartedly. From
childhood, Riefenstahl had been confident of herself
and her abilities. On countless occasions she re-
marked on her ability to do anything that she put
her mind to, as if to explain her ventures into danc-
ing, acting, and other forms of entertainment.15
When repercussions from “Triumph of the Will”
set in, Riefenstahl found herself in an unfortunate
position. Suddenly, people were attacking her for
being involved with Hitler and for helping advance
32 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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and legitimize the Third Reich. She was ostracized by
cinematic professionals and none of her post-War
works achieved either popularity or real success. In
response, Riefenstahl assumed the role of the artistic
genius whose career suffered from the effects of
political hatreds. According to Riefenstahl, nothing
she ever did was fairly judged after 1945. Because of
the attacks, she was doomed to a career with little
artistic recognition. In her memoirs she used a num-
ber of examples to explain the negative effect her
social exile had on her filmmaking efforts.  After the
War she no longer had available the most advanced
film equipment the Third Reich had provided for her,
which hindered her ability to create superior films.16 
Even worse, the professional and social isolation she
faced reached across continents. When she traveled
to America to promote her films, she met resistance
at every turn. Hollywood producers and studios told
her that neither she nor her films were welcome. It
quickly became apparent that her only supporters
resided within the borders of her homeland.17 De-
fending herself in her autobiography, Riefenstahl
even went so far as to claim that her film, “Tiefland,”
released in 1954, would have been a huge success
had the press not publicized the allegation that gyp-
sies from Auschwitz had been used in the film. She
stated that response to the film was overwhelmingly
positive at its screening, but then the “adversaries
struck” and made hateful attacks in newspapers that
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destroyed any chance the film had had for success.18
Riefenstahl wrote her autobiography in 1992 to
set the record straight. Almost sixty years after com-
pleting “Triumph of the Will,” she made the decision
to publicly address the issues that had been “punish-
ing” her since the War. At the end of her lengthy life
story she claimed her motive for writing was to dis-
pel “preconceived ideas and to clear up misunder-
standings” about her art and her life. She admitted
that it had not been an easy task since the life she
had recounted “did not turn out to be a happy
one.”19 Throughout these memoirs she maintained
she had been cheated by society and in so claiming
she reinforced the idea that the public had some-
thing to cheat her of, namely recognition of her cine-
matic brilliance.
The many different Leni Riefenstahls
Leni Riefenstahl is a popular subject for biogra-
phers.  Her controversial and fascinating life entices
authors hoping to write an interesting story, but,
one biographer’s interpretation does not make a
complete Leni Riefenstahl. Instead, similar to the
New Biography, where writers represent their sub-
jects in different contexts, biographers of Riefenstahl
use various aspects of her life and depict her accord-
ing to their individual interpretations. To some, she
is a vixen, while to others she is a naïve victim.  It is
almost as if authors are creating a character for a
day time soap opera, and in a way, they have. Many
of the biographers who have chosen to write about
34 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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her life have done so by writing screenplays for their
dissertations. Most, who are working to get their
Master’s degree in Theater Arts, find Riefenstahl to
be an intriguing figure that provides an excellent
framework for a juicy play. In real life there is not
one accepted version of Riefenstahl.  Therefore, the
plethora of screenplays and books on Riefenstahl lay
out a number of portrayals, each one contradicting
the other. Indeed, the many selves attributed to this
woman create a history worth investigating on its
own.
The sexualized Leni Riefenstahl
One version of Leni Riefenstahl turns her into a
seductress who relied on sexual appeal to find pro-
fessional opportunities. Lisa Williams’ dissertation,
“The Amazon Queen: A dramatic portrait of Leni
Riefenstahl,” fosters this notion of Riefenstahl. In
one scene where two men discuss the up and com-
ing Riefenstahl, one protagonist compares her to
sponge. “She soaks somebody dry,” he complains,
“then dumps them, and moves on to soak somebody
else.” His comrade replies by recalling having heard
she was a “nymphomaniac.”20 In Williams’ script,
Riefenstahl never met a man who did not have some-
thing to give her and she was willing to use any
means necessary to get it, even if it meant enticing
men with her body.21 Williams also calls attention to
Riefenstahl’s relationships with Hans, her married
boyfriend and her cameraman. Although Hans and
Riefenstahl often had differing views on the way a
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scene should be shot, Riefenstahl knew that by sex-
ually tempting her boyfriend, she could get her way
in the end.
“The Amazon Queen” makes numerous refer-
ences to an alleged romantic relationship with Hitler.
Williams is not alone in her opinion. Many authors
have implied there was such a relationship. How-
ever, Williams is more explicit. In one scene of her
play Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi minister of propa-
ganda and public information, has a conversation
with Hitler’s mistress, Eva Braun, about the close
relationship between Hitler and Riefenstahl. He tells
Braun that Riefenstahl “circumnavigated” him and
went directly to Hitler. He added that each had dis-
covered something in the other they could use.22
Just what that something might be became apparent
in another scene where Riefenstahl and Hans are
making love and instead of looking into the eyes of
her boyfriend as he kisses her, Riefenstahl’s eyes
lock onto the portrait of Hitler hanging next to her
bed.23
The naive Leni Riefenstahl
Riefenstahl, as a naïve woman who really had no
idea of what she was getting into, provides another
possible scenario for her biographers. In this version
of the woman, she appears an innocent and un-
knowing accomplice to an evil she fails to grasp. In
the screenplay that became her dissertation, Laura
Conover Wardle creates this Riefenstahl. In the play
Riefenstahl defends herself from the charges of her
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enemies by arguing that in 1934 no one knew what
lay ahead. She could never have predicted the out-
come of Hitler’s Germany.24 Conover has Riefenstahl
refute allegations with the claim that preoccupation
with her work absorbed all of her time and made her
lose contact with the outside world. She did not
realize until it was too late that during the 18
months (from 1935-1936) that she was in the editing
room the world’s opinion of Germany changed.25
Since she remained a strong supporter of Hitler long
after world opinion had shifted, however, this excuse
fails to convince anyone in the play and, most of all,
the playwright who created her.  
In the opening scene of Wardle’s screenplay,
Riefenstahl stands in front of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal to testify at the Trial of Nazi War Crim-
inals. In her monologue she pleads her innocence
and reflects on her life after the war and on the
treatment she received from the public. In a direct
quote from the transcript Riefenstahl tells the tribu-
nal that she had been stripped of everything. “They
have taken all of my things, my equipment, my cam-
eras, my films, my house, everything. My friends
have turned against me and they have murdered
me.”26 Ultimately, she claims responsibility for allow-
ing her connections with the Nazi regime to get out
of hand and makes herself responsible for her isola-
tion and ignorance.27 In this version, Riefenstahl
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acquires a certain amount of poignancy in the role of
an artist completely overtaken by the situation in
which she had unwittingly found herself.
The “fictitiously naive” Leni Riefenstahl
Audrey Salkeld’s biography presents a fictitiously
naïve Leni Riefenstahl who knew how and when to
play dumb as a means of getting others to help ad-
vance her career. Although not quite a collaborator
or outright supporter of the Nazi party, this
Riefenstahl indirectly contributed to the regime for
personal gain. Unconcerned with the politics of the
Third Reich, she looked on the regime as an oppor-
tunity to achieve her professional goals. Hence,
Salkeld’s Riefenstahl is more self-serving than vin-
dictive. Salkeld repeatedly alludes to Riefenstahl’s
tendency to play the “Hitler card” in order to main-
tain her artistic freedom.28 By merely alluding to her
close association with Hitler, Riefenstahl could count
on special privileges and have access to areas to
which others were denied. This Riefenstahl thor-
oughly enjoyed the privileges that Hitler’s favor
brought her. 
Another screenplay, by Dana Gillespie, adopts a
similar interpretation of Riefenstahl. Gillespie’s
Riefenstahl chooses to ignore atrocities occurring
right in front of her in order to further her career. In
this script Hans warns Riefenstahl about what the
Nazis are up to. He tells her to educate herself, but
she replies that she does not intend to stick her nose
38 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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in things she knows nothing about.29 Hans tells
Riefenstahl to stop looking only through a lens and
to remember that another world exists that does not
quite fit into the frame.30 Salkeld underscores this
willful naiveté when she reports that when asked to
do another movie for Hitler, Riefenstahl was initially
reluctant and claimed not even to know the differ-
ence between SA and SS or anything about politics.31
The vindictive Leni Riefenstahl
Perhaps the most common interpretation of this
woman, and the one shared by many of those out-
raged over the Academy’s recognition of her, is a
vindictive Leni Riefenstahl. This Riefenstahl was an
inherently evil woman who knew exactly what was
going on the entire time and compromised whatever
moral values she had for fame. Authors who take
this interpretive slant tend also to gravitate toward
the idea of a romance between Riefenstahl and Hit-
ler. 
Gillespie, who toyed with the idea of Riefenstahl
as fictitiously naive, also suggests the possibility of
Riefenstahl’s inherent wickedness. She draws atten-
tion to her need to be in constant control and her
perpetual efforts to deepen her relationship with
Hitler.32 Gillespie also makes Riefenstahl’s attitude
toward the Jews pertinent to the character she cre-
ates. According to Gillespie’s interpretation, the
more favors Riefenstahl’s received from Hitler, the
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more indifferent she became to what was going on.
She would not allow the boycott of the Jews or
threats of violence against them to interrupt her own
career. Other artists, such as Fritz Lang could see
what was going on and when asked by Hitler to cre-
ate films for the party, he refused to do so.33 She was
perfectly aware of Hitler’s determination to strip the
Jews of their social power and wealth and deny them
the opportunity to earn a living, and she still sent in
her request to be a member of the Reich Film Associ-
ation.34 Gillespie claims the “lure of artistic freedom
and unlimited resources Hitler dangled in front of
her were great enough to make her ignore the moral
consequence of supporting him and his regime.”35
Embedded in this interpretation is the idea that
Riefenstahl placed art above anything else. Whatever
the moral repercussions, if something benefited art
in any way it was justified. According to Gillespie,
“The threat of war, the Jewish problem, the brutal
policies of Hitler- all were ignored. Art, not moral
responsibility, was her goal.”36 When the accusation
surfaced that Riefenstahl used gypsies bound for
Auschwitz in her film “Tiefland,” she denied in her
autobiography that the extras had been executed.
While some accounts support her claim, others do
not. In Gillespie’s account, during the filming the
inmates of the concentration camp received clean
clothing and were forced to pose in front of a huge
banquet table full of food they were not allowed to
40 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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eat. After the film came out rumors circulated that
the prisoners were sent to Auschwitz and executed.37
Once the gypsies’ actual fate was learned, Gillespie’s
Riefenstahl maintained she did not know at the time
and did not want to know about it now. “They had
served her purpose.”38 Of course, in her autobiogra-
phy she denies ever using as extras gypsies who
were later executed.
The fabrication of a genius
Leni Riefenstahl became an accredited director
after the release of “Triumph of the Will” and “Olym-
pia.” There is no questioning her unique and gifted
style in both documentaries, and it is easy to under-
stand how her reputation as a cinematic genius
developed. However, there is not much critical dis-
cussion about Riefenstahl’s work either before or
after the two documentaries. Riefenstahl insisted
that her work was not given a chance after the War,
which explains her later failure.  But, this assertion
might be disputed. Perhaps Riefenstahl was not a
genius after all. Apart from her famous documenta-
ries, her films attracted little interest and a good
amount of artistic criticism. 
Riefenstahl’s first real chance at directing came
in 1932 with the film “The Blue Light.” Released
before the War, it did receive enthusiastic reviews at
the time of its release, but it also met harsh criti-
cism. Riefenstahl’s biographer, Rother, finds the film
naive, the meager “realization of a girlish dream.”39
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He calls attention to the striking parallel between the
life of Riefenstahl and that of the main character,
Junta, who is ostracized by her village for climbing a
mountain none of the local boys could conquer.
According to Gillespie, Riefenstahl blamed the film’s
unfavorable criticism on the Jews. For her, says
Gillespie, Jews were foreigners who did not under-
stand her art and sought to wreck her career. Rother
implies that Riefenstahl’s reaction to her film’s fail-
ures was a likely response to Hitler’s anti-semitic
laws. Riefenstahl forecasts that when Hitler came to
power, he would not allow Jews to slander her work
and determine the fate of her career.40
A decade and a half after the war began in 1954,
Riefenstahl finally released “Tiefland,” a film that she
had been working on for 20 years. Measured against
“Triumph of the Will” and “Olympia,” “Tiefland” was
met with much disappointment. Critics panned it at
the time and it goes largely unmentioned today in
discussions of Riefenstahl’s work. In Rother’s opin-
ion, and in this he was not alone, the “stylistic
agenda overwhelms the material” creating a “discor-
dant impression.”41 He characterizes the plot of the
film as “over-stylized”. In the face of criticism,
Riefenstahl blamed all the film’s shortcomings on
her limited resources when compared with what she
had had at her disposal working under Hitler.42
Riefenstahl’s problems, however, went beyond the
loss of her earlier resources and her professional
ostracism. There were limitations to her brilliance.
42 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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One of her major problems seemed to be her story-
telling ability. Riefenstahl was accused of being an
“unoriginal storyteller” and of having “creative uncer-
tainty.”43 Of Riefenstahl, Rother says she did not
have the “artistic temperament capable of conjuring
up successful films from variations of her ideas.”44
Put blatantly, she did not have the creative capabili-
ties to tell a compelling story. Rother argues that
after the War, Riefenstahl lost her touch and “lacked
convincing ideas for a film.”45 Documentaries re-
mained her favorite and only successful genre of
film.  In documentaries she did not have to write
scripts or tell stories, and was left to focus on her
true passion: photography. But, one critic finds
unoriginality even in one of her most famous docu-
mentaries: “Olympia.” According to Willy Zielke, the
cameraman who shot and actually created the pro-
logue for the documentary on his own, the prologue
was the most artistic part of the film, and
Riefenstahl never even admitted that he authored
it.46
No matter how “brilliant” her prior documentaries
were, if Riefenstahl could not advance with contem-
porary film techniques she could not remain a favor-
ite in the public eye, regardless of her involvement
with the Nazis. Photography played a central role in
Riefenstahl’s life. In fact, the genius displayed in her
two famous documentaries lay in her photographic
ability, but this passion for photography could not
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sustain her cinematic career. As time progressed,
Riefenstahl could not adapt with the pacing of main-
stream cinema. To view “Triumph of the Will” is to
see essentially a series of pictures. The pacing was
appropriate for the film’s purpose and for someone
who had this kind of ability. Each still image in her
films tended to linger on the screen too long. In
“Triumph of the Will,” which was a very successful
attempt at Nazi propaganda, the lingering shots were
effective for captivating the minds of viewers. “The
anticipation of the youthful audience is conveyed by
images of boys climbing up on barriers and each
other, straining, on tip-toe, to get a good vantage
point.”47 Richard Corliss notes that the film’s pulse,
“accelerating from stately to feverish,” is in
Riefenstahl’s master editing. She needed no narra-
tion to tell you what to think or feel; her images and
editing were persuasive enough.”48 However, in a film
such as “The Blue Light,” where a story line was
needed, Riefenstahl’s images could not overcome the
bland plot. In an age where popular cinema involved
fast-paced entertainment, audiences could not relate
to Riefenstahl’s style, which was more like flipping
through a picture book. In fact, “Last of the Nuba,” a
collection of pictures Riefenstahl took of an African
tribe, was intended to be a film before producers
decided it would be better off as a collection of pic-
tures. 
Another problem Riefenstahl encountered was
44 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      49Riefenstahl, 317.
      50Infield, 230.
that she was unable to “limit” her artistic ambitions
to her real talent. She still had a deep passion for
acting and dancing and refused to put that all be-
hind her when she transitioned into a career behind
the camera. It was not uncommon to see Riefenstahl
starring in one of her films. Because Riefenstahl
could not disassociate herself as an actress, her
films suffered. After watching “Tiefland,” she calls
herself “obviously miscast.”  She saw that her sick
and pale figure on the screen did nothing to enhance
the film.49 In her documentaries Riefenstahl did not
have to worry about acting and directing, she just
took pictures with her camera. Thus, the documen-
taries displayed her tremendous ability in taking
pictures. Her other films were compromised by her
attempt to be more than she was. 
Despite the public’s outrage at the Academy’s
recognition of Riefenstahl, some people remain de-
voted to the idea of her brilliance. Several members
of the feminist movement are committed to keeping
the spirit of Riefenstahl alive because she was a
powerful woman in history who, according to them,
paved the way for women in cinema. Infield narrates
that Riefenstahl’s popularity continues to grow even
after her death because she is praised by this femi-
nist movement. In his view, Riefenstahl was the
“only important woman director in the history of
cinema, and as such, regardless of her ethics or
morals, is cherished by some leaders of the feminist
movement.”50 
By recognizing Riefenstahl as one of the greatest
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have to worry about acting and directing, she just
took pictures with her camera. Thus, the documen-
taries displayed her tremendous ability in taking
pictures. Her other films were compromised by her
attempt to be more than she was. 
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that Riefenstahl’s popularity continues to grow even
after her death because she is praised by this femi-
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filmmakers of her time at the 2003 Academy Awards,
Hollywood divided art from politics saying the two
can coexist independently. But, can the two really
coexist peacefully? Infield doesn’t think so. He says
Riefenstahl cannot be recognized without drawing
attention to her involvement with the regime. Infield
makes artists particularly responsible for the mes-
sage they send out with their art. In his words, “an
artist’s skill, imagination, and the creativity give him
or her the ability to touch the minds of others much
more easily than the less talented person.”51 No
artist can ignore their need for an “ethical compass.”
He says, an aesthetic of mass murder is not possi-
ble. William Cook holds a different viewpoint and
finds that it is art that determines whether or not
something is immoral. According to Cook, “Triumph
of the Will” and to a lesser extent “Olympia” prove
that art is amoral. “Its morality depends purely on
its context. In a moral context, it is moral. In an
immoral context, it is immoral.”52
Of course even if art should not be judged by its
political ramifications, Riefenstahl was still not nec-
essarily deserving of the honor the Academy be-
stowed upon her, as only her documentaries played
a prominent role in cinematic history. And, many
even question the prominence of that role. Susan
Sontang writes, “Triumph” and “Olympia,” are un-
doubtedly superb films, but they are not really im-
portant in the history of cinema as an art form. No-
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      53Infield, 237.
      54Ibid., 237.
body making films today alludes to Riefenstahl.”53
Marcus Ophuls agrees with Sontang and says he
does not think she is one of the greatest filmmakers
in the world, Nazi or not.54 
In reality, Leni Riefenstahl was little more than a
gifted documentarian. She had an eye for camera
angles and a good sense of how to tell a story with a
camera. But, when it came to producing a film that
called for prose, she was an amateur. There is no
question of her ostracism from the cinematic com-
munity after the War, but had she been allowed to
continue filming without the scornful eyes of the
disenchanted public upon her, it is probable she
would be remembered today as a woman who once
directed two spectacular documentaries and lived off
the notoriety of these films for the remainder of her
years.
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Franco and the Jews:
The Effects of Image and Memory on
Spanish-Jewish Reconciliation
Rene H. Cardenas
The news of Francisco Franco’s death on the
morning of 20 November 1975 affected the Spanish
public in various ways.  Clothiers in grieving Galicia
and Madrid found themselves hard-pressed to provide
enough black ties and armbands to satisfy the insatia-
ble demand, a situation vastly different from the
dancing and celebrations that burst forth in the
Basque provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya.  Manuel
Vasquez Montalban, a Barcelona novelist, chronicled
the activity in the heretofore “occupied” city: “Above
the skyline of the Collserola Mountains, champagne
corks soared into the autumn twilight.  But nobody
heard a sound.”  Barcelona was, after all, a city of good
manners.1  As Franco’s body lay in state at the Sala de
Columnas of Madrid’s Palacio del Oriente, nearly
500,000 people filed past; some to mourn, others to
confirm that the was truly dead.  Compared in his
lifetime to the Archangel Gabriel, Alexander the Great,
Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, Napoleon, and Jesus
Christ, Franco was buried on 23 1975 November at
Valle de Los Caidos, outside Madrid.2  Only one
noteworthy Head of State, the Chilean dictator Gen.
Augusto Pinochet, attended the funeral.
48 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      3For a developed commentary on collective memory and anti-
memory, see Pierre Nora, Rethinking the French Past: Realms of
Memory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 1-23.
After Franco’s 36-year tenure in a role of unchal-
lenged power and authority, a significant amount of
scholarship has grappled with the complex question of
his legacy.  Motivated by admiration, fascination, and
disgust, foreign observers – not Spaniards – have
spearheaded the task to represent and remember
Franco as an archetypal dictator, megalomaniac or
calculating politico.  This study will also analyze his
memory, but one that scholars have not previously
emphasized – the Jewish memory of the dictator based
upon Israeli policy toward Franquist Spain and the
details about Franco’s life that were “forgotten” in
order to generate it.
The Spanish institutionalized memory of Francisco
Franco is heavily influenced by a wide spectrum of
Spanish politicians, intellectuals, and social commen-
tators who collaborated in what came to be known as
el pacto del olvido, or pact of forgetting.  Franco was
not necessarily forgotten post-mortem, though; in-
stead, an immense national appetite for details about
the private Caudillo fueled a cathartic release of diaries
and memoirs for years after his death.  El pacto only
stressed no settling of accounts, no revenge.  No one
sought to open what was considered a Pandora’s box
for fear of igniting another devastating civil war like
the one responsible for catapulting Franco into power
forty years earlier.  Thus, collective amnesia, or anti-
memory, became the consensus of an uneasy Spanish
public.3  In the Jewish memory of the dictator, this
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amnesia has a different origin - one rooted in the
dictator’s ambiguous stances and policies themselves.
Although El Caudillo publicly articulated a Catho-
lic, knightly, warrior-based formula for Spanish
identity and simultaneously sought to ingratiate
himself with Sephardim communities (Jews of Spanish
ancestry), many of whom immigrated to Palestine
during or immediately after the Spanish Civil War, his
duplicity was not entirely of his own design.4  It was
also a consequence of the Jewish experience in Span-
ish history. 5  According to Norman Berdichevksy,
bitter memories of the Inquisition and the Jewish
expulsion of 1492 dominated Jewish memories of the
Iberian Peninsula for centuries.6  Equating Jews to
Moorish “infidels in league with the devil,” Spain
retained this hostile posture until immediately after
the French Revolution, and only after the adoption of
the Constitution of 1868 did official persecution come
to a halt.  Immediately thereafter, a number of Spanish
intellectuals started to question what Spain might
have lost as a result of the Sephardic eviction and its
lasting antagonism.7  Noting the important cultural,
political, and economic contributions credited to Jews
in Northern Europe, Greece, Turkey, the Caribbean,
50 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      8Jose Antonio Lisbona, Retorno a Sepharad: La politica de
España hacia sus Judios en el siglo XX (Barcelona: Silex,1993).;
See also Maria Antonio Bel Bravo, Sefarad, Los Judios de
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and the United States, scholars such as Angel Pulido,
himself a Jew, dedicated their careers to settling the
Spanish-Sephardic rift.  Having spoken before the
Cortes, or Spanish Senate, visited the Sephardic
communities in Turkey and met with their chief rabbi,
and written articles for the Spanish press, Pulido
presented an image of a Spain held hostage by a
fervent ultra-nationalistic, Catholic ideology during the
late 19th and early 20th centuries.8  The Jewish intellec-
tual was so well accepted among all echelons of society
that King Alfonso XIII proposed the renewal of a
“Greater Spain” with Sephardim reconciliation as one
of his primary objectives during the first decades of the
20th century.  In this spirit, Spain voted in favor of the
British Mandate for Palestine in 1922, and the Repub-
lican government welcomed Chaim Weizmann, who
would become Israel’s first president, in 1932.  With
the Star of David in the ascendant, the Catholic
Church in Spain became increasingly insecure about
its influence, and this discomfort would come to
influence Franquist policy toward Israel later.  Thus,
the direction of Judeo-Spanish reconciliation, although
promising, was still uncertain immediately before the
largest European civil conflict since the French Revolu-
tion.  To better understand how Judeo-Spanish
relations continued their uncertain path after the
Spanish Civil War propelled the shy Galician Franco to
power requires knowing more about the array of
experiences and influences in the leader’s life that, by
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the 1930s, would turn him in his own psychology into
the savior of a historic Spain.
Franco’s Military Exploits and the Foundations of
a Vision
Upon graduation from the Spanish Military Acad-
emy at Toledo in 1910, the 17-year-old short, frail-
looking Second Lieutenant Franco volunteered to serve
in combat in Morocco, where he immersed himself in
Army life and paid extreme attention to personal
attributes like detail and duty.  While developing an
interest in topography and Spanish history, Franco
absorbed the idea of the Army’s moral responsibility as
the “guardian of the essence of the nation.”9 According
to that principle, when a government disgraced its
country by allowing disorder, it was the Army officer’s
duty to combat that government in the name of the
nation.
At the tender age of 20 and despite a growing
reputation for valor in combat, the lieutenant was still
withdrawn, a private contemplative with few friends.
Eschewing the drinking, gambling, and philandering
that dominated the leisure time of many officers in
Spanish Morocco, Franco poured over supply lists and
maps late into the evening.  By 1917, at the age of 24,
his competence and the cunning, yet fatalistic charges
that won him battle after battle in Morocco warranted
him a promotion to major.  After a brief return to
Spain, Franco again ventured across the Straits of
Gibraltar in 1920 where his service to both the French
Foreign Legion and the elite division of the Spanish
Army launched him to the top of the military hierar-
52 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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chy.  When his assignment ended in 1927, he was a
thirty-three-year-old brigadier and one of Europe’s
youngest generals.  The changing political situation in
Spain during the mid-1920s and 1930s, coupled with
important changes in his person life, would catapult
the general to yet unforeseen heights.
In 1923, Franco married Maria del Carmen Polo y
Martinez Valdes, the beautiful 17-year-old daughter of
an affluent Asturian businessman.  She injected into
their upper middle-class household a potent dose of
Catholic piety.  This served as a personal reawakening,
since his pious youth had given way to an irreligious
existence in Morocco, never attending Mass there.  The
apparent lull in the General’s career during this period
was actually of critical importance because it allowed
for the synthesis of a romanticized Spanish military
ideal with the reemergence of Franco’s Catholic beliefs.
As he helplessly watched the collapse of the monarchy
and the proclamation of the Second Republic, Franco’s
renewed Catholicism would become important to the
justification of actions to come.10 
During the political turmoil between 1923 and
1936, Francisco Franco perfected the technique that
several historians conclude characterized his regime –
deliberate and shrewd calculation motivated by self-
preservation.11  On 13 September 1923, disputes over
direct representation, local autonomy in Catalonia and
57
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the Basque Provinces, and foreign, military and social
reform paralyzed the parliamentary system and
ushered in the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, one of
Franco’s previous superiors.  Five years later, Rivera
established a military academy at Zaragoza for officer
candidates and named Franco its Director.  While the
General possessed the rigid attitude necessary to
provide the prospective officers with a strong founda-
tion in Spanish military psychology and esprit de
corps, his lack of experience in military technology and
theoretical training obligated him to hire a comprehen-
sive staff, and many high-ranking officers in charge
after the Nationalist victory in the Spanish Civil War
were part of this group from 1928-1931.   Although
Rivera’s administration temporarily corrected many of
the breakdowns that overwhelmed the government of
Alfonso XIII, it too succumbed to outside pressures
and collapsed, bringing down the monarchy with it.  It
would not fall, however, without first leaving a lasting
impression on the future Caudillo.  Despite its imper-
fections, the military regime’s relative internal stability
persuaded Franco that dictatorship was the ideal form
of government for Spain.12  
Aware that the balance of power rested with liberal
factions at the start of the 1930s, Franco took great
care not to offend the new administration by deed or
word.  The liberals’ attitude toward Franco, however,
was not as conciliatory.  During the initial transition
from Rivera’s dictatorship to the Second Republic, a
54 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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key priority of the left-wing government entailed
eliminating the vestiges of the old order by forcing the
Army’s older, more conservative officers into retire-
ment, thus altering the balance of power within the
Spanish army.13  Furthermore, many of the campaign
promotions that Primo de Rivera awarded Franco were
rescinded, and the general plummeted to the bottom of
the officer seniority list.  His silent acquiescence was
rewarded in 1932, however, when the War Ministry
gave him command of the garrison at La Coruña and,
a year later, the important post of commander at the
Balearic Islands garrison.  After Centrists assumed
power in 1934, relations between the military and the
government greatly improved.  Franco was promoted
to major general and named Commander-in-Chief of
the elite crack divisions in Morocco.  He was then
appointed Chief of the General Staff in May 1935, after
he publicly aligned himself with CEDA, a coalition of
moderate, conservative, and clerical parties.  Franco
took advantage of his role to appoint anti-leftist
officers, but the ensuing crisis caused by the leftist
Popular Front’s victory in February 1936 elections
brought forth newer, far more important priorities.14
Although conservative leaders urged Franco and the
War Ministry to annul the leftist victory and declare
martial law, the General refused.  Removed as Chief of
Staff and, in effect, exiled to the garrison at Tenerife in
the Canary Islands, Franco watched as liberal officers
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replaced his conservative nominees for important
posts.15
With tensions increasing between Left and Right,
whispers of a broad military conspiracy to overthrow
the government grew louder.  Led by Brigadier General
Emilio Mola, a cadre of mid-level officers championed
the effort.  Although they represented a broad cross-
section of the political spectrum – monarchists,
fascists, clerical reactionaries, and a collection of
officers without ideological leanings, the primacy of
liberal officers in senior positions put the conspiracy in
a difficult position.  For this reason, Franco’s conser-
vative reputation and respected accomplishments
made him an important potential candidate to repre-
sent the diverse anti-liberal, anti-socialist Junta.
Nevertheless, the exiled General kept his distance.  He
had no desire to destroy a storied career because of an
uncalculated blunder.  On 25 June 1936, he wrote a
letter to President Azaña actually warning him of the
Army’s eroding loyalty, but it went unanswered.16
Only after the Popular Front government created a
Marxist-leaning militia did Franco cast his lot with the
conspirators in July 1936.  Although the General only
had a basic understanding of Spain’s economic and
political intricacies, he was keenly aware of current
public unrest and leftist revolutionary organizations.17
The chaos in Spain had become so problematic that
sitting back any longer and watching matters deterio-
rate was worse than joining the rebels.  Franco also
56 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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thought it advantageous to side with the Republican
faction than to face a potentially stronger Leftist
menace later.  Thus, the first phase of a life-long anti-
Communist crusade - the fight against the Popular
Front - had begun.  It was one battle in a campaign
that would deeply impact the way he would be remem-
bered later.
El Caudillo Emerges
Franco’s eventual emergence as the Nationalist
leader was due to a combination of his successes, his
vision, and luck.  Although General Emilio Mola and
other leading conspirators had been eager for the
general to hold an important role in the revolt, General
Jose Sanjurjo had been tapped as its primary leader.
On 20 July 1936, however, Sanjurjo’s plane burst into
flames as it departed from Lisbon and the team of
generals in the Junta de Defensa Nacional invited
Franco to become its ninth member on 3 August 1936.
As the Junta consolidated its coalition of conserva-
tive elements under a unified body, Franco emerged as
the strongest individual member of the movement,
because he commanded the most important of the
Nationalist forces - the Armies of Africa and the South
of Spain.  In an interview a week after he joined the
Junta, Franco categorically announced: “Spain is
Republican and will continue to be so.  Neither the
regime nor the flag have changed.  The only change
will be that crime is replaced by order and acts of
banditry by honest and progressive work.  Spain will
be governed by a corporative system similar to those
installed in Portugal, Italy, and Germany.”18  However,
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five days later, Franco replaced the Republican flag
with the traditional monarchical yellow and red
standard, hailing it as the flag for which patriots had
given their lives in a hundred battles.  A public an-
nouncement of Franco’s leadership, the Junta’s Decree
of 29 September 1936 read: “In accordance with the
resolution adopted by the Junta de Defensa Nacional,
General Francisco Franco Bahamonde is named Chief
of the Government of the Spanish State, and will
assume all the powers of the new State.” 19  His investi-
ture speech in Burgos in early October declared: “You
are placing Spain in my hands.  My hand will be firm,
my pulse will not tremble, and I shall try to raise Spain
to the place that corresponds to her history and her
rank in earlier times.”20
Franco possessed a basic set of beliefs whose
fundamental values changed little in comparison to the
evolution of the regime.21  Franco’s belief in the Span-
ish “essence” resonated with a sense of a mythical
national, Catholic past superseding Jewish and
Muslim identities, one that could resurface as a force
behind the modern Catholic “Spanishness” for which
he lobbied.  He had also come to the conclusion that
Spain could not adapt to a parliamentary system, and
he saw himself as a bulwark against all that he ab-
horred: Communism, Marxism, Masonry, materialism,
and internationalism.
The Church provided Franco with much of the
propaganda he would adopt to publicly define himself
after the Nationalist victory.  The image of Franco as a
58 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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modern Catholic crusader was promoted by Enrique
Pley y Deniel, Bishop of Salamanca.  A letter on 30
September 1936 quoted Augustine of Hippo and
compared the “earthly city,” or Republican zone, where
Communism and anarchy reigned, with the celestial,
or Nationalist zone, where heroism and love of God
prevailed.  Toward the end of the war, on 16 April
1939, Pope Pius XII gave Franco his apostolic blessing
and praised him for his “noble and Christian senti-
ments.”22  Feverishly committed to retaining power and
now backed by the Church, he believed that the
Nationalists had an absolute right to suppress Repub-
lican supporters.  Victory, according to Franco, had to
be complete.
Consequently, one of his first acts as Head of State
was to ban all leftist and liberal parties.  The Falangist
state was to be a “national syndicalist state” in which
“the state, to discipline the economy, employs the
instrument of the syndicates.”23  He admired the social
programs of those regimes that had helped his victory
over the Leftists – Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.24
Yet, Spanish authoritarianism, as Franco called it, was
not derived from Hitler’s National Socialism or Musso-
lini’s fascismo, but instead from the centralized mon-
archy of Ferdinand and Isabella.  This revived “integral
nationalism” would somewhat base itself upon
Franco’s perceptions of the Spanish Golden Age,
including the intolerant conventions of Spanish
government and society, such as the “Black Legend” -
the myth of the Inquisition’s genocidal barbarism.
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The Emerging Dictatorship, Jewish Memory, and
the Heyday of National-Catholic Identity
While much can and has been said about the
brutal character of Franco’s regime, this study ana-
lyzes the generally overlooked and vexing problem of
how his policy toward Jews complicated the Jewish
response to his regime and his person.  The devastat-
ing war between 1936 and 1939 was arguably largely
responsible for the image of Franco that would thwart
attempts at Judeo-Spanish reconciliation thereafter.
His fascist coalition derided in orchestrated campaigns
the radical and “communist Jews” who had champi-
oned the Republican cause that Franco considered
impious and anti-Spanish.  A strong intellectual and
financial base for the Republican movement, liberal
Jews proved a formidable foe for the fascist National-
ists.  However, by strategically linking a Jewish Repub-
lican plot with long-disliked progressive Catalan
separatists, the Falange was able to galvanize Spanish
public opinion in its favor.  Ultimately, it is debatable
whether Franco himself stirred up anti-Semitic senti-
ment among the Falange or whether he allowed them
to decry the “Judeo-Catalan” conspiracy in order to
sustain its popularity.  Although anti-Semitic epithets
can be found in the general’s speeches, they are
remarkably few by comparison with the virulent anti-
Jewish rhetoric in fascist newspapers.25
Domestically, the1940s and early 1950s marked
the heyday of Franco’s image of a Spain based on an
anachronistic amalgam of medieval romanticism,
nationalism and a re-born sense of destiny.  Having
acted to outlaw opposition parties, control all media
60 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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and insert pro-Franco rhetoric into the educational
curriculum, El Caudillo monopolized the discourse
about Spanish identity.  His 1942 Raza, a semi-bio-
graphical novel, exalted a nation and people born out
of the ashes of fierce conflict.  As for Franco himself, it
presented him as a “gift from God,” a popular theme in
the period’s educational curricula, that protected
Spain’s Catholic roots.  Jose Churruca, the story’s
main character, incarnated the dictator’s idea of his
nation - resilient, crusading, protective, and spiritual.26
The Nationalist fervor born out of victory in the Civil
War also influenced the regime’s economic policy.
Eschewing international trade, Franco’s autarkic
measures played a dual role during the administra-
tion’s early years.  While these served as an economic
manifestation of Spain’s independence and a post-
World War II response to international ostracism, the
harsh realities of running a country trumped the
ideological constructs of Spanish identity.  As starva-
tion became a tangible problem, Franco’s coffers
suffered.  It was in this context that Franco courted
limited diplomatic relations with Israel in hopes of
easing Spanish international isolation.27    
The only clear evidence of any personal ill will
toward the Jewish people was Franco’s reaction to
Israel’s 1949 U.N. vote against admitting Spain to that
body as punishment for his alliance with Hitler in the
Spanish Civil War and Axis sympathy in World War II.
On 16 May 1949, Israeli ambassador to the United
Nations Abba Eban responded to a proposal by several
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Latin American countries to lift the U.N.’s diplomatic
boycott against Franco’s regime:
The United Nations has arisen out of the suffer-
ings of a martyred generation, which included
six million dead…That memory alone will deter-
mine Israel’s attitude.  While the Israeli delega-
tion would not for one moment assert that the
Spanish regime had any direct part in the policy
of extermination, it does maintain that Franco
Spain had been an active and sympathetic ally
of the regime that had been responsible for that
policy and thus contributed to its effective-
ness…For Israel, the essential point is the
association of the Franco regime with the Nazi-
Fascist alliance that corroded the moral founda-
tions of civilized life and inflicted upon the
human race its most terrible and devastating
ordeal…28
While Franco did not officially recognize Israel in
1948 because of personal ties to Arab states dating
back to his career as a leader of a Muslim brigade in
Morocco, his regime approached the nascent nation as
part of a strategy to overcome the barriers keeping it
out of the United Nations.  For example, prior to the
aforementioned vote, Franco authorized a Jewish
synagogue to operate in Spain for the first time since
62 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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numbers.
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the Civil War. The Israeli critique above ignored not
only Franco’s efforts in saving 20,000 to 60,000
European Jews during World War II and after it, but
also the delicate political situation that Franco suc-
cessfully navigated to avoid joining the Axis at Ger-
many’s behest.29  In the complicated history of rela-
tions between Spain and the Jewish people, Franco’s
rescue of the Jews during World War II had little
recognizable effect on the official Israeli stance toward
him later.  By labeling El Caudillo as a Nazi collabora-
tor and disregarding his pro-Jewish actions, the Israeli
government crafted a dubious place for him in Judeo-
Spanish history. 
El Caudillo’s rescue of thousands of Jews had a
prior legal basis.  The 1924 Primo de Rivera law
provided that any individual of Spanish ancestry living
outside Spain was entitled to the privileges of Spanish
citizenship without ever having to set foot in the
country.  Franco first oversaw the execution of this law
in 1924 and 1925 when, as an army major, he evacu-
ated several hundred Jews from the Moroccan port city
of Tetuan.  This law did more than simply entitle
Sephardic Jews to Spanish citizenship; it afforded
them the protection of the government.30  Sephardim
living abroad were under the authority of Spanish
sovereignty.  The Germans accepted Franco’s law
almost without question, because in the Spanish-Nazi
relationship, El Caudillo had leverage over his German
counterpart.
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Germany expected Spain to enter World War II on
the Axis side after aiding Franco in his defeat of the
Republicans.  Franco, however, was not eager to win
one war just to enter a larger war against the Allies.
The regime’s quarrel did lay with the Communists and
their sympathizers, but not to the extent that Franco
could realistically charge into the Axis camp.  It would
not have been popular among his supporters, and the
Head of State would not plunge Spain into a new
round of political and social turmoil.  Although Spain
allowed Nazi u-boats to patrol its waters, its assistance
to the Fuhrer would not amount to much more than
mouthing the party line at the onset of the war in
order to keep the Wehrmacht out of the Pyrenees.
Hitler could not force Spain into the war against her
will either.  Risking a guerilla war on his rear should
he cross the Pyrenees into the Basque country was too
great a risk for Germany to take while Franco at least
appeared to be an active sympathizer.  Franco con-
stantly put off entering the war, much to Hitler’s
annoyance, by requesting items like large quantities of
gasoline that he knew Germany could not dispense
with.  When, in the early months of 1943, the Germans
concluded that Spain would never enter the conflict,
they had no alternative but to curse themselves.31  The
Spanish leader’s policy of issuing visas to claimants of
Sephardic ancestry in occupied territories and letting
others cross the Pyrenees and reach refugee camps in
Navarre annoyed German authorities, and there was a
faction of German generals advocating attacking
Spain. The German Navy actually sunk a Spanish
vessel as a warning shot to the dictator, but Franco
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did not alter his outwardly ambiguous stance.  After
the war, official Israeli policy, by indicting Franco,
would fail to evaluate the complex political situations
that he overcame domestically during the Civil War
and internationally during World War II.
Cold War Politics and Israeli-Spanish Reconciliation
Israel’s initial rejection of Franco’s Spain resulted
partly from its own internal political complexities.  In
1950, the leaders of the Sephardic communities in a
dozen cities worldwide telegraphed Israeli Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion in another vain attempt to
get Israel to lift the Spanish blockade.  Their efforts
were blocked by what they saw as the Ashkenazi-
dominated government’s move to display its suprem-
acy over the Sephardim.  The Ashkenazi (Jews of
eastern European descent) Mapai and Mapam parties,
both socialist and committed to left-wing causes,
preserved the image of Franco as a Nazi sympathizer
regardless of signs of a more sympathetic Sephardic
perspective.32  During the mid-1950s, when Spain was
finally admitted into the U.N. and established an overt
alliance with the United States, Franco had the oppor-
tunity to combine the rebirth of the crusade, now
versus Communism, which was always central to his
interpretation of Spanish history with a move to
improve his relations with Israel.  The two nations
found themselves in the same geopolitical situation.
Both buffers against Communist expansion, Spain
would be for the western Mediterranean what Israel
was for the eastern Mediterranean – a strategic out-
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post.33  Even though Spain had finally been released
from its forced diplomatic obscurity and was moderniz-
ing its economy based on an increasingly sophisticated
technocracy in the late 1950s, the memory of Spanish
volunteers fighting on the side of the Axis during the
Second World War still kept the possibility of an Israeli
reconciliation remote. 
Franco’s rescue of the Jews was not finished in the
1940s, however.  In response to a 1956-1960 cam-
paign to relocate 2,733 Moroccan Jews from the ports
of Ceuta and Melilla to Israel via Malaga, Israeli
Sephardim urged their government to court Spain.34
Despite protests from Franco’s Arab allies, Sephardim
leaders in both countries promoted an exhibition of
books on the Sephardic experience in Spain.  In 1960,
General Franco hosted a Sephardic delegation that
included the Chief Sephardic Rabbi of Great Britain,
and Spain established the Institute of Sephardi Stud-
ies in the following year.35  Culturally, ties between the
two nations increased, but that could not derail the
political stalemate reached during the Six-Day War of
1967.  
This war also had a profound impact among more
sensitive Spanish politicians, who thought that Israel’s
lightning victory over the Arab coalition called into
question the extent to which Franco should follow a
pro-Arab foreign policy.  However, this change in
opinion was neutralized by later Israeli policy toward
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Gibraltar.  When the Spanish government put forth a
resolution seeking to wrest Gibraltar away from British
hands in December 1967, Spain’s Arab allies voted in
favor, but Israel abstained on the grounds that Franco
had allowed volunteers to fight on Hitler’s side while
Gibraltar held out as an allied stronghold during
World War II.  Again, the influence of Franco’s pro-Axis
image came to bear on Cold War politics and Israeli-
Spanish reconciliation.  Nevertheless, cooperation did
exist between the two countries’ secret services, and
American pressure forced Spain to make available the
American base at Rota as a logistical staging point for
Israeli missions during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  
By this time, Franco had begun fighting a series of
serious illnesses which rapidly weakened him.  The
consummate crusader, Franco clung to life for two
years while his government decided its future.  The
young prince Juan Carlos II, Franco’s appointed
successor since 1947, welcomed establishing official
diplomatic relations with Israel.  Such a step would
improve the image of Spain in the United States, as it
was the last Western European nation without rela-
tions with Jerusalem.  However, acting Prime Minister
Adolfo Suarez inherited from Franco a fragile relation-
ship with Spain’s Arab allies; approximately 90% of
Spain’s petroleum was supplied by Iran and its neigh-
bors.  This dependency created a rift between the
United States, who felt that Spain was being black-
mailed, and the Spanish government, who was not yet
ready to handle confronting the Arab world.  In 1979,
Suarez welcomed a visit from PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat and sparked controversy among European and
American observers.  Spain and Israel would not speak
of diplomatic ties for another six years.  
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The rise of the socialist PSOE government in the
mid-1980s under Felipe Gonzalez brought to fruition
a process begun in the early days of Francisco
Franco’s regime.  Although Franco was frustrated by
the political nature of the Spanish-Israeli reconcilia-
tion process and viewed the plight of the Sephardim as
a question of “Spanish identity,” the socialist Gonzalez
galvanized the voices of those repressed by Franco’s
regime to create an image that was congruent with the
Jewish memory of El Caudillo.  Those who remem-
bered the Spanish Republic, the International Bri-
gades, and the early anti-Franco struggle now spear-
headed the creation of cultural links that led to the
events of April 14, 1986.  On that day, Spanish Am-
bassador Pedro Lopez Aguirrebengoa presented his
diplomatic papers in Jerusalem and was greeted by
President Yitzhak Herzog with “Welcome after 500
years!”  King Juan Carlos II declared, “Spain has
overcome a situation that had not corresponded with
our own history nor with the present course of our
country.”  Achieving the status of a credible, modern,
parliamentary democracy required that Spain, accord-
ing to its own standards, finally meet this critical goal.
Examining Franco’s regime through the Jewish-
Israeli lens reveals one of the General’s key shortcom-
ings; he took criticism of Spain as a personal insult.
A personal bitterness toward the Israeli governments
of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s arguably created yet
another obstacle to reconciliation.  It appears that the
exit of Franco was a necessary step in the final diplo-
matic recognition ten years after his death.  Both
Franco’s regime and Felipe Gonzalez’ PSOE Party
viewed relations with Israel as a historic problem
grounded in the plight of the Sephardim.  Perhaps the
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Israelis needed the equivalent of a pacto del olvido for
themselves that would erase El Caudillo Axis ties from
the Judeo-Spanish historical record.  
As Spain and Israel enjoy full diplomatic relations
today, El Caudillo’s influence on the end result goes
uncelebrated and largely unrecognized.  Although
Franco had the power to create and institutionalize a
uniquely Spanish memory that he felt had been lost as
Spain declined from its zenith to the backwater it
became into the 19th and 20th centuries, he could not
guarantee the preservation of a positive memory for
himself after his death.  Franco’s inability to bridge the
gap between a personally relevant, politically sound,
economically expedient Arab friendship and an Israeli
alliance probably arose from the contradiction posed
for Franco’s policy makers between “Spanishness” as
a mythologized intellectual and cultural exclusiveness
on the one hand and a nostalgic inclusiveness on the
other, evidenced by the general’s protection of both
Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews.
Ultimately, Franco may share the same fate as his
suppressed domestic political opponents – remem-
bered only by those he personally impacted.  El Pacto
del olvido, in its refusal to open a so-called Pandora’s
Box, forced those who were silenced under the regime
to accept that there would not be any public recogni-
tion of their past lives and memories.36   It can be
noted here that collective memory may result from a
deliberate campaign to define an identity.  It does not
exist without the social commentators, analysts,
politicians, and historians who choose how it is
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constructed.  By either omitting or focusing on partic-
ular details about El Caudillo’s life, contemporary
Spaniards and Israelis have created a particularly
complicated memory of him in the complex history of
Judeo-Spanish relations.
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claimed that he was born in 1906, but that as a teenager he told
Argentinean officials he was born in 1900 in order to get a job,
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Jacqueline Kennedy.
From Saint to Sinner and Back Again:
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis Rehabilitates
Her Image
Kelsey Swanson
It is not uncommon for people to fall from grace
due to a vast array of reasons, including divorce,
crime, and debt.  Can the fallen possibly redeem
themselves in the eyes of those who matter most?  The
case of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis offers a powerful
example of the role that the disgraced can play in
rebuilding their images.  On 20 October 1968, Jacque-
line Kennedy, previously beloved as the brave widow of
the slain President of the United States, shocked the
world, not by wearing a new Valentino or trying out a
new hairstyle, but by getting married.  Headlines
across the globe exclaimed: “America has Lost a Saint,”
“Jackie, How Could You?” and “Jack Kennedy Dies
Today a Second Time.”1  What heinous act caused
people around the world to recoil in disbelief and
disgust?   The beautiful, young widow of the beloved
President John F. Kennedy did not remarry a youthful,
handsome American.  Instead, the thirty-nine year-old
Jacqueline Kennedy married Aristotle Onassis, a Greek
twenty-three years her senior.2  Not only was Onassis
older and extremely wealthy, but he was also foreign,
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short, unattractive, and overweight.  The American
public condemned the marriage as an insult to the
memory of the assassinated President. 
Jacqueline Kennedy had fallen from her pedestal;
overnight she had gone from national icon to villain.
Yet, by the time of her death in 1994, Jacqueline
Onassis had once again found her way back into the
hearts of the American public.  What can account for
such a turnaround?   It was no accident or merely the
result of Aristotle Onassis’s death in 1975; it was the
conscious effort of a woman determined to rehabilitate
her image by giving the press an alternative focus
beyond her wealth and unpopular second marriage. 
This paper is an examination of the calculated role
Kennedy Onassis played in the revival of her image,
tracing her fall from grace to her death, based on
contemporary popular newspaper and magazine
accounts.  It compares her portrayal in popular
periodicals in the period following her marriage to
Aristotle Onassis (1968-1975) to her portrayal in the
years after his death (1976-1994).  Kennedy Onassis
will be revealed as a woman who controlled her image
and consciously rehabilitated it, who learned the value
of being perceived in a positive light, and whose
actions were sometimes calculated to benefit her
public persona.
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis’s celebrity status is
unique in U.S. history.  As First Lady, she was beloved
for her youth, grace, and style.  She was the lovely wife
of the youngest President ever elected.  The American
public adored her as “the most beautiful and romantic
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legend we had ever had in a First Lady.”3  It was not
just Americans who were charmed: Charles de Gaulle,
President of France, was smitten with her, as were
other foreign heads of state and their populations.  In
fact, from 1962 until her remarriage in 1968, Jacque-
line Kennedy, according to the Gallup poll, was the
most admired woman in the world.4  Unlike her
immediate predecessors as First Lady, Bess Truman
and Mamie Eisenhower, Kennedy brought glamour,
youth, and elegance to the White House, elevating the
status of the Presidency.  The Kennedys were the
closest thing to American royalty.  People seemed to
relate to Jacqueline Kennedy, not just as the First
Lady, but as “our” First Lady.  After the assassination
of her husband, she was depicted as the brave widow,
holding the country together during its period of
mourning.  She became an American “saint,” clearly
enduring heartache, but with the inner strength to
remain poised and dignified.
As First Lady, she was admired for her selfless
devotion to her husband and children.  Her two
children always came first, and she tried to make their
childhoods in the White House as normal as possible.
Her feelings about the importance of motherhood were
clear: “If you bungle raising your children, I don’t think
whatever else you do well matters very much.”5  She
strove to provide her children with ordinary childhood
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experiences despite their extraordinary family circum-
stances.  She organized a nursery school in the White
House and arranged for her daughter to ride her pony
on the front lawn.  While she was the President’s
proud wife and dedicated supporter, the shy Mrs.
Kennedy stayed out of the political arena for the most
part, preferring to protect her family’s privacy.6  When
it came to attending a political event or staying with
her children, the First Lady would often choose the
latter, endearing her to the American public.  In
addition to being the sacrificing family woman, Ken-
nedy was a patron of the arts and a gracious host,
organizing magnificent dinners and entertainment in
the White House.  Her pet project was the restoration
of White House furnishings, including paintings,
furniture, and sculptures, to remind Americans of
their nation’s history.7  She appeared on television in
February of 1962 in “A Tour of the White House with
Mrs. John F. Kennedy” to explain the restoration to the
public.  She appeared endearingly shy, talking in her
whispery voice.  This TV special presented to the world
a woman who cared about her family, carrying out the
duties and responsibilities of home and country.
 Jacqueline Kennedy’s rise to fame and celebrity
was not of her own choosing.  She became famous for
being the beautiful wife, and later widow, of a popular
President.  Unlike other famous women of her genera-
tion, such as Elizabeth Taylor, whose celebrity status
was based on her outrageous lifestyle and beauty as
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much as her skills as an actress, Jacqueline Kennedy’s
celebrity was based on the man in her life, not on
anything really remarkable that she had done in her
own right.  Consequently, she erased her virtuous
image as Mrs. John F. Kennedy by remarrying.  The
American public was stunned and horrified, causing
her popularity to come crashing down.  They would
not accept her as anything but the brave widow of
President Kennedy, let alone the wife of a man who
was his complete opposite by so many standards.
Kennedy, knowing how much the public loved her
for remaining “true” to her slain husband’s memory,
married Aristotle Onassis anyway.  Why did she take
an action that would bring certain public disapproval?
Robert Kennedy, President Kennedy’s brother, was
assassinated in Los Angeles on 5 June 1968.  He was
the person who had comforted and supported Jacque-
line Kennedy after her husband’s death.  Since they
had grown remarkably close, his death hit her particu-
larly hard.  After this tragedy, Mrs. Kennedy remarked,
“I despise America, and I don’t want my children to live
here anymore.  If they are killing Kennedys, my kids
are the number one targets.”8  Aristotle Onassis, who
had provided her a safe, private haven in which to
recuperate in August 1963 following the death of her
son Patrick, was the perfect answer to her problems.
With his immense wealth and power, he could protect
her and her children and give them much needed
privacy, especially with his army of 200 security
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guards.9  The problem for the American public was
that, in most ways, he was the antithesis of Kennedy’s
first husband.  While John F. Kennedy was young and
handsome, Onassis was old and ugly.  He was not an
American, but rather a Greek divorcee.  He even had
been arrested in the United States in February 1954
and charged with criminal conspiracy for illegally
buying oil tankers.10  In the words of a seventy-year old
retired bookkeeper: “She could have done better.  To
us she was royalty, a princess, and I think she could
have married a prince.  Or at least someone who
looked like a prince.”11  In one simple act, Jacqueline
Kennedy transformed herself from saint to despicable
sinner.  
During her marriage to Aristotle Onassis, Jacque-
line Kennedy Onassis was portrayed as a spendthrift
and a reckless woman.  Aristotle Onassis was a
shrewd businessman, having amassed close to a
billion dollars in real estate, planes, ships, and art.12
He owned Skorpios, a 500-acre island in the Ionian
Sea, and the yacht Christina, both widely described in
the press.  The Christina reportedly featured forty-two
telephones, faucets made out of gold, and a huge
swimming pool, not to mention two El Greco paintings,
a $25,000 jade Buddha, and barstools covered with
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      14Liz Smith, “The New York Life of Jacqueline Onassis,” Ladies’ Home
Journal, Feb. 1970, 56.
      15“The Kennedys: Identity Crisis,” Newsweek, 4 Nov. 1968, 42.
      16“People,” Time, 8 Aug. 1969, 35.
the foreskins of whales.13  He had additional homes
around the globe, including a villa in Athens, a vaca-
tion home in Monte Carlo, a penthouse in Paris, and a
hacienda in Montevideo.14  The couple regularly took
exotic vacations to places like the Bahamas and Rome,
as well as the routine flight between Greece and New
York, where Kennedy Onassis still owned a fifteen-
room apartment.  This jet-setting woman, living
ostentatiously in the lap of luxury was not the shy,
selfless, and sacrificing mother the American public
had come to respect.
Further proof, in the public’s estimation, of Ken-
nedy Onassis’s turn to selfish materialism was her
enjoyment of the lavish gifts her husband bestowed
upon her.  His wedding gift to her was $1.2 million in
jewelry, including two twenty-four-carat gold bracelets,
a huge, heart-shaped ruby ring surrounded by dia-
monds, and a pair of ruby and diamond earrings that
matched the immense ring.15  On her fortieth birthday,
less than one year after their wedding, Onassis gave
his wife a forty-carat diamond, one carat for each year
of her life, estimated to cost between $400,000 and
$1,000,000.16  In December 1969 Ladies’ Home Jour-
nal published an article entitled “$10,000,000 Jewels
of Elizabeth Taylor and Jacqueline Onassis,” which
included a description of the many different pieces of
jewelry Aristotle Onassis had given to his wife of, at
that point, only fourteen months.  Kennedy Onassis
was so concerned with jewels that when she lost her
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wedding ring, she cried and Onassis had to console
her.17  She did not weep during President Kennedy’s
funeral, yet she cried over lost jewelry.  This was
definitely not the brave, controlled First Lady of
Camelot, but rather a materialistic, spoiled brat.
In addition to her obsession for jewelry were
Kennedy Onassis’s outrageous spending habits.
Onassis gave her an allowance of $30,000 a month to
spend on whatever she liked, but he eventually cut it
down to $20,000 because she continually exceeded her
limit.18  Still, $20,000 was more than the average
American made in an entire year.  The $60,000 sable
coat, the 200 pairs of shoes she bought in a single
outing, and the $650,000 spent on a nine-day trip to
Tehran, all noted in subsequent literature, were not
written about in contemporary, popular periodicals.
Other extravagant purchases, however, were detailed.
Kennedy Onassis and her sister Lee Radziwill would
often go shopping together in the most exclusive and
expensive stores in New York, such as Lafayette on
East 50th Street and Halston Ltd on 68th and
Madison.19  Kennedy Onassis purchased mass quanti-
ties of furs, shoes, handbags, cosmetics, and antiques.
In the first year of their marriage alone, the Onassises
spent twenty million dollars, leading Fred Sparks to
write The $20,000,000 Honeymoon: Jackie and Ari’s
First Year, calculating that the couple spent an average
of $384,615.38 per week.20  
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It was as if Kennedy Onassis had no self-control or
appreciation for anyone or anything beyond herself.
She appeared to be the classic “shopaholic.”  Although
some journalists such as Gloria Emerson tried to
present Kennedy Onassis as just a normal mother who
took taxis rather than chauffeured limousines, even
they discussed the lavish decorations in Kennedy
Onassis’s apartment and the opulence of the
Christina.21  Columnist Liz Smith especially tried to
stress the normal aspects of Kennedy Onassis’s life,
saying that she lived the “relatively simple life of any
well-to-do New York matron,” yet even Smith devoted
the majority of her article to Kennedy Onassis’s
possessions, specifically the décor of her apartment,
while noting that she had a maid, a cook, a nurse, and
additional servants.22  As the marriage progressed, the
couple routinely spent almost nine months out of the
year apart, carrying out separate lives.  It was clear to
the American public that their relationship was not a
love match.  Onassis was Kennedy Onassis’s protector,
while she was his trophy wife.  Her habits confirmed
the impression that she was a gold-digger who had
cold-heartedly married Onassis for his money so that
she could indulge in a decadent, hedonistic lifestyle. 
The American public disapproved of more than just
her self-indulgent materialism.  She was also a “public
sinner,” betraying her religion by marrying Onassis.
A widowed Catholic, Kennedy Onassis violated church
law by marrying the divorced Onassis.  Onassis was
Greek Orthodox, and the two were married in a Greek
Orthodox ceremony.  In an announcement covered
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widely in Christian journals of the day, it was made
clear by the Vatican that Kennedy Onassis could no
longer receive the sacraments.23  In the opinion of
many Catholics, she had committed adultery by
marrying Onassis, whose first wife was still alive.24
Catholics chided Richard Cardinal Cushing, Arch-
bishop of Boston, who defended the marriage by
ridiculing assertions that Kennedy Onassis should be
considered a public sinner.25  As a result of the ongo-
ing harassment by a public determined to denounce
her as wanton, Cushing resigned at the end of the
year.  Even his status as bishop failed to protect him
from the consequences of defending the despised
Kennedy Onassis.
As Kennedy Onassis’s spending habits began to
take their toll on her relationship with her husband,
she spent even more time in New York with her two
children while he remained in Greece.   There were
rumors in the press that Aristotle Onassis was going
to file for divorce, but when he died on 15 March 1975
in a Paris hospital, no legal proceedings had been
initiated. Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis received over
twenty million dollars from his estate, placing her in a
financially stable position as she started her life once
again as a widow in New York.      
Yet, Kennedy Onassis’s life seemed to change focus
from her previous materialism.  Although she was by
no means poor, her financial status was more con-
strained compared to the riches she had at her dis-
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posal while married to Aristotle Onassis.  She could
not hide on Skorpios anymore, behind Onassis’s small
army of guards, or recklessly spend his money.  She
was now on her own.  What else was she left to do but
to get on better terms with the public, to become
beloved once again?  According to one relative, “She
knows exactly what she wants, she’s single-minded
about it and she goes for it.”26  Jacqueline Onassis was
determined to reclaim some of her previous exalted
status.  She began by giving the media a new focus.
She would be more of a typical woman to whom
regular Americans could relate—working, caring for
her family, and becoming involved in charitable
causes.
One of the first steps she took was to reinvent
herself as a working woman.  On 22 September 1975,
she started as a consulting editor at Viking Press four
days a week.  For a salary of $10,000 a year, she
placed her own phone calls, made her own copies, and
warmed her own coffee.  Magazine stories proclaimed
a “new” Jacqueline Onassis, who would no longer live
in the shadow of her husbands, but would instead be
her own woman.27  Rather than focus almost exclu-
sively on her still considerable expenditures, these
articles were primarily dedicated to her work and
family.  When Kennedy Onassis’s material goods were
mentioned, they were discussed as an afterthought.
Ladies’ Home Journal was quick to point out that she
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had not spent $30,000 on clothes in 1975, but rather
was now a pants and T-shirt kind of woman.28  
After leaving Viking, she began work at Doubleday
in February 1978, reminding the public that she was
still a hard-working woman.  Working three days a
week, initially as an associate editor at $20,000 a year,
she continued to be a pleasant co-worker, keeping the
door to her “spartan space” always open.29  This vision
of Jacqueline Onassis stood in stark contrast to the
woman who had relaxed on a spacious, 325-foot yacht,
always trying to keep visitors out.  The “new” Onassis
also received praise from Ms. and Publishers Weekly,
“serious” publications beyond the circle of magazines
for middle-aged women that usually featured her.  
Many mothers were entering paid jobs for the first
time in the 1970s.  As a member of the paid workforce
herself, she was able to reconnect with the American
public, especially women, by sharing a common
experience.  She explained in an interview with the
feminist Ms. magazine, “There they [women] were, with
the highest education, and what were they going to do
when the children were grown—watch the raindrops
coming down the windowpane?…Of course women
should work if they want to.”30  She was no longer the
tragic widow or extravagant whore, with her identity
determined by her husbands, but a woman with
significant responsibilities.  Although she would never
be an average citizen, Onassis appeared more
grounded and accessible.  She could enjoy her three
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million dollar beach house and continue getting her
hair done at Kenneth’s with impunity because she was
performing paid work.  Average citizens were now
praising her, including a taxi driver who thought it was
great that she worked even though it was not finan-
cially necessary.31  Entering the paid workforce was a
major step in the rehabilitation of her image.
Even as she enjoyed the positive publicity gener-
ated by her new job, Jacqueline Onassis re-focused on
her two children, who were eighteen and fifteen in
1975.  Although her children had always been impor-
tant, they seemed to take second place during her
second marriage to her time spent in Greece and on
her spending sprees.  The “new” Jacqueline Onassis
rekindled the mother-daughter bond with Caroline
Kennedy, her eldest child.  By 1986, an entire article
was devoted to her approval of Caroline’s Jewish
fiancée, Edwin Schlossberg, emphasizing that she and
her daughter agreed on wedding plans.32  Rather than
the controlling mother of the bride who dictated every
detail of the ceremony, she was the supportive parent
behind-the-scenes.  Following Caroline Kennedy’s
marriage, Jacqueline Onassis reportedly spoke to her
by telephone often, visited her frequently, and doted on
her daughter’s three children.33  She was no longer
just a caring mother, but also a loving grandmother.
In her relations with her son John F. Kennedy, Jr., she
was portrayed as both a disciplinarian and a sup-
porter.  She advised him on his romances and studies,
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vetoing his decision to attend boarding school.  When
Kennedy graduated from prep school, she attended the
ceremony, beaming as the proud mother.34  However,
when her son became interested in acting as a career,
Onassis conveyed her displeasure, communicating
what she felt was in his best interest.35
The fact that her children turned out to be success-
ful, well-adjusted adults, even after all the tragedies in
their lives, was considered a testament to Jacqueline
Onassis’s maternal abilities, which were frequently
praised in the press.  She focused on being a more
typical mother, bragging about her children, dealing
with their problems, and giving motherly advice.36 
She had redeemed herself in the eyes of the average
American as a giving, selfless mother.   
Jacqueline Onassis also returned to her interest in
historic preservation, serving as a board member of the
Municipal Art Society.  She led the “Landmark Ex-
press” train trip to gather support for the preservation
of Grand Central Station, and the prevention of a
proposed fifty-five-story office tower of steel and glass
over the terminal.37  Her association with Grand
Central began in 1975, just as her marriage to Aris-
totle Onassis was unraveling.  Whenever Grand
Central was mentioned, her name also appeared, often
accompanied by a quote explaining her involvement in
this worthy cause.  She also played an important role
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in obtaining landmark status for the Greek Revival
buildings in New York’s Snug Harbor, confirming her
concern for preserving American culture, a subtle echo
of the White House restoration project of 1962.
 Jacqueline Onassis continued to rub shoulders
with the rich and famous, but, so the American public
would not object, she spent her money on charitable
causes as well.  Instead of attending events for social
purposes only, she attended benefits for the Municipal
Art Society and other worthy causes.  She organized a
dinner for the art society in honor of the artist Isamu
Noguchi, serving as the gracious hostess, another
similarity to her role as First Lady.  Even her private
dinner parties were smaller and less frequent than
before.  She was seen as a contributor to society, not
just a voracious consumer. 
Although people could relate to her through her
job, her children, and her involvement in charitable
organizations, it would always be her status as a
Kennedy that was most endearing.  Renewed involve-
ment in the Kennedy family was another successful
part of the rehabilitation of her image.  She was
involved in the John F. Kennedy Library and Museum,
attending a number of fund-raisers and dedications in
her late husband’s honor, and she also reached out to
other Kennedys, utilizing her Onassis ties.  She helped
recruit Greek-Americans in support of her former
brother-in-law Edward Kennedy during his presiden-
tial campaign, although she refused to speak on his
behalf, limiting herself to handshakes.38  She attended
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the marriage of her niece Sydney Lawford, and the
wedding of another niece, Maria Shriver, to the actor
Arnold Schwarzenegger.  These renewed connections
with the Kennedy clan helped to remind the public of
her status as the beloved wife of her first husband, the
martyr, and of the time when she basked in his re-
flected glory.
By the time of her death on 19 May 1994, Jacque-
line Onassis’s campaign to rehabilitate her image was
so successful that she was internationally mourned
and revered as one of the most celebrated women of
the twentieth century.  She had once again become a
“saint” in the public’s estimation, overcoming the
disappointment and hatred engendered by her mar-
riage to Aristotle Onassis. She was raised in high
society and was never just an average citizen, but the
American people found her down to earth as First
Lady.  They would not, however, accept Jacqueline
Onassis, the rich, trophy wife of a Greek tycoon.
Although in the later years of her life she dated
Maurice Tempelsman, another short, fat wealthy man,
they never married, keeping their relationship very
private.  She had learned that for a former First Lady
who was famous for being the wife of a popular man,
remarrying was not acceptable, nor was spending huge
amounts of money, unless she was employed. 
After John F. Kennedy was assassinated, his widow
told historian T. H. White to “rescue Jack from all the
‘bitter people’ who were going to write about him in
history."39  Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis also did not
want to leave it to the biased court of public opinion to
judge her life.  She took the initiative, playing an active
86 Historical Perspectives March 2005
role in how she would be remembered.  No one could
ever forget her grace as First Lady or the shock when
she became Mrs. Onassis.  She could never totally
control the press.  However, Jacqueline Kennedy
Onassis knew that she had the ability to transcend
previous press incarnations and define her life by her
actions.  By consciously focusing on her job, her role
as mother, her commitment to the arts, and her first
husband’s memory as President, she remade her
image.  Although she was well bred and extremely
wealthy, the average American could relate to her
newly formulated life.  She was no longer Jacqueline
Onassis, the villain, or even Jacqueline Kennedy, the
saint, but rather Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, a
woman Americans could pity, love, and envy, yet
respect all the same.
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A Calculated Crusade:
Venice, Commerce, and the Fourth Cru-
sade
James B. Hooper
When Urban II preached the First Crusade to the
Council of Clermont at the end of the 11th century, he
urged a pre-emptive strike against the Muslims whose
military advances continually threatened the eastern
boundaries of the Byzantine Empire.  Exhorting his
spiritual subjects to “destroy that vile race from the
lands of our friends,” Urban inspired an emotional
response from western Christians based on the fact
that their Muslim opponents differed so greatly from
them in culture, religion, and ethnicity.1  The popular
polarization of light versus dark, Christ versus Mo-
hammed, west versus east, and good versus evil filled
many Europeans with hatred and ignited the flames of
crusade that would not be extinguished for hundreds
of years.  However, closer examination of the Crusades
and the relationships developed therein reveal that a
diametric reduction of the conflict is grossly inaccu-
rate.  In fact, the intimate trade relationships that the
Venetians developed as a result of the early Crusades
gave them specific knowledge which proved paramount
in the redirection of the Fourth Crusade through
Constantinople. 
As the First Crusade took form and the Holy Land
erupted in religious conflict, the Christians occupied
88 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      2Jonathan Phillips, “The Latin East,” in Jonathan Riley-
Smith, ed., The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades
(Oxford, 1999), 115.
      3Ibid.  
a number of territories—including Jerusalem—known
as the Crusader States.  After stabilizing the region as
much as possible, a practical problem emerged.  Since
all the Muslims had not been expelled from the Levant,
the two sides would be forced to live in peace together.
While the war had been founded on cultural incompat-
ibility and religious opposition, neither side could
justify genocide.  When Christians had gained firm
control of the Holy Land and had established the
Crusader States, they allowed Muslims and Jews to
live under their jurisdiction with relative freedom,
adopting “an attitude of relative tolerance towards
other creeds.”2  According to Jonathan Phillips, the
Christians lived side-by-side with Muslims not neces-
sarily out of any religious concession, but simply
because “it was impractical for the Franks to drive out
or persecute all those who did not observe the Latin
rite.”3  
The interfaith communities that developed as a
result of the First Crusade led to a dramatic rise in
cross-cultural contact.  Although there was no love
lost between Christians and Muslims, out of necessity
and comparative advantage, they began trading with
one another.  The Muslims could obtain goods from
the East that were not available in great quantities in
Europe, while in exchange, the westerners could offer
raw materials from the countryside as well as finished
goods from the more specialized urban centers of the
medieval west.  In addition, the Crusaders who settled
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in the Levant harvested such cash crops as sugar and
cotton, as well as millet, maize, grapes and olives for
export, making the East a thriving commercial center.4
Most of this economic activity took shape in the form
of the Islamic kharaj, a tax system where the indige-
nous subjects of the Crusader States paid their Chris-
tian rulers from their crops.5
Before the Crusades, the Mediterranean was
already the scene of a robust inter-cultural economy.
The merchant city-states of Southern Italy, especially
Amalfi, dominated trade in the Southeast Mediterra-
nean in places such as Jerusalem and Alexandria.
The Amalfitans were mostly involved in the import of
luxury items from the East for the wealthy courts and
monasteries throughout Southern Europe and the
Byzantine Empire.  These southern Italian merchants
maintained a level of maritime dominance throughout
the tenth and eleventh centuries, and it was only later
that the Venetians, the Pisans and the Genoese
surpassed their southern rivals in the control of the
Levant microeconomy.6
Nevertheless, Northern Italians did have an eastern
Mediterranean presence in the pre-Crusading years.
A huge collection of correspondence and contracts
found in Old Cairo contains hundreds of letters
pertaining to Egyptian and Mediterranean trade during
the period from 900-1300.  One letter written in
approximately 1060 by an Egyptian merchant named
Nahray ben Nissim mentions the Italians present in
90 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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Alexandria at the time.  Indiscriminately referred to as
Rumi, the Italians are mentioned in a number of other
documents buying indigo and brazilwood, a material
grown in India and used as a red dye for textiles.  In
another letter, the Italians are involved in the purchase
of large quantities of flax.  The author of the letters is
under the impression that the Rumi will pay excessive
prices for these commodities, and will pay the same for
poor quality flax as high quality flax.  This assessment
seems to indicate either the value and scarcity of these
products in the west, or the incompetence of the
Italians.  One letter specifically identifies Genoese
merchants in Alexandria, so we know that the
Amalfitans did not operate a maritime monopoly.7
But, prior to the crusades, the involvement of northern
Italian merchants in Egyptian commerce was neither
regular nor widespread.8
Interestingly enough, the advent of the crusading
era undermined the Amalfitans’ commercial superior-
ity.  Tied up in the politics of the turbulent region of
southern Italy, the Amalfitans could not coordinate a
fleet for the First Crusade, and their northern counter-
parts managed to obtain the privilege of the crusaders
for their naval assistance and religious devotion.  In
exchange for their commitment to the crusading cause
by 1104, the Genoese received the first honors, receiv-
ing total exemption from commercial duties at a
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number of Holy Land ports.9  The Venetians profited
considerably from their crusade to assist King Baldwin
in the defense of the Kingdom of Jerusalem from 1122-
1124.  They were given various rights in all the major
cities of the Kingdom, and were promised one third of
Tyre and Ascalon if they helped the Christians capture
them.10  In the process, the Venetians encountered and
destroyed Egypt’s most effective naval fleet as the
Muslims attempted to regain a foothold in the Levant.11
Beyond that, the Venetians managed to ravage enough
Byzantine holdings to scare emperor John II
Comnenus into issuing a new chrysobull to Venice,
renewing their inordinately advantageous commercial
privileges in Eastern Europe.  So, for the Northern
Italian merchant states, the Crusades proved to be
beneficial in more than just a spiritual dimension.  
The early Crusades gave rise to Acre as a major
port of the eastern Mediterranean, and the subsequent
control of the coastline of the Levant achieved by the
conquest of Tyre (with the exception of Ascalon)
ensured the presence of western merchants in the east
for years to come.  The popular trade route that
emerged in the mid-1100s took merchants from
northern Italy with finished goods to deliver to Acre,
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and then on to Alexandria, the more profitable market,
with luxury goods and more attractive investments.  In
this system, Acre is merely a link point between the
Frankish settlers and the Egyptians, an excuse to
connect the worlds of Islam and Christianity.12  Adolf
Schaube contends that by 1150, a sophisticated
monetary system had developed that transferred silver
from the west into gold that was coined in Jerusalem
and used to purchase goods in Alexandria.  By this
time, Alexandria had established itself as a major hub
of economic prosperity, and both Italians and Crusad-
ers had taken a significant interest in it.13 
Alexandria gained such a distinct advantage over
the Christian port of Acre by the 1150s, primarily
because of its geographic advantage.  As the main
trading locus of the Egyptian region, merchants in
Alexandria were able to gain access to the world of the
west through the Mediterranean, and had access to
the vast resources of India and the east by virtue of its
proximity to the Red Sea.  According to David Abulafia,
“Alexandria was the interchange point between [two]
otherwise largely self-contained trading systems.”14
Although operating on favorable terms with easterners,
the Christians of Acre could never hope to enjoy that
kind of connection because of their location on the
comparatively static Levant coast, and the Egyptians
had control of the Red Sea.
At this point, the Muslims were regaining a signifi-
cant level of military power and political control over
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the regions they had lost to the Christians during the
first quarter-century of the crusading era.  After their
devastation at the hands of westerners during the First
Crusade, the Muslims lacked the ability to organize a
cohesive political union strong enough to combat their
Christian occupiers until around 1139.  Around this
time, the emir of Aleppo, a Muslim town just to the
east of the major crusader city of Antioch (the seat of
a Christian principality) began to gain control and
command some military authority.  His name was
Zengi, and he set the stage for a dramatic re-unifica-
tion of the Muslim empire when he recaptured the
northeastern crusader city of Edessa in1144.15  Under
Zengi and his son Nur al-Din, the unifying message of
jihad enabled the Muslims to take advantage of
Frankish politicians who were primarily involved in
internal squabbles.  In addition to Christian rulers,
even Muslim leaders of the northeastern portion of the
Holy Land were indiscriminately swept under the
control of Zengi and Nur al-Din.  The rise of the
Zangids was less a divinely inspired reclamation than
an attempt at expanding political sway.16  This rising
threat sparked a new crusade from the west, preached
primarily by Bernard of Clairvaux, which met little
success.17
After the conquest of Damascus by Nur al-Din in
1154 and the acquisition of Ascalon by the Frankish
King Baldwin III, a period of stability followed.  But,
the focus of the political conflicts moved to the south-
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ern region of the Levant, and Egypt came to the
foreground.  By mid-century, the authority of the
Fatimids who controlled the Muslims in North Africa
was beginning to wane.18  Around 1163 Baldwin was
able to “place Egypt under tribute,”19 at least to some
extent.  Soon after his death, Baldwin’s successor,
Amalric, mismanaged his holdings in Egypt and
jeopardized his truce with Nur al-Din in Damascus by
leading a number of sorties into Egypt and Alexandria
over the next 4 years.20  The Christian king intervened
in the intra-territorial dispute between the Fatimid
viziers fighting for political control, but could not make
any advances because he was thwarted by the inter-
vention of Nur al-Din’s head commander, Shirkuh,
who hoped to secure the valuable Egyptian cities for
his own interests.21  In 1167 and 1168, Amalric again
attempted to take over Egypt.  This time, he was
completely expelled and his army was obliterated.  
Amalric’s attempts at strengthening his own
holdings proved to be disastrous and fatal for his
future as a Levant monarch.  In the process, Shirkuh
took the leading role in the Egyptian government.
Within weeks he would die, and his nephew Saladin,
who had assisted him throughout the past years of
military upheaval, would be appointed leader.22
Saladin subsequently initiated the most widespread
unification of the Holy Land in history.  He continued
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to preach the message of jihad and aggressively sought
to reclaim the Near East for Islam and his political
regime.  This platform reached its height with the
conquest of Jerusalem in 1187, and the subsequent
defense of the Holy Land against the Third Crusade led
by Richard of England, Philip of France, and Frederick
Barbarossa.  The Levant was almost completely
retaken by Muslims in this period, and the only major
city in Christian hands after 1193 was the port of Acre.
Upon Saladin’s death in 1195, however, the empire he
united quickly disintegrated.  As so often happens
after the unexpected death of a strong authoritarian
leader, the Muslim empire suffered from a lack of
organization, and factional leaders sought to use their
military power to wrest control of government func-
tions.  Clan struggles followed Saladin’s death, mainly
initiated by his family members.  Under this disorga-
nized Ayyubid confederacy, major regions were parti-
tioned off and given to Saladin’s relatives.  Eventually,
in 1200, As-Adil Sayf Al-Din took some semblance of
control, but the Ayyubid leaders were “frequently at
odds” with one another.23
In Rome at this time, a new, young and headstrong
Pope had come into power advocating a new crusade
to reclaim Jerusalem, attempting to resurrect the same
religious fervor that Urban had elicited from the
knights and commoners of Europe more than a
century before.  Innocent III called his followers to win
back Christ’s city, and by 1201, a treaty had been
signed in Venice, officially organizing what would
become the Fourth Crusade.  By the turn of the
century, knights and nobility interested in the military
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strength of the Levant generally agreed that Jerusalem
could only fall to the Christians if an army traveled
first through Egypt.  Once they took Egypt, the rest
should fall into place.  In the century since Jerusa-
lem’s first capitulation, Egypt’s political strength
constantly threatened the safety of the crusaders
settled in the Levant.  Although its leaders were not
consistently hostile, Egypt remained Muslim-con-
trolled for the duration of the 12th century, a fact that
did not sit well with Europeans in the Levant.  Accord-
ing to Mahmoud Omran, the Egyptians (especially
under the Fatimid caliphate) posed “persistent opposi-
tion” that threatened the continued existence of the
Crusader States.24
In addition, the crusaders of 1201 had learned from
the catastrophic Third Crusade of Richard Coeur de
Lion in the previous decade.  That King gave his
opinion that Egypt was the weakest part of the Muslim
empire, and that any subsequent assaults on Jerusa-
lem must go through Alexandria in order to succeed.25
Furthermore, the previous position held by Alexandria
before Muslim conquest still had to be fresh in the
minds of those with an interest in the strength of the
Roman Church.  Alexandria, along with Rome, Jerusa-
lem, Antioch and Constantinople, had been one of the
original five patriarchates of the Church.  When the
First Crusade was called, the prospect of reuniting the
Church Empire only increased the fervor with which
Europeans set out for the Levant.  At that time, only
two of the original five patriarchates were in “Chris-
tian” hands.  The establishment of the Crusader States
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temporarily reunited most of the original Mediterra-
nean Church.  If the crusaders could regain Alexandria
in 1204 and move north, all the patriarchates could at
last be restored, along with the domination of the
Christian church throughout the Mediterranean.
The chronicler Gunther of Paris, who participated
in the Fourth Crusade, offered a number of explana-
tions for the selection of Egypt as the initial target of
the Jerusalem expedition.  “At this time a truce be-
tween our people and the Barbarians was in effect in
the regions beyond the sea.  Our people could not
violate what they had pledged in good faith.”   The
contract he mentions with the Muslims in Syria would
stand from 1198 to 1203, and had been negotiated in
the interest of protecting the Latins who lived there.
Those Europeans still living in the Levant had negoti-
ated peace with their Islamic neighbors and hoped to
keep conflict to a minimum.26  Gunther also cited the
unanimous agreement of the Crusade leaders Baldwin
of Flanders and Boniface of Montferrat on Alexandria
as the target.  They firmly agreed with Coeur de Lion’s
military assessment of the Muslim East.  Richard’s
statement proved to be even more pertinent due to the
current economic situation in Egypt, at least as it was
perceived by Gunther.  The Nile had been dry for a
period longer than normal, and word had spread to the
west that the formerly lush harvests of the Egyptians
were nonexistent because the land had become infer-
tile.  In an exaggerated estimation of the state of
Egypt’s citizens, Gunther remarked that “almost the
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entire population had either perished, the victim of
famine, or was barely eking out a poor living.”27
Although the situation was not likely this dire, the
Egyptians certainly appeared to be in a vulnerable
position.  Donald Queller seems to agree with Gun-
ther’s analysis, at least to some extent.  The Nile could
then—and still does today—weigh heavily on the
physical well-being of the Egyptian people, and subse-
quently on their political stability.  Queller also cites
hints from earlier crusaders like Amalric in the 1160s
and Reynaud of Châtillon, who led an expedition
against the Egyptians in 1183.28  For a short time
Reynaud’s presence threatened the most important
trade and pilgrimage routes of the Muslims.  In his
Ayyubid history, al-Maqrizi recognized Reynaud’s
intent to take the holy city of Medina.29  The 14th
century Muslim scholar al-Safadi referred to Reynaud
as “the most malicious, evil, and treacherous of the
Franks.”30  While ultimately unsuccessful, Reynaud
and Amalric managed to sufficiently threaten the
Egyptian Muslims and highlight the military reality
that if Egypt fell, Christians would be able to live
comfortably and freely in the Holy Land.  Moreover,
control of Egypt would split the Muslim world in two
sections, divorcing the Middle East and North Africa,
most likely rendering it powerless.31
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The assessment of the crusade leaders about Egypt
seems to have been pretty accurate.  One major
implication of their decision to go to Alexandria was
the necessity for sea travel.  The plan involved a
coastal assault on the great port city, and the crusad-
ers needed to commission an enormous fleet to carry
the proposed 33,500 crusaders necessary to sack the
city.  Therefore, the crusaders negotiated the Treaty of
1201 with the Venetians, who halted a majority of their
commercial activities over the subsequent year in
order to construct the requisite armada.  The decision
to involve the commercially proficient Venetians—the
historically debated fatal flaw of the doomed Fourth
Crusade—had many (mostly negative) implications.
The Venetians’ relationship with Alexandria and the
Egyptian government has fallen under great scrutiny
by historians hoping to find evidence that the Vene-
tians deliberately steered the Fourth Crusade not to
Egypt, but to Constantinople, which the Christians
ended up conquering by the end of their journey.  In
order to analyze this relationship, we must first look
deeper into the commercial history of Alexandria and
its involvement with the Italians.  Earlier, we discussed
the geographic advantage of Alexandria as the central
link of the commercial chain connecting east and west.
Under this advantage, Alexandria became a “major
clearing-house for spices from India and the southern
seas, providing in return a ready market for European
timber and metal.”32  In this environment merchants
could exchange goods to the great economic gain of the
Egyptian government.  For example, cotton, pepper,
and ginger were not even produced in Egypt, yet they
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would pass through the commercial registry of the
Sultan and be heavily taxed.33 
The Sultan had a significant control over the trade
that occurred in Egypt.  In 1183, Ibn Jubayr traveled
from his hometown in North Africa through the Mus-
lim Empire, keeping a detailed itinerary the whole way.
Upon arriving in Alexandria, he made note of the
immediacy with which the Sultan’s agents boarded his
vessel in order to record all the luggage items and food
stores that came with the ship. In addition, they
temporarily confiscated all of the travelers’ personal
belongings for inspection.  Jubayr was particularly
upset when some of his companions’ possessions were
“lost” in this process, most likely stolen by the cus-
toms agents.34  
Some variation of this procedure occurred with
every vessel that entered an Alexandrian harbor.
According to Aziz Atiya, an expert on medieval com-
merce, the Alexandrian agents would remove the sails
and rudders of any ship coming into port.  They also
used the common restraint of a giant chain across the
breakwater, in order to keep merchants from leaving in
the night without paying the fee of one gold piece to
dock at Alexandria.  In addition to these constraints,
more restrictions were imposed on foreigners.  Mer-
chants from abroad could not travel deep into the
channels of the Nile delta or far inland at all, in order
to protect the Red Sea from potential danger.  The
sultans “zealously guarded [the Red Sea] against alien
infiltration,” because it was such a crucial point in the
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protection of Mecca and Medina, and was the site of an
active eastern trade hub.35  In addition to travel
restrictions, foreigners were kept in a funduq (Italian
fondaco), a small neighborhood or simple inn.  The
funduq had to keep its doors closed from nightfall until
dawn, and during Friday prayers.  Highly suspicious
of infidels from the west, the Egyptians enacted these
measures in order to protect their domestic security
against sabotage.36  
In addition to taxation, the state monopolized the
sale and purchase of commodities that came through
Alexandria, and had done so since 1052.  For those
raw materials imported and not marked for re-export,
the Matjar (trade office) would purchase the whole
shipment, and determine the price at which they
would enter the market.37  The Matjar was able to
obtain this monopoly by charging lower duties on
goods sold to the state than those purchased by
private individuals.  They would often resell these
goods, even war materials, on the open market for a
fair profit, after fulfilling state requirements.  Accord-
ing to David Jacoby, an expert on Near Eastern com-
merce, the Matjar would offer to buy commodities such
as timber, iron and pitch at prices that would attract
foreign merchants.  In a letter addressed to the Pisans,
Saladin encourages Pisan investment trade by high-
lighting the potentially high profit levels.38
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During the late Fatimid era, and especially after the
first wave of crusaders took control of the Holy Land,
Egypt became particularly dependent upon the west
for the supply of the war materials.  Before the fall of
Syria to crusaders, Egyptians could simply sail up
their coast to cut timber in the abundant Cilician
forests.39  This advantage was lost in the 12th century,
but they were able to draw western interest through
the Matjar’s monopoly, the eastern luxury items, and
their own production of the minerals.  Alum in particu-
lar was used abundantly in the textile and leather
industries of the Europeans, and therefore in high
demand.  The Egyptians also secured the supply of
timber, pitch and iron through contingent trade
privileges granted on the condition that the merchants
would supply timber and other wartime commodities.40
Under these agreements, many records exist docu-
menting the supply of timber to the Muslims in Alex-
andria from the Pisans and the Genoese during the
height of crusading conflicts.  The Italians rarely
missed an opportunity to capitalize on a profitable
opportunity.41  
The Pisans seemed to have gained the upper hand
in the Egyptian market in the first half of the 12th
century, receiving trade privileges and a funduq in
Alexandria before 1153, and numerous advantages in
subsequent agreements.  According to comments made
by the geographer Zuhri around 1150, it seems that
the Pisans even supplied swords to Alexandria during
the crusades.  Conflicts emerged when the Crusader
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State leaders began to realize that a fair amount of
double-dealing had occurred.  In 1156 King Baldwin III
of Jerusalem offered commercial exemptions to Pisans,
but only to those who did not get involved in the arms
and war commodity trading in Egypt.  Some responded
by cutting off the Egyptians, some continued a secret
trading relationship, and some decided to stay with the
Egyptians after the sultan offered more incentives to
keep their business.42
Although the Pisans had the strongest presence in
Alexandria through the opening years of crusading,
the Genoese and the Venetians were certainly not
excluded.  A Byzantine edict shows that the Venetians
may have supplied war materials to the Muslims in
Alexandria as far back as 971.  With abundant timber
and iron resources in the region surrounding the
lagoon, the Venetians were well equipped to supply
Egypt with the tools of war.  However, their trade focus
and political allegiance lay, for the most part, with the
Byzantines in Constantinople, where they had received
very generous customs considerations since the
chrysobull of 992.  But, this relationship changed
dramatically after Emperor Manuel expelled the
Venetians from Constantinople in 1171, imprisoning
the thousands of merchants who conducted business
in his empire, and confiscating their property.  As a
result, trade between Venice and Egypt immediately
increased.  In fact, Saladin granted the Venetians a
funduq in Alexandria in 1172 at the request of the
Doge himself.  In addition, large shipments of timber
were regularly scheduled for Alexandrian delivery.
Finally, the Venetian diplomatic embassy sent in 1174
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to patch up the misunderstanding with Byzantium
made a winter-long stop with Saladin in Alexandria.
Coincidentally, the main ambassador on that mission
was the same man who would lead the Venetians in
the expedition against Constantinople 30 years later,
the future doge Enrico Dandolo.43
Regarding the events of 1201-1204, it is the con-
tention of this paper that the Venetians had ultimately
decided that they should try to steer the crusaders
away from Egypt, and towards Constantinople or any
other region where they might find economic gains.
Many scholars have supported the claim that the
Sultan of Egypt sent gifts and bribes to the Venetians
in 1202.  These scholars contend that a formal treaty
assured the cooperation of the two powers in diverting
the crusaders, but I see no reason to believe that this
treaty was ever concluded.  It did not need to be.  The
Venetians were smart enough to recognize that their
interests would be better served if they could gain the
favor of the Egyptians and secure Constantinople for
the future.  Even if the Crusade were successful, the
Venetians could not have hoped to take the economy
of Alexandria under their control, and this was made
evident by their actions.  Their actions also proved that
their motives were driven primarily by profits and not
piety.  Venetian ascent to commercial dominance after
the conclusion of the Crusade indicates the nature of
their privileged status within the Muslim kingdom as
a result of their hand in the Crusade’s diversion.
In order to more fully understand the motivations
of Venice with regards to Egypt, we must first address
the council at Montpellier in 1162 and Third Lateran
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Council of 1179, both called by Pope Alexander III.
These councils outlawed the sale of arms, iron or
lumber to Muslims, and even banned the ferrying of
Muslims on Christian vessels.  The punishment for
breaking either of these laws was excommunication.
Based on the persistence of trading activity, the
Italians seemed to pay no heed to these papal
threats.44  When Innocent came to power at the end of
the century, he chose to implement these policies with
more authority than had his predecessors.  Clearly,
the Venetians in particular would have been economi-
cally devastated by these restrictions, as evidenced by
their dependence on the Egyptians.  When he was
informed by two envoys from Venice that the Venetians
could not observe the decree, Innocent wrote a letter
addressed to the city itself.  His letter acknowledged its
dependence on trade since they did not “engage in
agriculture,” and he allowed them to participate in
trade with Egypt as long as only non-war materials
were exchanged.  He still forbade the sale of “iron, flax,
pitch, sharp instruments, rope, weapons, galleys,
ships, and timbers, whether hewn or in the rough.”
According to this letter, Innocent simply reasserts the
provisions of the Third Lateran Council, and expects
the Venetians to offer their naval assistance to Jerusa-
lem in return for his “favor.”45
This letter is a testimony to the prevalence of the
exchange in war commodities between Venice and
Egypt, very late into the 12th century.  Interestingly
enough, the Cairo Genizah documents contained a
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letter from 1200 reporting the unconfirmed arrival in
Alexandria of two Venetian ships loaded with timber.
This anticipated shipment shows that the Venetians
had no intention of honoring the prohibition of Inno-
cent III.46  Under risk of “divine condemnation,”47 the
Venetians continued to pursue profits.  Claude Cahen
puts it directly in his assessment of Venetian inten-
tions: “In order to strengthen their right to trade in
Egypt, the Italians succumbed to the requests of the
Fatimids and the Ayyubids for armaments.”48  It is also
apropos to note that, by 1200, the impending Crusade
was well known throughout the west.  Many prominent
nobles began to take up the cross as early as 1199.49
That the Venetians (as they had done many times
before) would supply the enemy in direct defiance of
their spiritual ruler shows that they acted primarily for
the advancement of their commercial benefit.
After the Treaty of 1201 was signed, the Venetians
began to prepare for the supposed attack on Jerusa-
lem.  Scholars such as John H. Pryor and John Julius
Norwich contend that the Sultan sent envoys and
bribes to Venice at this time in order to sway the
entourage away from the shores of Alexandria.
Norwich bases his argument on a treaty signed by the
Sultan As-Adil Sayf Al-Din granting numerous privi-
leges to the Venetians, including tax considerations,
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their own quarter, and the safe passage of any pilgrims
aboard Venetian ships bound for the Holy Sepulchre.
The agreement also involved an envoy exchange, with
each side sending an ambassador to their respective
capitals.  Norwich’s argument is based on Karl Hopf’s
analysis which dates the treaty to 13 May 1202.  Six
western sources exist that address the treaty between
the Venetians and the Sultan of Egypt.  One is clearly
from after 1204; another date is unintelligible, and the
remaining four give the date as the 19th day of the
Islamic month of Saben, but not the year.  The critical
element of these sources is that in them the Sultan
refers to himself as “king of kings and Commander of
the Faithful,” a title which was not bestowed upon him
until 1207-1208.  In addition, the Sultan’s pledge to
protect Christian pilgrims would not likely have been
made at a time when the westerners were organizing a
crusade.  The Sultan would be unlikely to make any
concessions outside of the commercial sphere to
Christians in such a potentially hostile climate.  M.
Hanotaux and Ludwig Streit convincingly discredited
Hopf’s analysis in a series of works published around
the turn of the 20th century.  Their apparently correct
date of 9 March 1208 places this treaty far enough
past the Fourth Crusade to render its direct implica-
tions for the Fourth Crusade meaningless.50
Pryor’s argument, based on the Chronicle of Flan-
ders, presents a slightly different angle.  The Chronicle
states that the Sultan sent 1,000 gold marks to
Dandolo upon hearing that Egypt was under threat of
invasion.  Although Pryor ultimately admits that “there
108 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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is no reason whatsoever to give any credence to [these
reports],” the fact of the matter remains that these
rumors did exist in the crusader camps.51  There may
not be a smoking gun, but the lack of conclusive
evidence does not mean that it did not exist at one
point.  In fact, based on the string of chance encoun-
ters that led the crusaders to Constantinople, it seems
that such a rumor is suspiciously creative.  Ultimately,
however, it seems that the rumor was more than likely
inserted into the Chronicle after the conclusion of the
Crusade as a way of placing more blame on the Vene-
tians, to lighten the guilt of the crusading host.
Nevertheless, the treaty cannot be so easily dis-
missed in this discussion.  Following the Fourth
Crusade, the Venetians did enjoy significant growth in
the rights they enjoyed in Alexandria.  The existing
treaty mentioned earlier was indeed signed in 1208,
and it is probable that this treaty was a reward for the
actions undertaken from 1201-1204 to deflect the
Fourth Crusade.  Furthermore, by 1238 a royal decree
from the Sultan Abu Bakr guaranteed the general
security of all Venetians in Egyptian lands, exemption
from any new duties, complete freedom of trade, two
factories, a bathhouse and a chapel all under their
own jurisdiction, the freedom to import wine, and
various legal privileges including trial by their peers.
In addition, the Venetians were safeguarded against
any Muslim corsairs or pirates raiding Egyptian
waters.52  Compared to the restrictions that weighed
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heavily on the freedom of the Venetians through the
12th century (they were held captive in Alexandria in
1195), they were now practically part of the family.
Although an explicit treaty does not exist, it seems that
a policy of back-scratching was certainly initiated after
the Treaty of 1201.  The Venetians were given more
favorable treatment after the Crusade than were rival
Italians from Pisa and Genoa.  (It is also imperative to
comment on the lack of a physical treaty.  Since any
agreement between Venice and Egypt would have been
kept very secret, the discovery of a physical document
outlining their commercial collusion is highly unlikely.
Consider the Treaty of 1201—it makes no mention of
Egypt either!)
Attempting to approach the decision to go to Egypt
from the Venetian perspective, at first glance it would
seem that conquering Egypt would serve them better
than Constantinople.  For example, the Venetians had
just renegotiated their chrysobull of commercial
privileges with Byzantium in 1198.  They had a signifi-
cant advantage over the Pisans and Genoese in Con-
stantinople, and trailed behind their two main rivals in
Alexandria.  Taking over the Alexandrian market would
have given the Venetians a monopoly on the eastern
connection.  However, a closer inspection into the
structure of the Egyptian and Muslim society will shed
some new light on the realities of a Christian assault
on Alexandria.
The Venetians would have been familiar with the
bureaucratic organization of the Egyptian government,
primarily through their dealings in the harbors of
Alexandria with the Matjar.  With the rise to ascen-
dancy of Islam in the Near East, Arabic metropolises
would develop in stark contrast to the major cities of
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the west.  The primary difference between the Islamic
cities and those of Western Europe lies in geography.
The rise of the Islamic urban center occurred inland,
primarily because the main contingent of Mus-
lims—Arabs and North Africans—were desert dwellers.
So when major cities began popping up, they were
naturally distant from the coastline of the Mediterra-
nean and Red Seas, as well as the Persian Gulf.
According to A.L. Udovitch, “the sea was a menacing
frontier to Muslim rulers.”53  The sea was not feared for
the inherent dangers it presented to all men—storms,
waves, etc.—but it was a threat because it threatened
the strategic unity of Islamic domination.  The sea was
the “one vulnerable frontier” where Muslims could
potentially be conquered from the West.  A perfect
example is the ease with which Reynaud ravaged the
coasts of the Red Sea once he was able to launch a
fleet there.  The Muslims’ fear grew so potent that the
Caliph Umar went so far as to outlaw sea travel for his
subjects, punishing anyone who traveled or conquered
by water.54  
Saladin maintained Umar’s attitude of negativity
toward the sea.  By the time the Mamluks took control
of Egypt in 1250, they set out to destroy coastal
fortifications so that enterprising crusade outfits could
not occupy them and threaten Islamic stability.  The
coastal centers in Islamic nations took the role of
“frontier outposts,” and were not the focus of military
or political strength.  In Egypt, Alexandria was the
main port, but it was still referred to as a frontier
town.  Cairo was the main hub of naval and military
115
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 10 2005
Published by Scholar Commons, 2005
A Calculated Crusade 109
heavily on the freedom of the Venetians through the
12th century (they were held captive in Alexandria in
1195), they were now practically part of the family.
Although an explicit treaty does not exist, it seems that
a policy of back-scratching was certainly initiated after
the Treaty of 1201.  The Venetians were given more
favorable treatment after the Crusade than were rival
Italians from Pisa and Genoa.  (It is also imperative to
comment on the lack of a physical treaty.  Since any
agreement between Venice and Egypt would have been
kept very secret, the discovery of a physical document
outlining their commercial collusion is highly unlikely.
Consider the Treaty of 1201—it makes no mention of
Egypt either!)
Attempting to approach the decision to go to Egypt
from the Venetian perspective, at first glance it would
seem that conquering Egypt would serve them better
than Constantinople.  For example, the Venetians had
just renegotiated their chrysobull of commercial
privileges with Byzantium in 1198.  They had a signifi-
cant advantage over the Pisans and Genoese in Con-
stantinople, and trailed behind their two main rivals in
Alexandria.  Taking over the Alexandrian market would
have given the Venetians a monopoly on the eastern
connection.  However, a closer inspection into the
structure of the Egyptian and Muslim society will shed
some new light on the realities of a Christian assault
on Alexandria.
The Venetians would have been familiar with the
bureaucratic organization of the Egyptian government,
primarily through their dealings in the harbors of
Alexandria with the Matjar.  With the rise to ascen-
dancy of Islam in the Near East, Arabic metropolises
would develop in stark contrast to the major cities of
110 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      53Udovitch, 144.
      54Ibid., 145.
the west.  The primary difference between the Islamic
cities and those of Western Europe lies in geography.
The rise of the Islamic urban center occurred inland,
primarily because the main contingent of Mus-
lims—Arabs and North Africans—were desert dwellers.
So when major cities began popping up, they were
naturally distant from the coastline of the Mediterra-
nean and Red Seas, as well as the Persian Gulf.
According to A.L. Udovitch, “the sea was a menacing
frontier to Muslim rulers.”53  The sea was not feared for
the inherent dangers it presented to all men—storms,
waves, etc.—but it was a threat because it threatened
the strategic unity of Islamic domination.  The sea was
the “one vulnerable frontier” where Muslims could
potentially be conquered from the West.  A perfect
example is the ease with which Reynaud ravaged the
coasts of the Red Sea once he was able to launch a
fleet there.  The Muslims’ fear grew so potent that the
Caliph Umar went so far as to outlaw sea travel for his
subjects, punishing anyone who traveled or conquered
by water.54  
Saladin maintained Umar’s attitude of negativity
toward the sea.  By the time the Mamluks took control
of Egypt in 1250, they set out to destroy coastal
fortifications so that enterprising crusade outfits could
not occupy them and threaten Islamic stability.  The
coastal centers in Islamic nations took the role of
“frontier outposts,” and were not the focus of military
or political strength.  In Egypt, Alexandria was the
main port, but it was still referred to as a frontier
town.  Cairo was the main hub of naval and military
116
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 10 [2005], Art. 1
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol10/iss1/1
A Calculated Crusade 111
      55Ibid., 146-8, 158.
activity.  It also served as the financial, commercial,
and economic center of the Egyptian caliphate, while
Alexandria was its very distant “suburb.”55  Based on
previous encounters with the Egyptian navy (1123),
the Venetians would have been confident in their
ability to dominate them on the coast, but they would
have also known that the heart of Egyptian power lay
in waiting many miles to the south in Cairo.
The Muslims’ history of negativity toward sea-travel
also meant that the Venetians knew that the Egyptians
needed allies for trade in the Mediterranean.  If an
Alexandrian assault proved unsuccessful, as the
Venetians must have believed it would, they risked
losing their diplomatic ties to Egypt.  Although the
Crusaders could have taken Alexandria with ease, the
rest of Egypt would be much more unmanageable.
And, without the support of the Muslims who con-
trolled the trade routes connecting the Red Sea and
the Persian Gulf with Alexandria, those vital connec-
tions to the east would most certainly be lost as well.
As a privileged client-state of the Caliphate, the Vene-
tians could surpass their North Italian rivals and reap
the benefits of an inside connection with the Matjar.
Ultimately, this is precisely what happened.
In line with their plan to keep the coast of Egypt
free from invasion, it is my contention that the Vene-
tians did not expect to conquer Constantinople.  The
alliance with Alexius IV did not necessarily mean that
Constantinople had to be sacked, but it would mean
that the Crusaders could pass through the Byzantine
Empire on their way to Jerusalem, and avoid going to
Egypt at all.  As it turned out, the events of the Fourth
112 Historical Perspectives March 2005
Crusade played to the Venetians’ immense advantage,
no matter what their initial intentions.  But it seems
clear that the Venetians had no intention of going to
Egypt, with or without an extant treaty of collusion.
As a city founded on the principles of mercantilism,
the Venetians dealt with all contemporary political
groups as clientele, from the Pope in Rome to the
Sultan in Cairo.  This attitude sparked their rise to the
top of the Mediterranean world, and the events of the
Fourth Crusade proved paramount in this unprece-
dented ascension.
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The Redefined Anti-Imperialist Movement
of 1898-1900
 Brian Hurd
On 1 May 1898, the United States Navy, under the
command of Commodore George Dewey, engaged and
nearly destroyed the Spanish fleet at Manila Bay. This
battle not only provided the United States with a
decisive victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898,
but it also inaugurated a new era in American expan-
sion. No longer confined within its borders, United
States growth would now continue abroad in the
Pacific Ocean. At first, the American public and press
welcomed the news of military advances during the
Spanish-American War. However, the ratification of the
Treaty of Paris in February 1899 and the annexation
of the Philippines sparked a new protest movement in
the United States that opposed this American expan-
sion into Asia.  
Those who favored economic expansion into Asia
saw the Philippines as a new market for American
industry and a possible gateway to the more lucrative
Chinese markets. They also saw this expansion as an
opportunity to spread civilization into the dark places
of the world. Historian Fred Harvey Harrington argues
that in opposition, the anti-imperialist movement,
which began in 1898, objected to imperialism for
political reasons. Many of the arguments found in the
anti-imperialist movement were motivated by the
political principle that a republic such as the United
States should not possess colonies. The anti-imperial-
ists did not oppose colonial expansion for economic or
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humanitarian reasons, but rather because such a
policy was inconsistent with the self-determination set
forth in the Declaration of Independence and the
Gettysburg Address.1  American imperialism violated
the tradition of republican expansion whereby new
territories were added with the expectation of eventual
admission into the union as a state. As Henry Van
Dyke stated in his Thanksgiving Sermon in 1898, an
“imperialistic democracy is an impossible hybrid.”2
Old World expansion ran counter to American ideals,
and it would weaken America’s moral position as an
example of freedom, democracy, and self-determina-
tion in the world.
Some historians, such as Harrington, overlook the
issue of race in the imperialist debate of 1898. While
those who favored expansion into Asia cited paternalis-
tic reasons of spreading civilization to “dark corners of
the world,” the anti-imperialists also used race to
justify their arguments. As radical historian Christo-
pher Lasch asserts, many politicians condemned
imperialism on the grounds that Filipinos, like African-
Americans, were innately inferior to white people and
therefore could not be assimilated into American life.3
Anti-imperialist arguments focused on these racial and
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political consequences of imperialism, not the eco-
nomic benefits that expansion into the Philippines
would have on American industry.
Harrington also believes that the anti-imperialist
movement failed because it was unable to elect William
Jennings Bryan to the presidency in 1900. However,
the movement initially stated that its objectives were
to redefine the notion of American foreign policy
following the Spanish-American War. The anti-imperi-
alists did not oppose the ensuing conflict with Filipinos
for control of the Philippine Islands. Even though the
Philippine-American War lasted longer, cost more
money, and took more American lives than the
Spanish-American War, the new protest movement
was anti-imperialist, not anti-war. An examination of
the lasting effects of the movement reveals that the
anti-imperialists did not fail as Harrington and other
historians have suggested. The Philippines were
eventually promised independence in 1916, and the
result of the movement was a distinctive form of
American Open Door Imperialism, which, according to
historian William A. Williams, is based on commercial
and moral development without the problems of
political entanglement.4
This imperialist debate, which was a result of
Dewey’s invasion of the Philippines, was prompted by
the need for American expansion at the end of the
nineteenth century. In his 1893 essay, Frederick
Jackson Turner stated that “the existence of an area of
free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of
American settlement westward, explain American
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development.”5  The history of the United States to this
time had been the expansion, acquisition, settlement,
and growth of the lands west of the Appalachians to
the Pacific Ocean. The United States, for the first time
in its brief history, no longer found itself facing the
challenge of taming the frontier.
With the absence of the American frontier in the
1890s, Americans began to look beyond their borders
for new places to spread their economic and cultural
ideals. Foreign commercial expansion and national
prosperity seemed intertwined, and many felt that it
was the duty of the national government to acquire
new markets for economic opportunity. In April 1897,
Senator Albert J. Beveridge stated that American
factories are “making more than the American people
can use, and American soil is producing more than
they can consume. Fate has written our policy to us:
the trade of the world must and shall be ours.”6  This
“trade of the world” that Beveridge referred to was the
Asian markets. By this time, the world had embarked
on a second era of colonialism in which European
interests had shifted to the Orient. As Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge wrote in a letter to a friend on 18 May
1898, “all of Europe is seizing China” and there is a
“consequent need to establish ourselves in the East so
as not to be shut out of the Asian markets.”7
The Spanish-American War, which captivated the
minds of the American people, presented the United
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States with an opportunity to secure such a foreign
market. At the same time as this movement for ex-
panding American markets, there was also a feeling
that the United States was the guardian state of the
Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine. As a
result, the Spanish-American War began as a demon-
stration of American humanitarianism and sympathy
towards the Cuban insurgents who were fighting
Spanish control. Americans felt that the Spanish had
no right to retain a colonial empire in the New World.
In his annual address to Congress on 6 December
1897, President William McKinley stated that in regard
to Cuba, “I speak not for forcible annexation, for that
cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality,
would be criminal aggression.”8
Even though the United States had claimed it
declared war on Spain over popular indignation of
Spanish colonial interests in the Caribbean, the first
battle in the war to free Cuba actually took place in the
western Pacific. When Dewey destroyed the Spanish
fleet in Manila Bay, he presented a new array of
problems for Americans at home. Out of this naval
victory emerged a crisis of national identity in regard
to the acquisition of the Philippine Islands. Almost
immediately, the presence of American forces in the
Philippines and the possibility of taking on the Philip-
pines as America’s first colony split the nation on the
issue of shaping the peace following the Spanish-
American War.9
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Those who favored the formal annexation of the
Philippines following the Treaty of Paris on 12 Febru-
ary 1899 believed that the islands would serve as the
source of the much-needed markets for American
industries. In November 1898, economist John Barrett
declared that the acquisition of the Philippines would
serve as “an unsurpassed point in the Far East from
which to extend our commerce and trade and to gain
our share in the immense distribution of material
prizes that must follow the opening of China, operating
from Manila as a base, as does England from Hong
Kong.”10 The Philippines were not needed as a tradi-
tional colony, but rather as an entrepôt into the China
market and as a center of American military power in
the Pacific.11
Largely ignored at this time in the discussion of
Philippine markets were the natives of the islands.
During the Spanish-American War, the Filipinos had
united with the American army to defeat the Spanish.
The Filipinos assumed that once the war had ended,
the Americans would leave and grant them independ-
ence. However, when the Americans remained, the
Filipinos rebelled again. During the ensuing
Philippine-American War (often referred to in the
United States as the Philippine Insurrection) the
Filipinos made no distinction between their Spanish
and American conquerors. They believed that the
American military showed the Old World sense of
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imperialism by remaining on the islands and not
granting them their independence.12
Never before had Americans fought outside North
America. In the jungle terrain of the Philippines, they
fought seven thousand miles from home.13  As the war
progressed, Americans realized that suppressing the
Filipinos would be far more difficult and costly than
defeating Spain. By mid-November 1899, after his
army had suffered defeat in conventional battle,
Filipino leader Emilio Aguinaldo switched to guerrilla
tactics, a brutal strategy that would prolong the war
another three years.14  Poorly trained and ill supplied,
the Filipino army proved no match for the Americans.
In fact, the American government did not even recog-
nize the conflict as a war but rather as an insurrection
against legitimate American authority.
This conflict, however, did not play a large part in
the imperialist debate at home. At the time, many
Americans did not have information about the war due
to military censorship imposed upon the press. The
military created the impression that the hostilities
were purely defensive in nature. The American public
was unaware of the extent of losses on both sides, and
opponents who sought to describe the human and
financial costs of the war were called liars.15  Instead,
debate focused on the Philippines merely as the stage
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of imperialism, not considering the military implica-
tions of the Philippine-American War specifically.
Historians have agreed that the anti-imperialists of
1898 were a diverse group that was united only
through their common opposition to the formal annex-
ation of new territories by the United States. However,
there is much disagreement over the particular mo-
tives of the various groups of anti-imperialists. Histo-
rian Robert Beisner critically analyses several of these
anti-imperialist groups, arguing that the anti-imperial-
ists offered a wide range of objections to the acquisi-
tion of new territories, including constitutional,
diplomatic, moral, racial, political, and historical
reasons.16  Following the annexation of the Philippines,
many Anti-Imperialist Leagues were founded to, as
historian Richard Welch states, “prevent the Spanish-
American War from being perverted into a war for
colonial spoils.”17  Early on, however, the Anti-Imperi-
alist League was essentially a protest movement
against overseas imperialism, not the military subjuga-
tion of the Filipino people.
In this sense, the anti-imperialists were motivated
by political philosophy, not the humanitarian implica-
tions that such a foreign policy would have on the rest
of the world. New opposition to imperialism did not
emerge out of moral condemnation of colonialism but
instead primarily focused on the political dangers
posed by such a foreign policy.18 They feared that even
more imperialism would emerge following the annex-
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ation of the Philippine Islands. Former Secretary of the
Interior Carl Schurz warned in 1898, “If we take these
new regions, we shall be well entangled in that contest
for territorial aggrandizement, which distracts other
nations and drives them far beyond their original
design.”19 It was the belief of many anti-imperialists
that an imperialist foreign policy would undermine the
institutions and moral health of the nation.
The unifying argument used during the anti-
imperialist movement, as Harrington suggests, cen-
tered around the implications that an imperialist
policy would have on the American political identity.
The anti-imperialists were guided by abstract princi-
ples of a political ideology, which they felt were
founded in the Declaration of Independence. They
asserted that a republican form of government could
not also be an imperial government, and the United
States could not preserve its own democracy if it
denied the right of self-rule to others.20
In his first speech against imperialism in Omaha,
Nebraska on 14 June 1898, William Jennings Bryan
stated, “To inflict upon the enemy [Spain] all possible
harm is legitimate warfare, but shall we contemplate
a scheme for the colonization of the Orient merely
because our ships won a remarkable victory in the
harbor of Manila?” Still wearing his uniform after
being discharged from the army, Bryan continued,
“Our guns destroyed a Spanish fleet, but can they
destroy that self-evident truth, that governments
122 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      21William Jennings Bryan, speech delivered at the Trans-
Mississippi Exposition, Omaha, Nebraska, 14 Jun. 1898, in
Bryan on Imperialism: Speeches, Newspaper Articles, and
Interviews (Chicago: Bentley & Company, 1900), 4.
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derive their just powers, not from a superior force, but
from the consent of the governed.”21
Historically, anti-imperialists such as Bryan felt
that a policy of imperialism violated the tradition of
American expansion whereby new territories in North
America had been added with the expectation that they
would eventually be admitted to the union as a state.
Many cited the fact that the United States intervened
in Cuba to protect its people from foreign arms, and
now the United States had the same imperialistic
vision in the Pacific. In a speech delivered at the
Duckworth Club banquet in Cincinnati, Ohio on 6
January 1899, Bryan declared, “The real question is
whether we can, in one hemisphere, develop a theory
that governments derive their power from the consent
of the governed, and at the same time inaugurate,
support, and defend in the other hemisphere a govern-
ment which derives its authority entirely from superior
force.”22  In response to the question of whether the
Constitution follows the flag of the United States,
Secretary of War Elihu Root said in 1901, “as near as
I can make out the Constitution follows the flag—but
it doesn’t quite catch up with it.”23
One final argument used by anti-imperialists,
which had a tremendous impact on public opinion
regarding the Philippines, was race. Historian Mark
Van Ells proposes that Americans viewed Filipinos the
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same as they viewed Native Americans in the United
States. “Americans surveyed the Philippines in much
the same way they did the North American frontier just
a few decades before,” Van Ells argues, “as one of the
world’s dark places awaiting Euro-American civiliza-
tion and enlightenment.”24  He believes Americans
thought that the Filipinos, like the American Indians,
had to either yield to their way of life or face extermi-
nation.
The generalizations that Van Ells describes
emerged from the public perception of the Filipinos
received from the American press. Filipino historian
John Lent analyzed this perception of the Filipino
people and reveals that “American newspapers in 1898
had the view that the islands were a rich, untapped
source of American wealth and capital. The natives,
half-devil, half-child, insist on playing government, a
group of warlike tribes who will devour each other the
moment American troops leave.”25  In most cases, the
press portrayed the inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands as helpless, mischievous children who desper-
ately needed American care and civilization.26
As a result of the limited knowledge that Americans
had regarding the Philippine-American War from the
press, there was a strong sense of racism concerning
Filipino rights. In the 7 February 1899 issue of the
124 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      27“Future Work in the Philippines,” New York Times, 7 Feb.
1899, 4.
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New York Times, an article entitled “Future Work in
the Philippines” proclaimed that Aguinaldo’s “insane
attack” and “stupendous folly” offered conclusive
evidence that the Filipinos were “undisciplined chil-
dren.” To give them any political power was “to give a
dynamite cartridge to a baby for a plaything.”27  There
was a belief among many Americans that there was an
innate incapacity for self-government among “colored”
races. The subsequent “insurrection” of the Filipinos
was seen as confirmation of their need for American
rule and tutelage.28  These notions are also reflected in
the letters of Henry Adams, an American soldier in the
Philippine-American War, to his wife Elizabeth
Cameron. In a letter dated 22 January 1899, Adams
wrote that the army “must slaughter a million or two
of foolish Malays in order to give them the comforts of
flannel petticoats and electric railways. We all dread
and abominate war, but cannot escape it.”29
It is important to note here that both those who
favored expansion and those who opposed it used
these racial ideas to justify their argument. Imperial-
ists, who favored the expansion into Asia on the
premise of securing new American markets, argued
that part of America’s role as a world power included
spreading civilization throughout the dark parts of the
world such as the Philippines. This idea not only
reflected the notion of Manifest Destiny, which was
used to secure North American lands in the nineteenth
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century, but it also included the concept of Social
Darwinism, which argued that survival and growth
belonged not only to the strongest individuals of a
species, but also to the strongest nations of the world.
It was as carriers of civilization that the United States
was obligated to annex the Philippines.30  The result of
these two principles was a distinctively new form of
American Imperialism that assumed commercial
development and the spread of civilization were twin
imperatives.31  As Theodore Roosevelt stated in 1899,
“expansion gradually brings peace into the red wastes
where the barbarian peoples of the world hold sway.”32
Using principles of American superiority, Senator
Beveridge defended the annexation and imperialist
policy of the United States before Congress on 9
January 1900. In response to the anti-imperialist
argument that the political ideology of the United
States forbids the country to annex the Philippines,
Beveridge argued, “The Declaration of Independence
applies only to people capable of self-government . . .
[The Filipinos] are not a self-governing race.”33  Bever-
idge felt that self-government should only be endowed
upon the “graduates of liberty, not the name of lib-
erty’s infant class, who have not yet mastered the
alphabet of freedom.” He considered it America’s duty
126 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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to carry out God’s mission of civilization throughout
the world, and that Americans “cannot retreat from
any soil where Providence has unfurled our banner.”34
Those who opposed American expansion in the
Pacific also used race as justification for their beliefs.
Both the imperialists and anti-imperialists, as histo-
rian Alfred McCoy states, “believed that the Philippine
reality could not impinge on their national self-image
of America as a new world power with civilization
worthy of imitation.”35 However, unlike their oppo-
nents, the anti-imperialists believed that Manifest
Destiny was merely continental, not global. Historian
Stuart Creighton Miller notes that the most effective
anti-imperialist argument was to “exploit racial fears
by threatening to insist that full citizenship be ex-
tended to Filipinos unless the ‘foolish venture’ into
imperialism was abandoned.”36 Anti-imperialists spoke
passionately about the dangers of bringing in, as one
southern senator described it, “yet another inferior
race under the American flag.”37 These racist fears of
Filipino infiltration into American life were echoed in
the House of Representatives. Congressman Champ
Clark from Missouri warned his fellow representatives
that “very soon almond-eyed brown-skinned United
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anti-imperialist argument was to “exploit racial fears
by threatening to insist that full citizenship be ex-
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States Senators would destroy the very Constitution
that had granted them the rights of citizenship.” Such
a statement drew resounding applause from Clark’s
fellow anti-imperialists in the House. Clark continued,
“No matter whether they are fit to govern themselves or
not, they are not fit to govern us.”38
With only very few exceptions, such as Senator
George Hoar, the anti-imperialists shared the expan-
sionists’ belief in the inferiority and incapacity of the
world’s “colored” population. However, while the
imperialists assumed that it was the responsibility of
Americans to care for these savage races of the world,
the anti-imperialists appealed to these same racist
assumptions to justify excluding non-white people
from a place in the American way of life. Beisner states
that both groups believed that “the blood of tropical
peoples would taint the stream of American political
and social life and further complicate the nation’s
already festering racial problems.”39
Herein lies the essence of the anti-imperialist
argument. An imperialist policy of annexation would
have been a dramatic departure from American expan-
sionism. Anti-imperialists fixed the limits of westward
destiny at the shores of the Pacific Ocean. Because all
new territories were contiguous, citizens of other states
could easily settle the new territories and establish a
population that was indistinguishable from other
states. These new lands could then be admitted with
the same standing as older states. Anti-imperialists
128 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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believed that such a policy could not exist in new
territories such as the Philippines because of racist
principles. They believed that the Filipinos were not
qualified to become American citizens, and they would
therefore have to be governed as subjects. However, a
republic based on the principle of self-determination
could not have subjects because it was a contradiction
of the principles over which the founding fathers had
separated from England, ideals which are found in the
Declaration of Independence and elaborated on in the
Gettysburg Address passage that states a government
“of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall
not perish from this earth.” This evidence suggests
that, as Harrington asserted, the focus of the anti-
imperialist argument of 1898 originated in historical
precedence and political principles.
The anti-imperialist movement began to grow after
the annexation of the Philippines in February 1899.
Members from literary, labor, and political organiza-
tions from all over the country joined Anti-Imperialist
Leagues. Almost immediately, imperialism became the
central issue in the presidential election.40
In the election of 1900, as rumors surrounding the
atrocities committed by the military in the Philippines
spread, the Republican Party platform regarding
imperialism stated: “It is the high duty of the Govern-
ment to maintain its authority, to put down armed
insurrection, and to confer the blessings of liberty and
civilization upon all the rescued peoples.”41  Demo-
crats, on the other hand, nominated the anti-imperial-
ist Bryan. In his nomination acceptance speech, Bryan
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“of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall
not perish from this earth.” This evidence suggests
that, as Harrington asserted, the focus of the anti-
imperialist argument of 1898 originated in historical
precedence and political principles.
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the annexation of the Philippines in February 1899.
Members from literary, labor, and political organiza-
tions from all over the country joined Anti-Imperialist
Leagues. Almost immediately, imperialism became the
central issue in the presidential election.40
In the election of 1900, as rumors surrounding the
atrocities committed by the military in the Philippines
spread, the Republican Party platform regarding
imperialism stated: “It is the high duty of the Govern-
ment to maintain its authority, to put down armed
insurrection, and to confer the blessings of liberty and
civilization upon all the rescued peoples.”41  Demo-
crats, on the other hand, nominated the anti-imperial-
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proclaimed imperialism the central issue of the race.
In describing the party platform regarding imperialism,
Bryan stated: “We favor immediate declaration of the
nation’s purpose to give the Filipinos, first, a stable
form of government; second, independence; and third,
protection from outside interference such as has been
given for nearly a century to the republics of Central
and South America.”42  Bryan knew that this election
would decisively determine American foreign policy
abroad.
Bryan’s defeat in the 1900 election served as a
crushing blow to the anti-imperialist organization.
Bryan had fewer votes than in the 1896 election, and
this loss prompted the Democratic Party to end all
affiliations with the anti-imperialist movement.43  In
his analysis of the reasons why they lost the election,
Harrington states that anti-imperialists had failed to
unite bi-partisan support behind a single candidate.
Many anti-imperialists did not like Bryan because of
his support of the Treaty of Paris.44  They also had to
contend with strong national feelings of patriotism and
pride elicited by the war with Spain. As Beisner
explains, the anti-imperialists had to “ask people
aroused by American armed triumphs to surrender the
fruits of victory.”45
Harrington believes that the defeat of the anti-
imperialists signaled the failure of the movement in
American history. However, while the election may
130 Historical Perspectives March 2005
have resulted in the formal break-up of Anti-Imperial-
ist Leagues throughout the country, anti-imperialist
ideas still remained in American politics. In looking at
the lasting effects of the movement, it can be seen that
the movement did not result in failure as Harrington
and other historians have suggested.
In terms of the originally stated goals of the move-
ment, the anti-imperialists were able to change the
American foreign policy of annexation. They had
opposed the annexation of the Philippines because it
violated the fundamental political foundations of the
country. This issue was well received following the
1900 election, and even though the anti-imperialist
movement had formally ended, Americans no longer
annexed foreign lands as it had after the Spanish-
American War. Since 1900, the Philippine Islands were
America’s sole experiment in colonialism, and the
Philippine-American War has been considered merely
a postscript to the Spanish-American War.
The Jones Bill, also referred to as the Organic Act
of the Philippine Islands, reflected that anti-imperialist
ideas were still in American politics after the move-
ment formally ended. Enacted on 29 August 1916, this
bill gave the Filipinos a greater measure of self-govern-
ment and confirmed the intention of granting the
Filipinos eventual independence. American industries
would still have a presence in the Pacific, but the
Philippine Islands themselves would be granted
independence. Moorfield Storey, former president of
the Anti-Imperialist League, stated in 1913 that “the
American people know in their hearts that they have
no right to hold the Philippines. They will hail with
delight and profound sense of relief the passage of any
measure which restores their self-respect by setting
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the islanders free.”46  However, not all those who
supported Philippine independence were anti-imperial-
ist. Theodore Roosevelt also supported the Jones Act
for military reasons, reflecting America’s move towards
isolation prior to World War I. In a letter to the New
York Times on 22 November 1914, Roosevelt declared:
“I do not believe we should keep any foothold whatever
in the Philippines. Any kind of position by us in the
Philippines merely results in making them our heel of
Achilles if we are attacked by a foreign power. There
can be no compensating benefit to us.”47
Granting the Philippines independence was one of
the major issues for anti-imperialists, and the enact-
ment of the Jones Bill in 1916 shows that ultimately
the purpose and objectives of the original anti-imperi-
alist movement of 1898, as stated in Bryan’s platform,
were achieved. The anti-imperialists had desired to
change the American practice of imperialism in the
twentieth century because it violated, what the Anti-
Imperialist League called, “the spirit of 1776.” Another
result of the anti-imperialist movement was that, as
historian Frank Ninkovich notes, “underneath the
political and aesthetic contrasts, there was neither Old
nor New World [emerging], but a common, economy-
driven new-world-in-the-making.”48
This new type of imperialism that emerged from
America’s involvement in the Philippines is what
historian William A. Williams calls “Open Door Imperi-
132 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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alism.” Williams argues that while Americans had
agreed upon the need for commercial expansion to
secure new markets, the imperialist debate disputed
the proper strategy and tactics of such expansion. This
debate, Williams believes, was solved by “a policy of
the open door that was designed to clear the way and
establish the conditions under which America’s
preponderant economic power would extend the
American system throughout the world without the
embarrassment and inefficiency of traditional colonial-
ism.”49  This Open Door policy would become the
Monroe Doctrine of the twentieth century and the
central feature of American foreign policy. 
While Williams does recognize the emergence of
Open Door Imperialism at the turn of the century, he
does not identify that this new type of imperialism was
based upon the beliefs of the anti-imperialists. All
Americans, including the anti-imperialists, realized the
need for foreign markets. The anti-imperialists did not
contest the war in the Philippines or the economic
aspects of colonialism, but rather opposed the political
implications that an imperialist policy would have on
the American tradition of self-determination. Anti-
imperialist leader Carl Schurz believed that this Open
Door Imperialism would “extend freedom by exerting
civilizing influences upon the population of the con-
quered territories and gain commercial opportunities
of so great a value that they will more than compen-
sate for the cost of the war.”50 The anti-imperialists
137
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 10 2005
Published by Scholar Commons, 2005
Delayed Success 131
      46John A. Beadles, “The Debate in the United States
Concerning Philippine Independence,” Philippine Studies 16
(July 1968): 424.
      47Theodore Roosevelt, “The Navy as a Peacemaker,” New York
Times, 22 Nov. 1914, SM5.
      48Ninkovich, 36.
the islanders free.”46  However, not all those who
supported Philippine independence were anti-imperial-
ist. Theodore Roosevelt also supported the Jones Act
for military reasons, reflecting America’s move towards
isolation prior to World War I. In a letter to the New
York Times on 22 November 1914, Roosevelt declared:
“I do not believe we should keep any foothold whatever
in the Philippines. Any kind of position by us in the
Philippines merely results in making them our heel of
Achilles if we are attacked by a foreign power. There
can be no compensating benefit to us.”47
Granting the Philippines independence was one of
the major issues for anti-imperialists, and the enact-
ment of the Jones Bill in 1916 shows that ultimately
the purpose and objectives of the original anti-imperi-
alist movement of 1898, as stated in Bryan’s platform,
were achieved. The anti-imperialists had desired to
change the American practice of imperialism in the
twentieth century because it violated, what the Anti-
Imperialist League called, “the spirit of 1776.” Another
result of the anti-imperialist movement was that, as
historian Frank Ninkovich notes, “underneath the
political and aesthetic contrasts, there was neither Old
nor New World [emerging], but a common, economy-
driven new-world-in-the-making.”48
This new type of imperialism that emerged from
America’s involvement in the Philippines is what
historian William A. Williams calls “Open Door Imperi-
132 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      49Williams, 45.
      50William Appleman Williams, The Roots of the Modern
American Empire: A Study of the Growth and Shaping of Social
Consciousness in a Marketplace Society (New York: Random
House, 1969), 441. 
alism.” Williams argues that while Americans had
agreed upon the need for commercial expansion to
secure new markets, the imperialist debate disputed
the proper strategy and tactics of such expansion. This
debate, Williams believes, was solved by “a policy of
the open door that was designed to clear the way and
establish the conditions under which America’s
preponderant economic power would extend the
American system throughout the world without the
embarrassment and inefficiency of traditional colonial-
ism.”49  This Open Door policy would become the
Monroe Doctrine of the twentieth century and the
central feature of American foreign policy. 
While Williams does recognize the emergence of
Open Door Imperialism at the turn of the century, he
does not identify that this new type of imperialism was
based upon the beliefs of the anti-imperialists. All
Americans, including the anti-imperialists, realized the
need for foreign markets. The anti-imperialists did not
contest the war in the Philippines or the economic
aspects of colonialism, but rather opposed the political
implications that an imperialist policy would have on
the American tradition of self-determination. Anti-
imperialist leader Carl Schurz believed that this Open
Door Imperialism would “extend freedom by exerting
civilizing influences upon the population of the con-
quered territories and gain commercial opportunities
of so great a value that they will more than compen-
sate for the cost of the war.”50 The anti-imperialists
138
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 10 [2005], Art. 1
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol10/iss1/1
Delayed Success 133
      51Henry F. Graff, American Imperialism and the Philippine
Insurrection (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1969), xiii.
believed that wars such as the Philippine-American
War were necessary in order to ensure American
industries new markets such as the Philippines. This
new Open Door Imperialism was a creative solution for
anti-imperialists because it satisfied their desires for
economic growth and preserved democratic purity.
They became pioneers of a new foreign policy that
would guide American economic growth throughout
the twentieth century and today.
After receiving news of the American naval victory
in Manila Bay in 1898, the Washington Post declared,
“The guns of Dewey at Manila have changed the
destiny of the United States. We are face to face with a
strange destiny and must accept its responsibilities.”51
The war to drive Spain from Cuba opened the door for
the establishment of an American marketplace
throughout the world. As the result of Dewey’s victory
in the Philippines, Americans debated contrasting
visions of the proper foreign policy for their country.
The United States, which only a century earlier had
been born out of a reaction to imperial domination,
now itself became an imperial power. Americans
favored expansionism not colonialism. Realizing that
they could not expand in the traditional European
way, Americans found a way to expand their interests
economically and socially, but without violating the
modern notion of democracy, which the United States
itself had established. This foreign policy was vital to
American growth and, for the first time, the United
States was building an overseas empire. This new
Open Door Imperialism, which resulted in part be-
134 Historical Perspectives March 2005
cause of the anti-imperialist movement of 1898, did
not violate the spirit of 1776 and had all the advan-
tages while escaping all the burdens of colonialism. At
the turn of the century, Americans had the economic
need, the Social Darwinian vision, and the progressive
impetus to develop a new foreign policy that had the
power to create a worldwide market where American
businesses could buy, sell, and openly invest in other
parts of the world.
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Excuses for the Construction of the Alaska
Highway
Dane Skilbred
The construction of the Alaska Highway (also
referred to as the ALCAN Highway) has been regarded
as one of the greatest projects in American history.
The highway spans a distance of over fifteen hundred
miles from Dawson Creek, British Columbia to Fair-
banks, Alaska.  It was constructed during World War
II after the Japanese attacks on the Aleutian Islands,
specifically those on the ports of Dutch Harbor, Attu,
and Kiska.  These attacks are widely held to be the
direct reason for the United States government’s
decision to build the road, along with the fear that a
Japanese invasion of Alaska was imminent.  
As a challenge to this view, one must ask why a
road being built to Fairbanks, Alaska was necessary to
defend Alaska against a Japanese attack on the
Aleutian Islands.  If the Japanese invasion of Alaska
was such a looming threat, why was the road to Alaska
not extended to the coast close to the Aleutian Islands
rather than to the center of Alaska?  While it makes
some sense that the United States government would
want to bring military supplies to Alaska in a timely
fashion in an emergency, it does not make sense that
the government would attempt to do so by construct-
ing a road that leads to a part of Alaska that is far from
the area of concern.  In fact, it could be argued that
the government was discussing a road to Alaska many
years before its construction in 1943, and the “de-
fense” of Alaska was not the most important focus of
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discussion.  There were mainly economic, as well as
some political and social, reasons for constructing the
Alaska Highway that were greater factors in the
deliberation to build it than was national defense. 
The discussion on the project today seems more
concerned with how the Alaskan Highway was built,
the planning that was involved, and the social implica-
tions related to its construction, rather than the
motivations for its creation.  Historian J. Kingston
Pierce compares the military effort in the project to
that of the military in building the Panama Canal.  He
discusses the long hours without sleep that troops
spent working on it, as well as the battles with the
wilderness they had to endure.1  John Krakauer also
describes some of the effects of nature on the troops,
namely the boggy marshes that engineers had to move
through and the ice and extreme cold present in the
wintertime.2  These two authors write briefly about
hearings in Congress, but their discussion seems to be
concerned mainly with the actual construction of the
highway.  The motivation for the highway’s construc-
tion is never in question.
It seems logical that the desire for the Alaska
Highway not be in question.  The reason for it being
pushed through Congress may well have been purely
for national defense.  The national defense argument,
however, does not explain why the highway was
proposed in Congress as early as 1933.  It does not
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account for the fact that the proposed highway was
built not in the direction of the areas being attacked
and invaded by the Japanese, but rather significantly
to the northeast of them.  Historian M.V.  Bezeau
writes that the road was already a foregone conclusion
to help the United States economy, and the Japanese
attack on the Aleutian Islands was just enough to
legitimize the American presence in the Northwest.3
There is clearly room to challenge the view that the
U.S. built the Alaska Highway purely to defend against
a Japanese threat.
The first point of contention against the argument
for national defense is the route the army took in its
construction of the highway.  The finalized route went
through mountain ranges and swamps.  The army
argued that supplies could more readily be transported
through air force flights inland along this route where
flying conditions were better.4  However, what is
interesting is that the army was not willing to build a
highway toward southwest Alaska, where the Japanese
attacks had occurred.  Looking at the following map,
it seems quite reasonable for the army to have built a
road through the pass between the Kuskokwim Moun-
tains and the Alaska Range toward Bristol Bay as
indicated by the dashed line (roughly the last 650
miles of the chosen route is indicated by the solid line).
The mountain route would have given naval forces a
much more direct route to Dutch Harbor, and the
138 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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Aleutian Islands, than a trip from Fairbanks, through
Valdez, around the Gulf of Alaska and the southwest-
ern peninsula to the same place.  According to histo-
rian M.V. Bezeau, however, the highway was never
meant to be a supply route to the Aleutians.5
6
Beside the troubling fact that the road was not
built along the simple mountain passage toward
Bristol Bay, it did not really “shorten” the route from
the continental states to Alaska all that much.  Simply
looking at distances, one might deduce that the Alaska
Highway would not make the trip for troops and
supplies any easier.  For instance, the flying distance
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from Seattle to Dutch Harbor is about 2000 miles.  The
distance from Fairbanks to Dutch Harbor, however, is
about 900 miles.  It seems the idea of building a
highway that spans 1500 miles, only to connect to
another highway that spans 1500 miles, to reach a city
that falls 900 miles short of the area the U.S. military
was trying to defend would not shorten the time of
reaching it at all.7 Because the distance from the
continental United States to Dutch Harbor was not
sufficiently cut, other motivations need to be examined
to explain the construction of the Alaska Highway.
Common sense indicates that the economic impact
such a project would have on the Alaskan economy as
well as the economy of the whole United States was a
strong motivation.  For years before World War II there
had been discussion in Congress about building a
highway to Alaska.  As early as 1930, Herbert Hoover
had suggested the study of a link between Alaska and
the lower 48 states.8  The discussion of the link had
little to do with the defense of the territory at the time.
The Department of the State, in its study of the terri-
tory, felt that the road would help in the “development
of natural resources,” the “development of tourist
traffic,” and the “promotion of good will and trade
between Canada and the United States, by facilitating
travel between the two countries.”9  Any discussion of
the defense of Alaska was completely missing.  What
was important in the study, though, was the idea that
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the increased output of exports from the territory
would outweigh the cost of building the road.10
Historian Kenneth Coates argues that the riches in
the Canadian Northwest were on people’s minds for
years.  At the turn of the 20th century, the Klondike
gold rush had piqued great interest, and that interest
was revived in 1920 when oil was discovered in the
Mackenzie valley of British Columbia.  The thought of
this land’s immense resources never escaped public
consciousness.11  In fact, those resources were the
main topic of conversation in the Alaska legislature’s
memorial to Congress of 1933.  The legislature wrote
a letter to be read in Congress asking them to reintro-
duce dialogue about the vast economic opportunity in
the territory of Alaska, and to initiate conversation on
a highway to Alaska.  The letter described the eco-
nomic depression occurring in the territory, and the
only emergency they seemed to cite was that of the
urgent financial problem.12  It seems the whole point of
the letter was for the Alaskan legislature to give
Congress an idea of the wealth that would be gained in
the transaction.  Save for one small paragraph about
the instability in the Far East, which did not make a
strong case, the legislature dealt only with economic
issues.13
145
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 10 2005
Published by Scholar Commons, 2005
Getting Defensive 139
      7Estimates from www.webflyer.com, WebFlyer Network.
      8Alaskan.com, “The Alaskan Information Center,”
http://alaskan.com/gen-info.html.
      9U.S. Department of State, Report of the Commission to Study
the Proposed Highway to Alaska, Conference Series, No. 14. 
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1933), 23.
from Seattle to Dutch Harbor is about 2000 miles.  The
distance from Fairbanks to Dutch Harbor, however, is
about 900 miles.  It seems the idea of building a
highway that spans 1500 miles, only to connect to
another highway that spans 1500 miles, to reach a city
that falls 900 miles short of the area the U.S. military
was trying to defend would not shorten the time of
reaching it at all.7 Because the distance from the
continental United States to Dutch Harbor was not
sufficiently cut, other motivations need to be examined
to explain the construction of the Alaska Highway.
Common sense indicates that the economic impact
such a project would have on the Alaskan economy as
well as the economy of the whole United States was a
strong motivation.  For years before World War II there
had been discussion in Congress about building a
highway to Alaska.  As early as 1930, Herbert Hoover
had suggested the study of a link between Alaska and
the lower 48 states.8  The discussion of the link had
little to do with the defense of the territory at the time.
The Department of the State, in its study of the terri-
tory, felt that the road would help in the “development
of natural resources,” the “development of tourist
traffic,” and the “promotion of good will and trade
between Canada and the United States, by facilitating
travel between the two countries.”9  Any discussion of
the defense of Alaska was completely missing.  What
was important in the study, though, was the idea that
140 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      10Ibid., 44.
      11Kenneth Coates and W.R. Morrison, The Alaska Highway
in World War II (Norman, OK:  University of Oklahoma Press,
1992), 13-14.
      12U.S. Senate, House Joint Memorial 5, The Congressional
Record, 73rd Congress, Vol. 77, Part 5 (U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1933), 5058.
      13Ibid., 5058-9
the increased output of exports from the territory
would outweigh the cost of building the road.10
Historian Kenneth Coates argues that the riches in
the Canadian Northwest were on people’s minds for
years.  At the turn of the 20th century, the Klondike
gold rush had piqued great interest, and that interest
was revived in 1920 when oil was discovered in the
Mackenzie valley of British Columbia.  The thought of
this land’s immense resources never escaped public
consciousness.11  In fact, those resources were the
main topic of conversation in the Alaska legislature’s
memorial to Congress of 1933.  The legislature wrote
a letter to be read in Congress asking them to reintro-
duce dialogue about the vast economic opportunity in
the territory of Alaska, and to initiate conversation on
a highway to Alaska.  The letter described the eco-
nomic depression occurring in the territory, and the
only emergency they seemed to cite was that of the
urgent financial problem.12  It seems the whole point of
the letter was for the Alaskan legislature to give
Congress an idea of the wealth that would be gained in
the transaction.  Save for one small paragraph about
the instability in the Far East, which did not make a
strong case, the legislature dealt only with economic
issues.13
146
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 10 [2005], Art. 1
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol10/iss1/1
Getting Defensive 141
      14U.S. Senate, The Congressional Record, 73rd Congress, Vol.
78, Part 11 (U.S. Government Printing Office 1934), 11620.
      15Ibid., 11621.
      16U.S. Senate, The Congressional Record, 75th Congress, Vol.
81, Appendix, Part 10 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1937),
1775.
      17Ibid., 1775-77
Discussion in Congress continued to neglect the
defense argument for the better part of the next
decade.  In an address to Congress, Senator Clarence
C. Dill of Washington argued that since there was talk
of a highway through Mexico, there should be talk of
one through Canada to Alaska.14  It seemed only
logical that a road should be built connecting the U.S.
and its territories.  In fact, Senator Robert R. Reynolds
of North Carolina furthered the argument by saying,
“The greatest industry on earth is the tourist industry.
This would add to the tourist industry of America as
well as of our sister countries to the north and south,
and would create for us a warmer bond of friend-
ship.”15  Three years later in the House of Representa-
tives, Warren G. Magnuson of Washington made the
case for the opening of industry as well.  By opening
new territories, the U.S. could finally make use of the
land that they had purchased from the Russians
seventy years before.16  Magnuson continued on about
everything from population growth, to the welfare of
Alaskans and the interconnectedness of the United
States.  The whole argument, however, was based on
economics, never once mentioning defense of the
region.17  The government’s stress on the monetary
value of the Alaska Highway would be the frame for
discussion throughout the period before World War II,
rather than any argument based on defense.
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Not only was the debate in Congress based on
assessment of economic opportunity, but the national
media also focused on the same frame of reference.
The New York Times portrayed the construction of the
Alaska Highway as a great financial and cultural
advantage to the whole United States.  One particular
article highlighted the possibilities for future produc-
tion in Alaska.  Alaskan miners felt that Alaska could
be a permanent settlement for Americans as well as a
place for tourists to visit.  The vast resources present
in Alaska could provide jobs for people if they had
adequate transportation to the territory.18  Even as late
as 1939, the editor ran a story that featured engineer
Donald MacDonald of Fairbanks speaking to the
economic power of the region.  He believed that the
highway was a way for people to see the wildlife and
beautiful summer settings.  It would also give miners
and farmers a chance to make new beginnings.19
Clearly the media’s center of attention was on the
markets and opportunities the Alaska Highway could
potentially open up.
The discussion in Congress of a road to Alaska
gradually changed.  Talks moved from dialogue about
the development of resources and production toward
talk of defense of the territory.  One can reasonably
deduce that since the economic argument was not
enough to convince the Congress, discussion was
forced to defense.  Historian David Remley argues that
talks in Congress were stalled until the attack on Pearl
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Harbor.  He says that the fear of the Japanese was
what finally pushed the governments of both the U.S.
and Canada to agree on the proposal to build the
highway.20  
Even before the attacks on American harbors, as
the international climate changed, congressmen slowly
started framing their discussion around defense of
Alaska.  Rep. Magnuson made another speech in the
Congress in October 1941, this time shifting the
discussion to defense as well as resources.  His mes-
sage was that the highway would be a “great adjunct
to the national defense,” as well as “an incalculable
factor in the development of the great resources of
British Columbia and interior Alaska.”21  In August
1941, the Alaska legislature had been making similar
statements, but played on emotion much more vividly.
In a telegram to Congress, the legislature felt that the
fall of Russia was “seemingly imminent,” and that
military presence was drastically necessary.22  While
some military advisors may have suggested the possi-
bility of an attack from Japan through Alaska, it was
not widely accepted that Alaska was an immediate
target.  The legislature used the argument that it was
completely isolated except by sea and air.  The idea
that Japan would bother conquering Alaska to reach
the continental United States when there was no route
from Alaska to the continental United States for them
144 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      23Donald MacDonald,  “Defenseless Alaska – The Ramparts
we Don’t Watch – Danger in the North – an Eye-opening Look at
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to travel on seems unreasonable.  The legislature’s
claims were simply exaggerations without sufficient
evidence to support them.
Other such claims came from the engineer who just
one year previous had said the Alaska Highway would
be used mainly for tourist attractions.  In an article in
the New York Times, Donald MacDonald had argued
about the economic and social benefits of the highway.
In Liberty magazine, however, he changed his opinion
to include the necessity of a highway for defense from
hypothetical threats.23  He conjectured that a threat
might one day come, and that the United States
should protect the precious resources in Alaska.  
This sort of rhetoric was adopted by the media
around the country throughout the war period.  The
New York Times published articles in favor of the
Alaska Highway, using military reasoning for the
project.  Secretary of the Interior, Harold L. Ickes,
wrote one such article. The article argued that Alaska
provided a crossroads for many key centers around the
world, making it seem that it was the closest part of
the U.S. to almost all locations across the globe.24  He
masked his discussion of the enrichment of resources
inside the territory of Alaska with ideas that it was the
center of the world for strategic positioning.
Other reporters skirted the issue of the economy
like Ickes had.  Richard L. Neuberger of Oregon dis-
cussed the possibilities of a canal project to Alaska in
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an article in 1941.  The idea in the Oregon legislature
was that this canal could provide for defense, even
though its main purpose would have been for shipping
lumber.25  He started out with the defense argument,
and then the article became a venue for discussion of
assured profit.  Neuberger extended the discussion
about the Alaska Highway in 1942, with an article
entitled “America’s Burma Road.”26  This time, the
discussion was more about defense, but again had the
hint of economic interest in the Northwest region.  The
article seemed to be a tool to rally emotion from the
American public, with the final passage about the
completion of the Alaska Highway stating:  “It will be
a great day for Donald MacDonald – and a sad one for
Hitler and Hirohito.”27  The idea was that an engineer
would be happy with the project because of its poten-
tial, and the “evil leaders” would be exposed to attack
through Alaska.  The second argument does not hold
because it would be more efficient to make a direct
path from the continental United States to Japan and
the highway never was a strategic blow to the Japa-
nese, let alone the Germans.  The protection of Alaska
was an excuse for constructing a resource highway.
If the main reason for constructing the Alaska
Highway had been for the protection of Alaska, then it
was a terrible failure.  In 1944, the Alaskan Interna-
tional Highway Commission deemed the project just
146 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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that, a failure.28  The highway commission had been
created as a subcommittee in Congress in the 1930’s.
They felt the highway did not serve the purpose that it
had set out to fulfill.  It had not ever been used to
protect the people of Alaska, and it certainly never
aided in a front against the Japanese.  
Many other observers of the project did not share
the sentiment that the Alaska Highway was a failure.
The New York Times ran articles about the success of
expeditions in the Canadian Northwest and in Alaska.
Reporter Theodore Strauss mentioned the booming
industry in the territories because of everyday discov-
eries of vast resources, even during the war.29  Others
argued that the highway might improve future rela-
tions between Alaska and Canada.  The argument was
that the highway would be mutually beneficial to both
countries after the war.30  While the sentiment may
have been that both groups would benefit equally, the
U.S. has been the primary recipient of the revenue
from the Alaska Highway.
The government, as well as some members of the
mass media, used propaganda to their advantage in
bringing Canada along to finance a highway that was
more beneficial to Americans.  There is an argument
that the U.S. government purposefully moved forward
on construction of the highway to claim a sort of
political sovereignty over Canada.  Historian Curtis R.
Nordman argues that, in order to save face, the Cana-
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dian government was forced to pay $123,500,000.31
The majority of this was for staging routes on the
Alaska Highway.  Not only that, but the Canadian
government has been forced to pay for the constant
improvements on the highway since its completion.32
While the Alaska Highway has benefited Canadians to
an extent in the post-World War II era, many see it as
a passage for Americans from the Continental U.S. to
Alaska.  The trip through the Canadian Northwest has
drawn revenue from tourists on their way to Alaska,
but the majority of their money has been spent in
Alaska.  It is as if Canada were only a stepping-stone
that the United States government had to overcome to
connect its territories.  The movement for the Alaska
Highway was just another example of Americans’
sentiment for political supremacy over Canada.33
Beside the political ramifications the venture had
on Canada, there were social indicators that might
help to put the Alaska Highway project into an even
larger context and give it a complete perspective.  The
majority of the United States army workers for this job
were black.  It is believed by some that the highway
was an attempt to separate blacks and whites because
of racial tensions in the military.  President Roosevelt
had it in mind to keep a sizeable part of black troops
in a remote area away from white troops during the
148 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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war.34  The perfect opportunity would be in a remote
area like the Pacific Northwest.  This was one social
problem for the U.S. solved by the construction of the
Alaska Highway.
One other social problem solved during the project
was that of disconnection between Alaska and the
continental U.S. due to a lack of communication
technologies.  Theodore Strauss argued that communi-
cation was tough even for the army.  The only news
that they could receive was from Japanese and some-
times Russian radio stations.35  Alaska was without
telephone service, and could only reach the rest of the
United States through telegram.  By the end of the
war, a telephone system was constructed along the
highway, which helped to unite Alaska with the
contiguous part of the country.36  While these seem-
ingly small social implications do not add up to much
in the grand scheme of the need for a highway to
Alaska, they help to put the whole picture of its
conception into context.
Looking at the entire picture, it seems that the need
for military defense of Alaska was not the most sub-
stantial piece of the puzzle.  Bezeau would argue that
the Alaska Highway did not contribute significantly to
the defense of Alaska.37  Even during the early stages
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of the war, the military did not back a road to the
territory of Alaska.  There was no justification for it.38
The highway never even accomplished the military goal
of taking pressure off of the Aleutian Islands.  Coates
writes that the Alaska Highway lost its importance in
the scheme of the war because the Japanese threat to
Alaska fell dramatically after the initial attacks on the
Aleutian Islands.39  It makes no sense that the road
would have been built for defense reasons, when it was
not used for that purpose during World War II.
What does make sense is the Alaska Highway’s
significance to the history of the Alaskan economy.
Because of the road, tourist families from all over the
United States can more easily make the trip to Alaska.
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution ran a story on one
such family, the Coogle’s, in 1959.  The family may not
have been able to make the trip without the road, but
in 1959, they finally made the drive all the way from
Georgia to Alaska with its improved conditions for
tourists.  They had wanted to explore the adventure
that is Alaska, just as so many other families had
wanted to before the construction of the highway and
since its completion.40  Tour buses have provided
transportation to Alaska, and brought money into the
state with increased expenditure.  Even neglecting the
increase in tourism, Alaskans have been better off with
the highway because of its benefits of cheap transpor-
tation.  With the oil, seafood, and many minerals in
Alaska, exporting goods to other places has been
150 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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facilitated by the highway.41  All of these products have
bolstered the Alaskan economy and have given an
extra source of useful natural resources to the conti-
nental United States.
The construction of the Alaska Highway has
provided numerous opportunities for the state of
Alaska, and from Alaska to the rest of the country.
While many point to the need for the defense of Alaska
as the primary reason for the construction of the
highway, it is clear that Japanese attacks were only
the final straw that helped the government gain
support for the project.  The economic success of
Alaska has been greatly helped by the Alaska Highway,
and the economic impact on Alaskan industries was,
as were certain political and social factors, far more
important than military defense in the motivations of
those interested in constructing the highway.  The
economy was what drove the idea of the Alaska High-
way to Congress.  The need for military defense was
just a measure used to bring those unsure of the
project to support it.
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Their Genocide and Ours:
International Influence in 1994 Rwanda
Maggie Penkert
In 1994 Rwanda suffered a genocide of unprece-
dented speed. Western press coverage at the time
attributed the genocide to ancient ethnic hatreds
between Hutus and Tutsis, but the genocide was, in
fact, a political act involving the Rwandan government
that planned it and the international community that
stood back and observed it.  This international com-
munity included Western states, international organi-
zations, and neighboring African states.  The world
community seems to tread a fine line between violating
national autonomy and working together across
borders to maintain a standard for human rights.
Moreover, genocide places the effects of national self-
interest on international relations in stark relief, often
to the detriment of less developed countries.  Though
Rwandans organized and carried out the genocide, no
actor on the world stage ever performs in isolation.
The international community, collectively in the form
of various organizations and states, influenced the
genocide both by abandoning Rwanda in its time of
need, as well as contributing to factors leading to the
genocide.
Africa has long grabbed the attention of the world
with its civil wars and massacres, but the Rwandan
genocide is an extreme case.  Within only a few
months, ethnic Hutu extremists planned the genocide
and then murdered approximately 800,000 Tutsi men,
women and children.  Two million Rwandans fleeing
the killings became refugees within Rwanda and in
152 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      1Guy Arnold, Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa
(Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1999), 229.
      2Robert F. Gorman, “Genocide,” Great Debates at the United
Nations: An Encyclopedia of 50 Key Issues, 1945-2000 (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001), 96-99; Alexander Laban
Hinton, ed., Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of
Genocide (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002): 1-6.
      3Mahmood Mamdani is part of the group of scholars that
believes that the colonial experience exacerbated any political,
ethnic, and economic divisions that may have existed before
colonialism.  On the other side of the debate, Philip Gourevitch,
Catharine Newbury , and David Newbury believe that ethnicity
was created as a political construct within Rwanda during
neighboring countries.1  As a brutal genocide, the
events in Rwanda could not escape comparison to the
Holocaust.  It was after the Holocaust that the United
Nations organized a Genocide Convention in 1948 as
part of the international community’s commitment
that the genocidal horrors “never again” be repeated.
The Convention’s immediate goals were to clarify
genocide in legal terms as a criminal act, thereby
making it legally imperative for nations ratifying the
Convention to attempt to halt any genocidal acts.  The
Convention defined genocide as the intention to
destroy wholly or partially a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group.  Genocide became an unacceptable
tool of political or military authority, with the interna-
tional community organized through the United
Nations to act as watchdog for prevention.2  
Much of the scholarly writing on the genocide in
Rwanda has focused on the causes of the genocide,
explained in terms of Rwandan history.  Scholars agree
that ethnic tensions existed between Hutus and
Tutsis, but disagree about the depth of traditional
divisions between these two groups.3  This debate is
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significant considering that ethnic differences, to some
extent, influenced the genocide.  Some scholars have
also discussed economic causes for the genocide.4
Rwanda, already a poor country by international
standards, experienced economic hardship in the
1980s, and these economic difficulties often reinforced
views of Hutu and Tutsi class differences.5  Focusing
on the international impact of economics as opposed
to the national, some scholars have discussed the
influence of Western states’ and organizations’ eco-
nomic aid in Rwanda in the years leading up to the
genocide.  In continuing to provide aid to Rwanda
despite governing Hutus’ racist policies against Tutsis,
the donor countries were unofficially supporting the
government’s human rights abuses.  Rwanda’s in-
creasing debts to donor countries also contributed to
the negative economic situation despite benevolent aid
intentions.6  These economic factors placed the
Rwandan government in a desperate situation, which
prompted some officials to extreme measures.  While
many scholars have explored international political
actors’ responses to the genocide, there has been very
154 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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      8Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis (New York: Columbia
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little work on the responses of non-governmental
organizations like the Red Cross or Christian mission-
ary groups.  This study will comprehensively explore
the role of the international community in the forms of
the UN, the United States, Belgium, France, Western
Christian missionary groups, the Red Cross, Doctors
Without Borders, and neighboring African states.
The history of ethnic relations in Rwanda is often
mistakenly described as one in which primordial
“tribal” conflict eventually resulted in genocide.
Ethnicity, however, is a social construction that is
contextually relative.  Ethnic identity often varies by
situation, and indeed, the identities of Hutu and Tutsi
had fluid ethnic boundaries.  Even after colonialism
hardened the distinction between them, social and
political forces continued to construct and manipulate
Hutu and Tutsi ethnicity for various reasons.7  At one
point in the distant past the Hutus and Tutsis be-
longed to different ethnic groups that migrated to the
region of Rwanda, but after centuries of living together
and intermarrying, they came to share a language,
religion, and other cultural traditions.  Their differ-
ences largely centered on economic status, as the Tutsi
predominately raised cattle for their livelihood and the
Hutu farmed. 8  There were some differences in social
status as well.  A kingdom state developed in Rwanda,
and while official position appointments were con-
trolled by a Tutsi monarchy and chiefs were usually
Tutsi, Hutus could also be chiefs, especially in posi-
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tions of agricultural authority.9  While people’s identity
as belonging to a particular group remained generally
intact over time, Hutu or Tutsi group membership was
not their sole identity.  Kinship, clan (which often was
inclusively Hutu and Tutsi), and class were often more
important markings of social identity during pre-
colonial history.10
The Germans were the first colonialists to arrive in
the Rwanda region in 1897, and they remained until
they lost the territory to the Belgians after World War
I.  When the Germans set about structuring their
administrative rule, they saw the Tutsi-led kingdom as
an instrument of control over the people.  The Ger-
mans’ racist attitudes also influenced how they per-
ceived the kingdom.  The colonialists viewed the fairer
and taller Tutsis as a superior race to the Hutu; this
notion seemed to be validated by the fact that the Tutsi
dominated political leadership.  The Germans theo-
rized that the Tutsi had migrated from the north,
possibly even from west Asia, and then set themselves
up to rule over the inferior (and smaller, darker)
Hutu.11  This imaginary scenario, based in nineteenth-
century Social Darwinian ideology, worked well for the
colonialists, because the colonial administrators could
simply perpetuate the “natural” social structures by
giving Tutsis positions of leadership.  When the
Belgians became the new colonial lords, they contin-
ued using the system that the Germans had set up.
The Belgians reified ethnic distinctions by instituting
identity cards in 1933 naming the bearers as Tutsi or
156 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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Hutu.  However, their system of distributing the cards
confused and artificially strengthened pre-colonial
“ethnic” identities of Rwandans, and in many cases
ignored the self- and ancestral identity of the individu-
als. Colonial rulers favored Tutsis in political and
religious leadership, employment opportunities, and
education (using the identity cards to help them
distinguish between Hutus and Tutsis).12  Through the
years of Rwandan colonial experience, ethnicity
became a self-fulfilling prophecy, and its function as a
fixed identity marker disadvantaged Hutus and bene-
fited Tutsis. 
As independence movements gained momentum in
Africa, Hutu populations in Rwanda sought independ-
ence for themselves.  However, in their revolutionary
struggles to restructure Rwandan society, Hutu
activists targeted the downfall of the Tutsi monarchy
as the key to their freedom rather than the complete
removal of the Belgian colonialists.  The Hutus were
aided in their efforts to grab power because prior to
granting independence in 1962, the Belgian trustee-
ship (working with the UN) replaced many Tutsi
authorities with Hutus.  The Church and European
governments were influenced by post-World War II era
ideologies that connected colonialism to favored, and
thus, suspect leadership groups.  When independence
was granted to Rwanda in 1962, the new government
was mostly Hutu.  Many Hutus internalized the
European colonialists’ view of Rwandan history to the
degree that they came to see themselves as the indige-
nous Rwandan population, suffering for years under
161
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the “foreign” rule of the conquering Tutsis.13  During
the struggle to gain power at independence, 20,000
Tutsis were killed and thousands sought refuge in
neighboring states, which increased perceived divi-
sions between Hutus and Tutsis.14
The first independent leader of Rwanda was
Gregoire Kayibanda, and during his presidency, ethnic
divisions between Hutus and Tutsis established by the
colonialists intensified.  With Hutus now the elite
ruling class, it was they who reaped the benefits of an
ethnically prejudiced system, and the Tutsis who
suffered.15  The second independent presidency, of
Juvenal Habyarimana, starting in 1973, generally
continued anti-Tutsi policies.16  Economic problems,
political problems of declining legitimacy, external
situations of Hutu and Tutsi conflict in Burundi and
Uganda, and an influx of refugees led to increasing
disapproval of Habyarimana’s leadership, especially
among extremist Hutus who disliked his attempts, in
the face of international pressure, to negotiate an end
to the war with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a
largely Tutsi army based in Uganda that demanded the
return of Tutsi refugees and Tutsi representation in
government.  Habyarimana’s political favor also
plummeted among the rural Hutu population that
feared an invasion by RPF Tutsis.  Returning Tutsis
might reclaim land and property taken over in their
absence, a prospect that was especially alarming to the
158 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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coffee farmers who had largely turned to subsistence
farming on former Tutsi lands when the price of coffee
dropped on the world market.17 
With all of these problems faced by the
Habyarimana regime, violence against Tutsis was a
tool of the government to maintain power while “pun-
ishing” a cultural scapegoat.  During the early 1990s,
Tutsis were blacklisted, arrested, and killed in raids
that were encouraged, if not planned, by extremist
Hutu members of the president’s circle.18  Peace
accords, reached during negotiations in Arusha,
Tanzania, in the early 1990s, between the RPF and
Habyarimana’s government declared that current
political leaders would share the future Rwandan
government with RPF leadership and that some
extremist Hutu parties would be excluded.  It was the
potential implementation of the Arusha Accords that
prompted the extremists, fearing loss of power, to use
genocide as a political tool.19  The genocide’s first
victim would not be any Tutsi but the man viewed by
the extremists as most responsible for allowing the
Arusha Accords, the president himself.
On April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Habyarimana
and the Burundian president, Cyprien Ntaryamira,
was shot down, killing both presidents.  Although it is
still not certain who was responsible, this event
seemed to mark the planned start of the genocide.
Within hours roadblocks throughout the capital of
Kigali were set up, Tutsi and opposition Hutu names
were spread, and groups of government soldiers,
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police, and youth group militias searched out the
victims, whom they began to massacre.20 Although the
majority of victims were Tutsis of all social and politi-
cal groups, Hutus opposing Habyarimana’s regime
were also targeted.  The massacres spread out from
the capital into surrounding areas of Rwanda and
drew in masses of low-class Hutus to join the “profes-
sionals” in wielding mostly machetes to murder men,
women, and children.  Orders and encouragement to
join the killers permeated the country through official
political chains of command, starting at the top of the
government leadership.  People at any political level or
social class who were reluctant to kill were cajoled,
enticed by the property of potential victims, or threat-
ened with death themselves.21  Propaganda to join in
the killing was also spread by the extremist Hutu radio
station Radio des Mille Collines (RTLM), which aided
the killers by directing them to locations where victims
were hiding.  The RTLM broadcasts, like the extremist
Hutus in the government, ignored the distinction
between Tutsi civilians and the Tutsi-led RPF guerilla
army invading Rwanda from Uganda.  Many Hutus
were encouraged to feel that their lives were in danger
from their well-known Tutsi neighbors.22  Meanwhile
the RPF was attempting to halt the genocide, but not
by slaughtering Hutu civilians.  The RPF aim was to
reach the capital of Kigali as soon as possible to take
over the government.  In the face of the international
community’s lack of action, it was indeed the RPF’s
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capture of Kigali on July 2 that heralded the end of the
genocide.23 
If the international community had intervened, this
tragedy could have been halted early on, if not pre-
vented altogether.  Instead, the Rwandans were left to
themselves, to kill or be killed.  The international
players that virtually abandoned Rwanda during the
genocide, both states and organizations, had various
reasons for their inadequate response and had various
relationships with pre-genocidal Rwanda.  The UN was
no stranger to Rwanda as it participated in the Arusha
Accords’ negotiations between the RPF and the
Rwandan government.   The deployment of UN peace-
keeping troops to the country in 1993 was part of the
implementation of the Accords’ peace plan.  The
operation, called the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda
(UNAMIR), sent 2,500 troops to the country on a
Chapter Six peacekeeping mandate.  The Chapter Six
mandate restricts operations to light weapons for self-
defense only.24  Thus, mandates can restrict UN troops
on the ground from carrying out actions that they may
deem necessary, as in Rwanda in 1994.
The UN was first made aware of genocidal plans in
Rwanda in January 1994 through a cable sent by the
UNAMIR commander in Rwanda, General Romeo
Dallaire, to the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations in New York.  A government politician
warned Dallaire of government plans to kill the Tutsi
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population as well as Belgian troops, if necessary to
prompt the Belgians to pull out.  Dallaire, justifiably
alarmed, suggested that the UN troops raid the mas-
sive arms stores in the capital city, to which Dallaire’s
informant could direct them.25  The responding cable
from Kofi Annan, then Deputy Director of Peacekeep-
ing Operations, did not seem to take the threat of
potential massacres seriously.  He advised Dallaire to
assume that Habyarimana was not aware of the
genocidal plans and inform him of them.  Dallaire was
also told to inform the ambassadors of Belgium, the
United States and France of the potential violence.
However, Annan did not pass the informant’s message
along to the UN Security Council.26  At this point, three
months before the beginning of the genocide, a UN
department and three western governments were
apparently aware of the potential violence being
planned by extremists in the Rwandan government,
but nothing was done.
There are several reasons why the UN avoided
intervention in Rwanda once the genocide began,
including the recent UN mission failure in Somalia
widely covered by the international media, the disincli-
nation of member states to support action in Rwanda,
and the lack of accurate information about the severity
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of the genocide.27  In addition to the UN leadership’s
wariness of becoming embroiled in another African
disaster, member states of the UN were equally worried
about the financial costs and potential loss of lives.
Moreover, most countries could not rationalize action
in Rwanda with their own national security or national
interests.  With the exception of a few states such as
the Czech Republic and New Zealand, member nations
did not volunteer troops.28  The United States and
Belgium, in fact, even encouraged the complete with-
drawal of UNAMIR.  On April 21, weeks after the
genocide began and as the death toll was mounting,
the UN passed a resolution to reduce the UNAMIR
force by ninety percent.29  The UNAMIR commander
General Dallaire later blamed the member nations for
failing to intervene, saying, “The true culprits are the
sovereign states that influence the Security Council,
that influence other nations into participating or
not.”30  This is an indication of a critical inadequacy of
the UN as an international organization.  That is,
problems are inevitable if member states are faced with
a choice between their own good and the common
good.  Shortcomings within the leadership of the UN
compounded the effects of the unwillingness of mem-
ber states to intervene.  Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh of
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Cameroon was the UN special representative who
supplied UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
with information on the situation in Rwanda.  How-
ever, Booh-Booh had a conflict of interest because he
actually supported Habyarimana’s regime.  Booh-
Booh’s reports to Boutros-Ghali toned down the speed
and scale of the killings and made it seem as if both
sides were murdering each other in similar numbers.
When Boutros-Ghali received reports from Dallaire
that contradicted some of Booh-Booh’s reports, the
Secretary General took his advice from the latter.31  
The United States’ role in the genocide largely
paralleled the UN role.  Because of the death of eigh-
teen U.S. soldiers in the Somali capital the previous
year, Congress resisted joining potentially dangerous
UN operations.  National interest also played a role, as
the U.S. appeared to have nothing at stake in the
Rwandan crisis other than a moral obligation to
prevent genocide.  The U.S. ambassador to the UN at
the time, Madeleine Albright, pressured other states to
join the U.S. in opposing further involvement in
Rwanda.  This coincided with Presidential Decision
Directive 25, which set up guidelines for acceptable
U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations.32
Rwanda did not fit the guidelines.
The UN and the United States both faced a di-
lemma by not intervening in the Rwandan genocide.
According to the Genocide Convention, they both were
morally and legally responsible for acting to prevent
genocide if they knew it was occurring.  The solution
for the UN and the U.S. initially was to deny the events
164 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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      34“Interview with James Woods,” The Triumph of Evil, 1999
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as genocide.  UN and U.S. leaders publicly avoided
using the term and encouraged their staffs to follow
suit.  The U.S. took this word avoidance a step further
by actually forbidding unqualified official use of it.
State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelley
openly admitted that qualifying phrases for the term
“genocide” were necessary because, “there are obliga-
tions which arise in connection with the use of the
term.”33  James Woods, former Deputy Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs in the Department of
Defense, also noted that the U.S., “didn’t want to know
the full dimensions of this thing and, thereby, assume
the responsibility of having to deal with it.”34  
Belgium and France also played significant roles in
the Rwandan genocide.  Belgium’s involvement dated,
of course, from the colonial period.  When the UNAMIR
force was first deployed, the largest contingent of
troops was Belgian.  The extremist Hutu government
was betting that if European peacekeeping troops were
killed, it would influence them to withdraw.  On April
7, the day after Habyarimana’s plane crash, ten
Belgian soldiers, protecting the moderate Hutu Prime
Minister Agathe Uwilingiyamana, were killed by
genocidaires.  The Hutu extremists had planned
correctly.  After the peacekeepers’ deaths, the Belgian
government withdrew their soldiers from UNAMIR.
Similar to the U.S. administration, Belgium, placing
national interest above international responsibility,
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decided that intervening in Rwanda was not worth the
risk for Belgian soldiers. 35
France, another influential actor in the interna-
tional community’s inaction in Rwanda, was unique
among western states because of its close connection
with the Rwandan government before the genocide.
The ties between the two countries were largely per-
sonal and cultural.  The personal relationship was
based on the friendship of French President François
Mitterand and Rwandan President Habyarimana. The
cultural relationship was grounded in France’s desire
to maintain political, linguistic, and cultural ties with
Francophone African countries.  French motives
stemmed partly from the desire to spread French
culture but also from a phobia of losing ground to
Anglo-Saxon influence on the African continent.36  The
two countries also had a military cooperation agree-
ment since 1975.  Beginning in 1990, French troops
joined the government military Forces Armees
Rwandaises (FAR) in fighting the RPF invasions.
France saw the Tutsi-led RPF as promoting
Anglophone interests in Rwanda because the RPF had
emerged from the Anglophone country of Uganda.
While French involvement in actual fighting was not
large-scale, French arms shipments to Rwanda were
huge throughout the early 1990s and even during
1994, when the genocide was obvious.37  Even if
French officials and military leaders had no idea of the
extremity of the Hutus’ genocidal plans, the institu-
166 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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Barayagwiza (the leader of the most extreme Rwandan Hutu
political party) were officially received by President Mitterand,
French Prime Minster Edouard Balladur, and French Foreign
Minister Alain Juppe in Paris on April 27, 1994.
      39Prunier, 277-279.
tionalized racism and policies of anti-Tutsi discrimina-
tion should have been apparent, as the French worked
closely with the Rwandan military, many of whose
generals were extremist Hutus.  Whether or not France
had any advance information of the genocide, the
French government’s reaction to news of the genocide,
once it became common knowledge within the interna-
tional community, was as inadequate as the responses
of the UN and the United States.  The French govern-
ment made no official declarations about or against the
genocide.  Indeed, Rwandan government leaders were
welcomed in a trip to France weeks into the genocide,
further evidence of French avoidance of the genocide
and French support of Habyarimana’s government.38
In contrast, during this period, Belgium refused to
issue visas for Rwandan government ministers.  As the
genocide continued, the French shipment of arms to
Rwanda continued as well, in spite of a UN sanctioned
arms embargo on Rwanda.39  France seemingly ignored
not only the evidence of genocide in Rwanda, but they
also ignored the international community’s admittedly
weak efforts in censuring the Rwandan government. 
France finally took the initiative and responded to
the genocide, but even that response was inappropri-
ate.  In choosing to respond to the genocide, French
Prime Minister Balladur spoke to the UN Security
Council of a “moral duty” to protect the threatened
171
et al.: Historical Perspectives Vol. 10 2005
Published by Scholar Commons, 2005
Their Genocide and Ours 165
      35Peterson, 292.
      36Gourevitch, 90.
      37Grourevitch, 89; Alain Destexhe, “The Third Genocide,”
Foreign Policy (Winter 94-95): 3-18; Barnett, Eyewitness to a
Genocide, 56.
decided that intervening in Rwanda was not worth the
risk for Belgian soldiers. 35
France, another influential actor in the interna-
tional community’s inaction in Rwanda, was unique
among western states because of its close connection
with the Rwandan government before the genocide.
The ties between the two countries were largely per-
sonal and cultural.  The personal relationship was
based on the friendship of French President François
Mitterand and Rwandan President Habyarimana. The
cultural relationship was grounded in France’s desire
to maintain political, linguistic, and cultural ties with
Francophone African countries.  French motives
stemmed partly from the desire to spread French
culture but also from a phobia of losing ground to
Anglo-Saxon influence on the African continent.36  The
two countries also had a military cooperation agree-
ment since 1975.  Beginning in 1990, French troops
joined the government military Forces Armees
Rwandaises (FAR) in fighting the RPF invasions.
France saw the Tutsi-led RPF as promoting
Anglophone interests in Rwanda because the RPF had
emerged from the Anglophone country of Uganda.
While French involvement in actual fighting was not
large-scale, French arms shipments to Rwanda were
huge throughout the early 1990s and even during
1994, when the genocide was obvious.37  Even if
French officials and military leaders had no idea of the
extremity of the Hutus’ genocidal plans, the institu-
166 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      38Rwandan Foreign Minister Bicamumpaka and Jean-Bosco
Barayagwiza (the leader of the most extreme Rwandan Hutu
political party) were officially received by President Mitterand,
French Prime Minster Edouard Balladur, and French Foreign
Minister Alain Juppe in Paris on April 27, 1994.
      39Prunier, 277-279.
tionalized racism and policies of anti-Tutsi discrimina-
tion should have been apparent, as the French worked
closely with the Rwandan military, many of whose
generals were extremist Hutus.  Whether or not France
had any advance information of the genocide, the
French government’s reaction to news of the genocide,
once it became common knowledge within the interna-
tional community, was as inadequate as the responses
of the UN and the United States.  The French govern-
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populations and to end the genocide.40  This rhetoric
contradicts the previous French stance that the killing
was not genocide but was just massive casualties on
both sides of a civil war between the RPF and the
government.  The reversal of French policy towards
Rwanda prompted international leaders to question
French motives in mounting an armed operation in
Rwanda.  South African President Nelson Mandela and
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and of course the RPF,
were all concerned that the proposed French military
action was really a cover to aid the FAR.41  However,
the UN approved of the French mission, called Opera-
tion Turquoise, which also consisted of Senegalese
troops to keep up appearances of multilateral action.42
Operation Turquoise received a UN Chapter Seven
mandate, which authorized troops on the ground to
use aggressive military action in self-defense and to
protect civilians.  Operation Turquoise officially started
on June 22, and succeeded in setting up a “safe zone”
in the country.  The beneficiaries of the “safe zone,”
however, were not those who had been most victim-
ized.  The French mission probably saved more ex-
tremist Hutus fleeing from the advancing RPF than
Tutsis fleeing the genocidaires.  To be sure, the Opera-
tion saved the lives of some Tutsis and innocent
Hutus, but it did nothing to aid the deteriorating
political situation.  In fact, by the time the Operation
began, not only was the genocide winding down (as
most of the Tutsis to be killed had already been
168 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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      44Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in
Rwanda (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, Inc.,
1998), 42.
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      46Ibid., 43-46; DesForges (website).
murdered), but the RPF was nearing victory in gaining
control of the capital. 43  The French response was
essentially too little, too late.
In looking at the involvement of the international
community in Rwanda it is also important to examine
the role of development aid, including aid from foreign
states and international financial institutions like the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).  In the 1970s Rwanda was seen as a model
developing country, and international aid poured in
from Western states, especially Switzerland and
Belgium.44  Even after the economic crisis began,
Rwanda signed an agreement with the World Bank for
a ninety million-dollar structural adjustment program
(SAP) in 1991.45  Rwanda’s political stability made it an
ideal recipient country.  Although it was clearly a
dictatorship, the government was in undisputed
control of the country, there was an effective adminis-
tration, and there was a concern for investment in
rural areas.  This dictatorship had the problems that
aid and adjustment programs were meant to address
– poverty, high population growth, and environmental
pressures.  Other problems, such as human rights
abuses and racism, were not easily solved with donor
money and adjustment programs, so they were ig-
nored.  The aid agencies failed to investigate the
political history of Rwanda in their project reports.46
These were grave mistakes.  Rwanda was given the
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impression that what they were doing internally would
be ignored externally.
Following the end of the Cold War, however, the
West added a new condition for aid, democratization,
which, ironically, adversely affected the Rwandan
situation.  President Habyarimana was forced to accept
democratization as a goal of structural adjustment, to
avoid economic disaster.  However, the extremist
leaders of the government were fearful of potential
power loss, and they became more extreme and anti-
Tutsi in their attempts to retain authority.47  The
effects of aid programs on pre-genocide Rwanda were
twofold.  First, as model recipients for aid and develop-
ment, Rwandan economics and not Rwandan politics
were the focus.  Rwanda’s pattern of prejudice and
human rights abuses was initially ignored.  Second,
the conditions of receiving aid and adjustment pro-
grams were forced moves towards democratization,
which merely pushed Hutu officials towards extremism
as they feared losing power.  While foreign aid and
structural adjustment programs cannot be blamed for
the genocide, they were undoubtedly in part responsi-
ble for setting the political and economic scene in
Rwanda that eventually led to genocide.  
Another large group who had the opportunity to
work for positive change in Rwanda, but did not, were
the Christian Churches and their various missionary
orders.  Christian missionaries not only made up a
significant portion of the international community
living in Rwanda, but they had also been intimately
involved in the development of ethnic politics in
Rwanda since the colonial period.  The White Fathers
170 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      48Timothy Longman, “Christian Churches and Genocide in
Rwanda,” The Holocaust Revealed 1997
<http://www.logon.org/-domain/holocaust.revealed.org/
Africa/Rwanda/Christian_Church_Genocide.htm> (15
November, 2003);  Rakiya Omaar and Alex de Waal, “The
Ungodly Missionary Legacy,” from U.S. Complicity by Silence:
Genocide in Rwanda  <http://mediafilter.org/ CAQ/
CAQ52Rw2t.html> (4 November, 2003).
order of the Catholic Church established their mis-
sionary movement in Rwanda in the 1880s.  This
group of missionaries attempted initially to convert the
traditional leaders of Rwandan society, in the hopes
that once the leaders converted the rest of the popula-
tion would follow.  By the 1930s the majority of
Rwandans had converted to Christianity, and the
devotion lasted.  In post-colonial times, Rwanda was
one of the most “Christian” states in Africa.  The
missionary attention to leadership extended to the
colonial powers as well as to the African elite.  Reli-
gious leaders worked closely with the colonial adminis-
trations and contributed to the legitimacy of colonial
authority.  Church officials and priests preached
obedience to the state as a core Christian value.
Protestant missionaries came to Rwanda after the
Catholics, and while Protestant churches often ap-
pealed to the more marginalized populations, Protes-
tants followed the Catholic example of preaching
obedience to the state.48
The relationship between the Church (Catholic and
to a lesser extent Protestant) and the state extended
further than respect for state authority.  The churches
played a key role in establishing visions of ethnic
superiority, as they were the original sponsors of the
Hamitic hypothesis, which stated that the superior
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foreigner Tutsis conquered the native inferior Hutus.49
The Catholic Church was also instrumental in con-
structing ethnic relations in the post-colonial state of
Rwanda.  Priests played a crucial role in changing
Belgian colonial support from Tutsis to Hutus as
independence neared.  In the 1950s, the typical
Belgian missionary priest coming to Rwanda was a
Flemish “progressive” motivated by theories of social
justice.  These priests regarded minority rule as out-
dated, and they identified with the oppressed Hutu
majority.  The Church attitude influenced the Belgian
colonial authorities.  Following the Hutu struggle to
gain power, when Belgium was granting independence
to Rwanda, colonial and Church leadership supported
the switch from Tutsi to Hutu leaders.50  After inde-
pendence, the ties between Church and state were
knotted even tighter.  Many of the early Hutu leaders
had Church patrons who not only supervised their
advanced education but also helped them gain posi-
tions within the government.  Church leaders were
also members of the government.  The Archbishop of
Rwanda was a member of the Central Committee of
Habyarimana’s party, the only party until the 1990s.51
Not all religious officials participated in discriminatory
practices against the Tutsis before the genocide, but
neither did the Church stand against the institutional-
ized racism – cooperation with the state was too deeply
ingrained at this point. 
The Church also played a role during the genocide.
Due to the Church’s significant status in Rwandan
172 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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“The Rwanda Genocide in 1994 and Danish Baptist Involvement
in the Country,” trans. Allan Poulsen (Report for the Baptist
Union, 1998), 1-7.
society and the nonexistence of other social organiza-
tions, churches and priests often had very close
relationships with community members, especially in
rural areas.  Populations went to their churches for
education, economic assistance, healthcare, charity
and employment.  These resources furthered the
Church’s status among the people and provided an
image of refuge in tumultuous times.  The people
remembered this image during the genocide.  Tutsis
often fled to their local churches for safety.  The
genocidaires often told Tutsis to gather in churches,
ostensibly for their protection, but in reality to gather
them together to make the killing easier. The range of
nuns’ and priests’ actions during the genocide varies
widely.  Some religious leaders attempted to protect
their Tutsi congregations seeking refuge, some did
nothing, and some were actively involved in helping
the killers or even carrying out killing themselves.52
The Church can be held accountable for its complicity
with the extremist Hutus in government and its failure
to take a stand against ethnic discrimination and
violence in Rwanda.53
There are other international organizations that
should be examined, not because they were directly
complicit with the violence in Rwanda, but because of
their lack of appropriate response to the genocide.
Two groups were the International Committee of the
Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, also
known as Doctors without Borders), the only two
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large-scale humanitarian organizations that continued
to operate in Rwanda during the genocide.  The Red
Cross and MSF are independent non-governmental
groups that go to areas facing humanitarian crises to
provide medical relief as well as to address underlying
health-related issues, such as providing clean drinking
water and better sanitation facilities. The MSF is often
the first NGO to arrive at a crisis, but their services are
only meant to be temporary, whereas the Red Cross
carries out long-term projects in many countries after
the immediate crisis has ended but while humanitar-
ian relief is still needed.54  
MSF and Red Cross workers provided medical care
to survivors of genocidaire attacks in Rwanda.  Treat-
ing near-fatal machete wounds was a common purpose
of medical teams.  Wounded and hiding Tutsis also
sought refuge in the MSF and Red Cross compounds,
and both organizations cared for orphans of the
genocide.  The MSF and Red Cross were doing their
jobs to the best of their abilities, considering the
number of volunteers and the amount of available
supplies.55  It is in the area of politics that MSF and
Red Cross were constrained.  Publicly choosing sides
in a conflict would limit their effectiveness in future
endeavors.  They have to stay neutral to continue
working in areas of conflict.  In addition, aid from the
174 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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developed world is often viewed as a cover for political
manipulations in the Third World, and, therefore, MSF
and the Red Cross have to scrupulously and publicly
avoid politics to assure the countries that the aid and
relief comes with no strings attached to Western
governments.  These factors limit the ability and
willingness of such organizations to take a stand on
issues about which they have unique access to infor-
mation.  Only after crises, such as the genocide, can
MSF and Red Cross workers speak out politically
about what they witnessed.56
The final group of international actors to examine
regarding the 1994 genocide are three of the states
surrounding Rwanda: Burundi, Uganda, and Congo.
Burundi had the most influence on Rwanda among the
neighbor states in the years from independence until
the genocide, partly due to shared histories and partly
due to the ease of populations crossing borders.
Rwanda and Burundi had been governed by the
colonial powers jointly as one territory.  The colonial
powers favored Tutsi minorities in both territories, and
policies of ethnic discrimination were put in place.
Rwanda and Burundi attained independence in 1962,
but unlike the case in Rwanda, Tutsis remained in
control of political and military power in Burundi.
Burundian minority Tutsi officials discriminated
against majority Hutus.  The discrimination by both
governments evolved into ethnic violence.57  
The violence in each country influenced ethnic
violence in the other.  Ethnic violence towards Hutus
in Burundi was the justification Rwandan officials
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used in persecuting Rwandan Tutsis, and violence
against Tutsis in Rwanda was justification for Burun-
dian officials’ persecution of Burundian Hutus.  The
movement of refugees fleeing from such persecution
across borders also influenced inter-ethnic relations.
In 1972, Tutsis killed between 100,000 and 200,000
Hutus in Burundi after Hutus attempted to organize
an uprising.  This event, referred to by scholars as the
first genocide after the Holocaust, sent Hutus fleeing
across borders to Rwanda, and also played a pivotal
role in aiding future President Habyarimana’s regime
of anti-Tutsi policies.  In 1993, Burundi’s first popu-
larly elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, was
assassinated by the Tutsi-controlled military.  The
assassination prompted Burundian Hutus to murder
about 20,000 Tutsis, which the army responded to by
killing about 300,000 Hutus. 58   These events led to
Hutu refugees fleeing into Rwanda, many of whom
later participated in the 1994 genocide.59
The killings of Hutus in Burundi in 1972 and 1993
were used as examples by the Habyarimana regime of
the threat that Tutsis posed to Hutus and as justifica-
tion for ethnic violence within Rwanda.  In addition, as
journalist Philip Gourevitch stated, “Lack of interna-
tional response to the 1993 massacres in Burundi
permitted Rwandan extremists to expect that they too
could slaughter people in large numbers without
consequences.”60  The ethnic violence used as political
tools by Rwanda and Burundi were inextricably linked
176 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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– when the two states had problems with the policies
of their neighbor, they never engaged in government
dialogue, but simply channeled their anger with their
neighbor to their own populations of their neighbor’s
politically powerful ethnic group.
Uganda was also involved in Rwandan affairs
because many Tutsis fleeing from Hutu extremist
violence throughout the decades after independence
sought refuge in Uganda.  There they joined with
Ugandans to create the post-colonial state.  However,
under Ugandan President Milton Obote’s two periods
of rule, Rwandan refugees were viewed with hostility,
prompting many to join with Ugandan Yoweri
Museveni’s revolutionary guerilla forces to overthrow
Obote.  One Rwandan involved in this guerilla move-
ment was Paul Kagame, future leader of the RPF.  After
Museveni’s victorious ascent to power in Uganda, he
changed rules of citizenship so that anyone who had
lived within the country for ten years was a citizen,
partly to acknowledge Rwandan refugees’ aid to his
revolution.  However, facing criticism from native
Ugandans, and needing to maintain his legitimacy,
Museveni revoked the changes so that citizenship was
once again dependent on ancestry.  Refugee Rwandan
Tutsis, unable to return to Rwanda, were faced with
losing their welcome in Uganda.61  These events played
a significant role in the establishment of the RPF as a
group fighting for the right of Tutsis to return to
Rwanda.  Thus, events in Uganda had an influence on
pre-genocide Rwanda, although direct relations at the
state level had not been a factor.  
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Congo (Zaire at the time of the genocide) was also
involved in pre-genocidal Rwanda, but unlike Burundi
and Uganda, Congo maintained positive relations
because of the friendship between President Mobutu
Sese Seko and President Habyarimana.  Mobutu aided
the Rwandan government’s struggle against the RPF by
assisting the shipments of arms to the Rwandan army
during the genocide.  Mobutu also provided bases for
the French Operation Turquoise within Congo, as a
cultivator and recipient of French government support
for his own country.62  While Mobutu did nothing to
halt the genocidal culture developing among extremist
Rwandan Hutus, and, in fact, probably encouraged it
through his support of Habyarimana’s regime, Congo’s
most direct involvement in the affairs of Rwanda
occurred towards the end of the genocide and after it.
Partially through the French Operation Turquoise safe-
zone, Hutu extremists fled the RPF into the protective
custody of refugee camps located in Congo.  These
refugee camps, run by numerous international hu-
manitarian organizations, provided a base for the
extremist Hutus in exile to reorganize their violent
anti-Tutsi efforts and to regain support among the
camps’ populations.  The extremist Hutus directed
armed battles against the new RPF-controlled govern-
ment of Rwanda in an attempt to regain power.  The
extremists also, tragically, encouraged ethnic violence
against Tutsis living in Congo, even if they were native
Congolese.63
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Were there warning signs of the violence or poten-
tial actions that the international community could
have taken?  The major warning sign of impending
genocide was supplied by the UNAMIR commander
Dallaire’s informant, but other evidence for a potential
genocide was also ignored by the international com-
munity. In 1993, a mission undertaken by Interna-
tional Federation of Human Rights and Africa Watch
found evidence of human rights abuses carried out by
Habyarimana’s regime in the mass graves of Tutsis
killed in 1991 and 1992.  Their report was corrobo-
rated by a UN human rights official, and the report
was sent to Western governments.  The report was
largely ignored or viewed as an exaggeration.64  How-
ever, some foreign officials heeded the signs of impend-
ing violence.  The Foreign Minister of Belgium, Willy
Klaes, warned the UN Secretary General in March
1994 that the current situation in Rwanda, “could
result in an irrepressible explosion of violence.”65
Another ignored warning sign was the hate propa-
ganda pouring out of the Rwandan radio station RTLM
and the newspaper Kangura beginning in the early
1990s.  The messages of ethnic hate encouraged
violence against Tutsis and portrayed all Tutsis as
direct threats to Hutu safety.66  
Some scholars note that the international commu-
nity could have undertaken various military actions to
halt the genocide once it began.  For example, bombing
the RTLM radio headquarters would have presented
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little risk to the military volunteers heading the opera-
tion, and by cutting out the main voice that encour-
aged and aided killers, lives might have been spared.67
More direct action to halt the genocide would have
involved military presence on the ground in Rwanda,
but this could have occurred in various degrees of
intensity.  The UN could have changed the UNAMIR
mandate from Chapter Six to Chapter Seven, authoriz-
ing more aggressive force.  The UNAMIR forces could
have been enlarged.  The Belgian and French para-
troopers who were sent in only long enough to evacu-
ate their citizens, could have remained to protect their
citizens and provide an armed presence in Rwanda.68
The UN or the U.S. could have led an intervention force
designed to end the killings.  Political scientist Alan
Kuperman theorized that a minimal intervention
consisting of solely air force from outside Rwanda that
either evacuated Tutsis to neighboring countries or
bombed Rwandan government troops, could have
saved up to 75,000 Tutsis from execution.69  
Historical events are, to be sure, contingent on a
variety of factors, so it is impossible to know the
outcome of any of these scenarios.  Yet, it is clear that
contemporaries did make predictions based on their
assumptions about outcomes.  The organizers of the
genocide were betting on international withdrawal
from Rwanda once the genocide exploded.  Interna-
tional presence, even without international military
action, might have been enough to dramatically reduce
the killings by genocidal killers armed only with
180 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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machetes.  It was only after the international journal-
ists, diplomats, clergy, aid agencies, and businessmen
left Rwanda that the killing became massive and
widespread.70  The international community’s obvious
decision to leave the Rwandans to themselves was a
clear signal to the extremists in power that they could
continue with the genocide as planned without anyone
trying to stop them.  Tragically, the same signal that
told the genocide’s organizers they could continue with
their plans also signaled to the populations in Rwanda
that participating in the killing would not incur pun-
ishment.  Realizing the relative ease with which the
international community could have intervened leads
to questions of why it did not.  To prevent genocide
from occurring again, which in all probability it will
somewhere, these questions need to be asked and the
answers explored. 
Rwanda had a very troubled history that led to a
culture capable of committing genocide.  Many factors
played a role in not only setting Rwanda on the path to
ethnic violence as a state policy, but also in causing
the genocide.  Although the genocide had obvious
ethnic expressions, it was a form of political violence
and did not result from ancient ethnic differences.
Because the genocide was a political outcome, it could
have been dealt with in the international community
through political avenues.  It should not be denied that
Rwandans were responsible for committing the geno-
cide, but neither should it be ignored that the interna-
tional community and historical conditions were
influential in setting the stage for assisting the extrem-
ist Rwandans to attain power in Rwanda and to
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pursue genocide in a state which was  in economic and
political crisis.  In addition, the international commu-
nity, in its various forms, is limited by the necessity of
respecting state sovereignty.  States’ national interests
are usually prioritized above those of individual
citizens.  Recognizing these aspects of the interna-
tional system and acknowledging the historical role of
international governmental and non-governmental
actors in events leading to genocide will help explain
the failures in Rwanda.  Furthermore, it may  help to
avert future genocide under different circumstances.
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